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Constitutional law has long assumed that mothers andfathers are fundamentally different.
Maternity, that law posits, is certain, obvious, and monolithic - consolidated in an easily
identifiable person who is at once a biological, social, and legal parent. Paternity, in
contrast, is construed as uncertain, nonobvious, relative, and often unclear. Over time,
constitutional aw has grown more insistent about the obviousness of motherhood. It also
has cemented its idea of maternity into a fundamental principle of sex equality law that
applies in settings - like transgender ights - that have nothing to do with certain
mothers and uncertain fathers.
Constitutional aw's logic of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty invites criticism
for many reasons. It channels the notion that pregnant women are presumptive mothers.
It perpetuates questionable stereotypes about mothers and fathers. It determines who can
be a parent and how he, she, or they ought to parent. It is in serious tension with
constitutional law's disestablishment idea. For all of these reasons, constitutional
maternity warrants reform, and one promising pathway of reform is family law's less
regressive and more multidimensional vision of motherhood.
Never as uncomplicated as the Supreme Court has assumed, maternity has become
considerably more complex in light of the new forms of kinship enabled by alternative
reproduction and its legal accommodation. During the exact time that the Supreme Court
has insisted that women and men are inherently different because of maternal certainty
and paternal uncertainty, state family law has painted a more complicated picture.
Maternity, that picture suggests, often is uncertain and nonobvious. It often is relative.
Like paternity, it often is a matter of opinion - judicial opinion. Most remarkably, state
family law has shown that maternity is all of these things by relying on the same body of
federal constitutional doctrine that insists that mothers and fathers are fundamentally
different - and fundamentally different because mothers, unlike fathers, are basic,
singular, and monolithic.
This Article argues that progressive advances surrounding the new maternity ought to
unsettle regressive tendencies surrounding constitutional maternity. These regressive
tendencies touch and burden many: from unmarried fathers and transgender individuals
to nonbiological and biological mothers. This Article imagines what the new maternity
emerging from family law would mean for constitutional aw. The idea that the new
maternity could unsettle constitutional maternity is not necessarily radical - that project
has been unfolding in state courts for years. The consolidation of the new maternity in
constitutional aw, however, could have meaningful consequences both within and beyond
the law of parenthood, destabilizing everything from parentage regimes that rest on the
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notion of essential biological difference to the argument that transgender discrimination
is not illegal because "sex" is not "a stereotype."
[P]ater semper incertus est. [M]ater certissima est. ([T]he father is
always uncertain. [The] mother is very certain.)
- Roman law of parentage
Maternity is a matter offact. Paternity is a matter of opinion.
- American proverb2
[M]aternity is never uncertain.
- Gossett v. Ullendorff
We really have no definition of "mother" in our lawbooks ....
"Mother" was believed to have been so basic that no definition was
deemed necessary.
-Judge Marianne 0. Battani4
INTRODUCTION
T he Supreme Court of Utah upholds the termination of a biologicalfather's parental rights5 on the ground that paternity is "inherently
different"'6 from maternity given that maternity, unlike paternity, is "ob-
jectively apparent" through birth.' The Supreme Court of the United
States credits one form of sex discrimination in federal citizenship law
(the sex-specific proof-of-parentage requirement)," even as it jettisons
another (the sex-specific duration-of-residence requirement),9 on the
ground that maternity, unlike paternity, is "establishe[d]" by the act of
1 NARA B. MILANICH, PATERNITY: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR THE FATHER 12 (2019).
2 E.g., Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive
Technologies, g6 YALE L.J. 187, ig8 n.42 (Ig86).
3 154 So. 177, 181 (Fla. 1934) (declaring that "a wife is not permitted to deny the parentage of
children born during wedlock" because "maternity is never uncertain").
4 Surrogate Has Baby Conceived in Laboratory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1986, at A26 (quoting a
Michigan judge's order upholding a surrogacy agreement in 1986).
5 Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption ofJ.S.), 358 P 3 d 1oog, 1011-13 (Utah 2014) (rejecting an unwed
biological father's federal and state due process and equal protection challenges to a lower court's
decision to approve the adoption of the father's child by a married couple over the father's veto).
6 Id. at 1031; see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 436 (gg8) (stating that "[t]he blood
relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious," whereas the relationship to the father
"may often be undisclosed and unrecorded in any contemporary public record").
7 Adoption ofJ.S., 358 P 3 d at 1030; see id. at 1030-31.
8 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1694 (2Q17) (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.
53, 62 (2001)).
9 See id. at 1686 (striking down as unconstitutional sex discrimination under the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause a provision of federal law imposing
more burdensome requirements on unwed citizen fathers than on unwed citizen mothers in order
to transmit U.S. citizenship to a child born overseas).
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"giving birth."10 And a funeral home supports its argument that
transgender discrimination is not actionable sex discrimination under
federal law - in a case that is now before the Supreme Court - by
citing to the section of a Court decision saying that an "undeniable dif-
ference" distinguishes mothers and fathers upon the birth of their chil-
dren: the fact that "the mother's knowledge of the child and the fact of
parenthood have been established in a way not guaranteed in the case
of the . . . father."" A common thread unites these three recent exam-
ples drawn from different areas of the law: the assumption that paternity
is complicated, contingent, and unknowable whereas maternity is obvi-
ous, "basic,"1 2 and epistemologically simple.
Under the Napoleonic Code, "maternity and paternity were ontolog-
ically different."1 3 The civil law tended to view maternity as provable
through birth, a "material fact, visible, subject to the domination of an-
yone's senses."14 Paternity, by contrast, was a "mystery of nature," "an
act for which it [was] impossible to give clear proof of any kind."15
The same holds true today in American constitutional law. For dec-
ades, that law has assumed that mothers and fathers are fundamentally
different because maternity is certain, obvious, monolithic, and rarely in
doubt, whereas paternity is uncertain, nonobvious, relative, and often
unclear.16 Over time, the logic of constitutional law has grown more
insistent about the obviousness of motherhood. It has also grown more
expansive, reverberating in settings - like transgender rights - that
have nothing to do with certain mothers and uncertain fathers." The
constitutional law of sex and gender discrimination, it seems, begins with
the idea that "maternity is a matter of fact," whereas "paternity is a
matter of opinion.""
Constitutional law's assumptions about obvious maternity and com-
plicated paternity invite criticism. Those assumptions blur into stereo-
typical views of women and men. They are deployed to withhold rights
from nontraditional parents. The law relies on them in other contexts
to validate discrimination on the basis of sex, gender identity, and sexual
10 Id. at 1694.
11 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68; see Brief for the Petitioner at 14, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-io7 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2019) (citing the same paragraph of Nguyen, 533 U.S. at
68, for the proposition that "'[p]hysical differences between men and women' relating to reproduc-
tion - the very factors that determine sex - are not 'gender-based stereotype[s]"' (alterations in
original)); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, No. 18-1o7 (U.S.
Nov. 6, 2018) (same).
12 Surrogate Has Baby Conceived in Laboratory, supra note 4, at A26.
13 MILANICH, supra note i, at 14.
14 NARA B. MILANICH, CHILDREN OF FATE: CHILDHOOD, CLASS, AND THE STATE IN
CHILE, 1850-1930, at 54 (2009).
15 Id.
16 See infra section I.A, pp. 2234-44.
17 See infra section I.B. 3 , pp. 2250-53.
18 Stumpf, supra note 2, at IgS n.42.
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orientation. For these and other reasons, this Article argues that consti-
tutional maternity is in need of reform, and that one promising pathway
of reform is the vision of maternity unfolding today on the ground under
state family law. Family law's maternity, or what this Article calls "the
new maternity," looks very different from constitutional maternity and
its paradigmatic mother: a singular and obvious woman in whom bio-
logical, social, and legal motherhood converge. In addition, family law's
new maternity offers a richer and more normatively satisfying account
of motherhood than the one that dominates constitutional law, which
remains grounded in regressive understandings of sex, gender,
parenthood, and the family.
Contrary to what the Supreme Court and countless other courts have
said about the obviousness of maternity relative to the nonobviousness
of paternity, "proof of motherhood" is not necessarily "inherent in birth
itself."19 The "paternity is uncertain but maternity is obvious" shibbo-
leth first surfaced in Supreme Court jurisprudence20 in the 1960s and
1970s through a series of decisions involving state law's treatment of
nonmarital children and unwed fathers.2 1 These decisions rationalized
19 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). Some commentators have briefly observed (mainly in
footnotes) that the Court's assertions and assumptions about obvious motherhood are in tension
with maternity in an era of alternative reproduction. See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, From Citizen-
ship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405, 44o n.224
(2013) ('Cases involving in vitro fertilization or surrogacy have proved challenging to the govern-
ment given the [Supreme] Court's emphasis on the event of birth [in the citizenship transmission
cases]."); Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 347, 358 n.58 (2012) ('Contemporary practices such as egg donation and gestational
surrogacy challenge the assumption that maternity is always obvious."); David B. Cruz, Disestab-
lishing Sex and Gender, go CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1002 n.24 (2002) (observing that the Supreme
Court's belief that maternity "inheres" in birth "fails to address the situation of women serving as
gestational surrogates carrying to term a conceptus formed from another woman's egg and a man's
sperm"); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 431
(2007) ('The unwed father cases took the identity of the mother as given, but science has since split
biological motherhood into two parts: begetting by the 'genetic mother' and bearing by the 'gesta-
tional mother."); Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimina-
tion in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222, 238, 245 n.io7 (2003) (observing that
"innovations in in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, and other new techniques may mean that the egg
donor is not present at birth," id. at 245 n.io7, contrary to the Nguyen Court's confidence that
motherhood is inherent in birth, id. at 238); Ashley Moore, Note, The Child Citizenship Act: Too
Little, Too Late for Tuan Nguyen, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 279, 282 (2003) ('The process of
IVF has raised issues as to who the parent is in regard to the child's birth."); Stumpf, supra note 2,
at 1g n.42 (observing even in 1986 that "[d]espite the adage that 'maternity is a matter of fact, and
paternity is a matter of opinion,' the dichotomy is less valid and more transparent oday than ever").
20 This idea, of course, has a lineage that far predates these cases - indeed, far predates the
Supreme Court itself. See MILANICH, supra note I, at 3 ('Whereas a mother's identity can be
known by the fact of birth, the father has always been maddeningly uncertain. The quest o identify
him animated medical experts at least since Hippocrates and preoccupied jurists of Roman, Islamic,
and Jewish law.").
21 See infra pp. 2234-39.
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states' different treatment of mothers and fathers because of what preg-
nancy ostensibly guaranteed: the "inherent" certainty of maternity rela-
tive to paternity.22 According to this logic, maternity was clear through
pregnancy and birth as well as a unified biological, social, and legal
status. The woman who gave birth was the clear genetic mother.2 3 She
also was presumed to naturally perform the social functions of mother-
hood,2 4 and was designated by law as an automatic legal parent.25
Throughout the next three decades, this logic gained steadily in jus-
tificatory power, shaping the Supreme Court's jurisprudence dealing
with the rights of unwed fathers.2 6 In time, constitutional law's idea of
maternity as inherent in pregnancy and birth and as a unified biological,
social, and legal status was cemented into a fundamental principle of
sex equality law that applied both within and well outside the context
of unwed fathers.2 7
During much of this period, however, the practice of alternative re-
production did render maternity more complicated than Supreme Court
doctrine had suggested. Starting in the 1980s, alternative reproductive
technologies (ART), like artificial insemination and surrogacy, started to
unsettle constitutional law's vision of maternity as a simple biological,
social, and legal category, and courts around the country were forced to
grapple with the question of maternity as a matter of state family law.
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari
in a Michigan surrogacy case.28 In 1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court
decided In re Baby M,29 a landmark surrogacy decision that required
the court to determine whether a surrogate was a legal mother.3 0  Five
22 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64 (stating that "proof of motherhood ... is inherent in birth itself");
Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.), 358 P 3 d 1oog, 1031 (Utah 2014) (discussing the "inherent[]"
differences between mothers and fathers with respect o proof of parenthood); see also infra section
I.A, pp. 2234-44.
23 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that be-
cause "[t]he mother carries and bears the child ... her parental relationship is clear"); In re Estate
of Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d 8o6, 812 (Sur. Ct. 1969) ('That the child is the child of a particular woman
is rarely difficult to prove.").
24 See Estate of Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 812 ('In most cases the child remains with the mother
and for a time is necessarily reared by her.").
25 See Gossett v. Ullendorff, 154 So. 177, 181 (Fla. 1934).
26 See infra section I.A, pp. 2234-44.
27 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note ii, at 14 (arguing that transgender discrimination
is not impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII because of the differences between mother-
hood and fatherhood discussed in Nguyen (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68)).
28 See Doe v. Kelley, 459 U.S. 1183, 1183 (1983), denying cert. to 307 N.W.2d 4 3 8 (Mich. Ct. App.
'98'); Doe, 307 N.W.2d at 441 (upholding as constitutional a Michigan statute that prohibited the
making of a surrogacy contract). For a history of surrogacy, see Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-legal
Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035,
1107-18 (2002).
29 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
3o Id. at 1234.
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years later, the California Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Calvert, 3 1
another landmark decision requiring a court to settle dueling claims to
maternity under state parentage law.32 These and other cases showed
that, contrary to the Supreme Court's suggestion otherwise, pregnancy
and birth were not inherent proof of motherhood. They also showed
that legal maternity might exist not in one biological mother, but in two,
and that sometimes, legal maternity did not require biology at all.
Today, family law offers no shortage of contested maternity cases,3 3
especially at a time when more people are turning to alternative repro-
duction to have children3 4 (and pressing state courts to resolve the par-
entage disputes that often ensue3 5 ), and when the technology of procre-
ation permits the division of reproductive labor between or among
multiple players.36 Nevertheless, constitutional law remains wedded to
"the once monolithic and still pervasive legal principle that the mother
of the child is the woman who bears the child."3  That assumption
might have made some sense during a time when procreation was ex-
clusively sexual. It makes decreasing sense, however, in the modern
reproductive era, which is currently in the midst of a "second reproduc-
tive revolution""3 that has already witnessed the birth of children with
two "genetic mothers" as a result of mitochondrial transfer, 3 9 and which
31 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
32 Id. at 778.
33 See infra section IILA, pp. 2 266-82.
34 See Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2286-87, 2286 n.140,
2287 nn.141-42 (2017) (citing statistics indicating that ART use has "soared in the ... twenty-first
century," id. at 2286).
3s See infra section IILA, pp. 2 266-82.
36 See Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1486-87 (2018)
(observing that in some "far from uncommon" scenarios, a child created through ART could "owe
its existence to the coordinated efforts of five individuals," id. at 1487).
37 John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis
for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 370 (Igg1); see also Kevin Maillard, Other Mothers, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2629, 2632 (2017) ('Despite significant transformations in family structure and
diversity, the contemporary legal conception of parenthood, and particularly maternity, reflects the
core principles of the 197os.").
38 I. Glenn Cohen, Chair Lecture, The Second Reproductive Revolution: From Gene Editing, to
Uterus Transplants, to Embryos Derived from Our Skin - How Technology Is Changing Reproduc-
tion, PETRIE-FLOM CTR. FOR HEALTH L. POL'Y, BIOTECHNOLOGY & BIOETHICS AT HARV.
L. SCH. (Apr. 29, 2019, 5:I5 PM), https://petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/events/details/i-glenn-cohen-
chair-lecture [https://perma.cc/9F7A-WgNY].
39 See, e.g., Sara Reardon, Genetic Details of Controversial "Three-Parent Baby" Revealed, NATURE
(Apr. 3, 2Q17), https://www.nature.com/news/genetic-details-of-controversial-three-parent-baby-
revealed-I.2 1761 [https://perma.cc/KP4P-ZHU8]; Rob Stein, Her Son Is One of the Few Children





could soon see "two mom" (and "two dad") reproduction through in vitro
gametogenesis.40
Other scholars have explored some of the issues raised by alternative re-
production, novel family structures, and evolving gender norms. Professor
Darren Rosenblum, for instance, envisions what the separation of biol-
ogy, gender, and parenting, and the "[u]nwinding [of] parenting from
biosex roles,"41 would mean for law, culture, and the family.4 2 Like this
Article, Rosenblum's work destabilizes the legal and social category of
mother (and mothering), arguing that "[t]he various ways in which one
can become a mother" under contemporary reproduction "complicate
the usage of the term in ways that expose language's inadequacy."4 3
Similarly, recent scholarship by Professors Naomi Schoenbaum, David
Fontana, and Jessica Clarke considers what various bodies of law might
look like if certain aspects of pregnancy, or even pregnancy itself, were
decoupled from sex. Schoenbaum and Fontana argue that many aspects
of the care work associated with pregnancy can, and should, be unbun-
dled from sex, even though the law effectively bundles sex and preg-
nancy for most purposes.4 4 Clarke pushes this idea even further, asking
whether the law should decouple sex and pregnancy as a formal matter
for all purposes, particularly in a world where more nonbinary people
and transgender men are having children.4 5
Finally, Professors Douglas NeJaime and Michael Higdon consider
the relationship between constitutional law and the body of state family
law that has evolved in response to alternative procreation and novel
family formation. NeJaime argues that state regulation of alternative
reproduction, and of the "new parenthood" facilitated by alternative re-
production, is in tension with existing and emerging constitutional
norms favoring sex, gender, and sexual orientation equality.46 At the
same time, NeJaime contends that constitutional law itself is "out of
40 In vitro gametogenesis involves the creation of sex cells (eggs and sperm) from skin cells "in
vitro." For a more complete explanation of in vitro gametogenesis and its implications for same-
sex couples, see HENRY T. GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRO-
DUCTION 121-36, 232 (2016); and Courtney Megan Cahill, After Sex, 97 NEB. L. REV. I, 11-12,
16 (2018).
41 Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 57, 61 (2012).
42 See id. at 8o-8i; see also Darren Rosenblum et al., Essay, Pregnant Man?: A Conversation,
22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 208-17 (2010).
43 Rosenblum, supra note 41, at 7o.
44 See David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 309,
311-13 (20Ig). For instance, Fontana and Schoenbaum show that federal family law provides cov-
erage for newborn-care classes and smoking-cessation programs to pregnant women only, even
though none of that prebirth pregnancy work is inextricably tied to a "real" sex-based difference.
Id. at 342 & n.202.
45 See Jessica Clarke, Pregnant People?, iig COLUM. L. REV. F. 173, 176-0 (20Ig); Jessica A.
Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 954-57 (2019).
46 See NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2268.
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step" with state family law developments around nonbiological
parenthood.47  Higdon urges the Court to take up the issue of constitu-
tional parenthood - last addressed by the Court more than three dec-
ades ago - in light of alternative reproduction and same-sex marriage.48
While benefitting from many of the insights offered by these schol-
ars, this Article centers its attention on an issue unexplored by them: the
relationship between constitutional maternity and the maternity made
possible by alternative reproduction and new forms of family and
parenthood. Specifically, this Article looks to progressive advances in
family law surrounding the new maternity to destabilize constitutional
maternity's factual assumptions and regressive tendencies. These re-
gressive tendencies touch and burden many: from unmarried fathers and
transgender individuals to nonbiological and biological mothers. This
Article shows that family law has facilitated new kinds of maternity
beyond the monolithic idea of motherhood construed by constitutional
law. Family law has done so by often relying on unwed-father
doctrine - the same doctrine that simultaneously extended some legal
rights to unwed biological fathers and reinforced the idea of a singular
and unchanging mother.4 9 This Article reverses the arrow in that rela-
tionship of influence, considering how family law's idea of multidimen-
sional maternity might be leveraged to unsettle constitutional law's
monolithic maternity.
Importantly, even as family law has deployed the law of unwed fa-
therhood to renovate the law of parenthood, that modernizing project
remains incomplete - in large part because of the constitutional law of
unwed fatherhood.
For instance, many courts continue to appeal to constitutional law's
logic of maternal certainty (and paternal uncertainty) in ways that per-
petuate stereotypes about mothers and fathers.5 0 Others have invoked
47 See Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 268 (2020).
48 See Higdon, supra note 36, at 1486-87.
49 See infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text. NeJaime has demonstrated how some advo-
cates have relied on constitutional unwed-father law to secure parental rights for nontraditional
parents, including unmarried, nonbiological fathers and unmarried same-sex couples. See Douglas
NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1216-17 (2016)
(noting that lawyers for an unwed, nonbiological father seeking parental rights in the early 2000S
successfully "recast cases on unmarried fathers, including the Supreme Court's cases from the ig7os
and ig8os, as functional, rather than biological, parentage cases," thereby "transform[ing] biology
(for unmarried parents) from a necessary starting point to an increasingly immaterial feature," id.
at 1217); id. at 1227-28, 1228 n.263 (discussing a California co-maternity case from the 2ooos and
advocates' use of unwed-father law in that case to argue for parental rights); see also Serena Mayeri,
Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J.
2292, 2389-90 (2016) ('The unmarried fathers cases, with their emphasis on parental conduct rather
than mere biology, unexpectedly aided nonbiological LGBT parents [in the 2000s] who lacked ac-
cess to marriage but who clearly had demonstrated their commitment to parenthood.").
50 See infra p. 2300.
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the logic embodied in constitutional law to justify transgender discrim-
inations1 and still others have cited it to curtail parental rights for non-
traditional families.5 2 Indeed, even as the law in some jurisdictions has
relied on the Supreme Court's unwed-father decisions to expand paren-
tal rights for nontraditional families,5 3 the law in others has turned to
them to stymie novel forms of kinship.54 In other words, the constitu-
tional law of unwed fatherhood has enabled a more multidimensional
maternity in some jurisdictions - but remains a stumbling block for
contemporary kinship and nonnormative gender identity in others.5 5
By unsettling constitutional law's belief in the certainty of maternity
relative to the uncertainty of paternity, this Article furthers the project
of modernizing not just the law of motherhood, but also the constitu-
tional law of sex and gender. It does not claim that the alternative re-
productive technologies that compose the new maternity are new -
some of those technologies are now decades, even centuries, old.5 6 Rather,
this Article contends that the rich body of doctrinal and statutory law
that has arisen around those technologies ought to cast constitutional law's
jurisprudence of motherhood, sex, and gender in a new light. Constitutional
law's "maternity is obvious" refrain gives the false impression that ma-
ternity and paternity remain locked in an age-old binary that sees pa-
ternity as eternally fraught and difficult and maternity as eternally ob-
vious and simple. The law of maternity in an age of alternative
reproduction and novel family formation belies this facile conception of
motherhood and fatherhood (and of women and men), prompting this
Article's interest in unsettling constitutional maternity and the often-
repressive legal regimes to which it has given rise.57
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I makes visible the origin,
evolution, and reach of the constitutional notion that maternity, unlike
51 See infra section I.B. 3 , pp. 2250-53.
52 See infra pp. 2 247-50.
53 See infra pp. 2 268-69, 22 74-78.
54 See infra pp. 2 280-81.
55 As NeJaime observes in a related context, "family-law authorities" do not always "[speak]
with one voice." NeJaime, supra note 47, at 321.
56 Alternative insemination was first performed on humans in the late eighteenth century. See
Bernstein, supra note 28, at 1049 ('Most accounts point to the performance of human [artificial
insemination] by the English physician, Dr. John Hunter, some time between 1776-1799."). The
first recorded traditional surrogacy contract - where the surrogate was artificially inseminated
with the intended father's sperm - occurred in 1976. See Lawrence Van Gelder, Obituary, Noel
Keane, g8, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at B8. The
first baby conceived through in vitro fertilization was born two years later, in 1978. See Peter
Gwynne et al., All About that Baby, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66.
57 This Article uses the term "unsettle" in the sense of complicate, not replace and supersede.
This Article does not suggest hat pregnancy - the principal indicator of constitutional maternity -
should have no place in constitutional motherhood. Rather, this Article advocates an expansion of
constitutional motherhood to better align it with the maternity of contemporary life and law -
maternity that includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy.
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paternity, is certain and uncomplicated. This Part charts the trajectory
and transmission of constitutional law's logic of maternal certainty and
paternal uncertainty: from its emergence in the Supreme Court's illegit-
imacy cases in the i960s,51 to its consolidation in the Supreme Court's
unwed-father cases,5 9 to its recent appearance in lower and state court
decisions addressing parenthood rights and transgender discrimination.6 0
Part II makes the case for why constitutional maternity warrants
reform. Here, this Article argues that constitutional maternity perpetu-
ates outdated ideas about pregnant women and questionable stereotypes
about mothers and fathers. It also maintains that constitutional mater-
nity is in tension with the "disestablishment" idea in constitutional law.6 1
Through key constitutional precedents like Griswold v. Connecticut,6 2
Lawrence v. Texas,'6 3 and Obergefell v. Hodges,64 understandings of the
Fourteenth Amendment have evolved to prohibit an official vision and
version of the family, much as the First Amendment prohibits an official
vision and version of religion.65  Constitutional maternity resists this
disestablishment idea by allowing the state to favor traditional forms of
procreation, parenthood, and the family. For these and other reasons,
constitutional maternity demands reform.
Part III begins that reform project by offering a thicker, alternative
account of maternity, one that challenges some of the most regressive
aspects of constitutional maternity. This account turns largely to family
law - specifically, to the body of statutory and decisional law that has
addressed maternal parentage in an era of alternative reproduction,
novel family formation, and even gestational fatherhood and gender-
neutral pregnancy.
Part III's thicker account of maternity under state family law is sig-
nificant for two reasons. First, that account shows that many of the
factual assumptions on which constitutional maternity is based are in-
accurate. Where constitutional law assumes that motherhood exists in
a singular and easily identifiable woman, state family law shows that
58 E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968).
59 E.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
60 E.g., Carcatio v. McCrory, 203 E Supp. 3 d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Elizabeth D. v. San Diego
Cty. Health & Human Servs. Agency (In re D.S.), 143 Cal. Rptr. 3 d gi8 (Ct. App. 2012); C.E v. D.D.
(In re Adoption of B.B.D.), 984 P.2d 967 (Utah iggg).
61 See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family After Marriage Equal-
ity, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 246-49 (2015) (describing this theory); Cruz, supra note ig, passim
(applying First Amendment principles of disestablishment and free exercise to sex and gender);
Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Feature, Disestablishing the Family, Iig YALE L.J. 1236, 1241
(2010) ('In several ways, the recognition of rights of free exercise of the family has already led
toward disestablishment.").
62 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
64 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
65 See Cahill, supra note 61, at 246-48.
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motherhood might exist in two women. Where constitutional law as-
sumes that maternity is certain and obvious, state family law shows that
maternity can be uncertain and contested. Where constitutional law
assumes that maternity is different from paternity, state family law
shows that maternity can be as indeterminate, fractured, and multidi-
mensional as paternity. Second, Part III's thicker account of maternity
shows that a more progressive alternative to constitutional maternity
already exists in family law, which has produced an image of mother-
hood that is more in line with contemporary constitutional commitments
to sex, gender, and sexual orientation equality.
Based on the cases surveyed and the insights offered in Parts I to III,
Part IV envisions what it would mean for constitutional law to accom-
modate and incorporate the new maternity. Part IV first argues that
unsettling constitutional maternity with the new maternity is not neces-
sarily radical. In some sense, that disruption has already happened
through family law's reliance on constitutional unwed-father doctrine
to expand motherhood and contract differences between mothers and
fathers. Moreover, the unsettling of constitutional law by family law
accurately reflects how constitutional law is made. As recent scholar-
ship shows, family law is as much a generator of federal constitutional
meaning as it is responsive to it,66 and "exceptional" family law institu-
tions can over time become "mainstream[ed]" in constitutional law. 67
Importantly, that is precisely what happened with the logic of mater-
nal certainty. That logic surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s in a relatively
exceptional context (for the time) - nonmarital parenthood - but has
66 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell's Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. gig,
922 (2016) (challenging "[t]he usual approach [which] emphasizes the impact of constitutional doc-
trine on family law" by examining "how family law principles, assumptions, and values have infil-
trated and shaped constitutional doctrine"); Douglas NeJaime, The Family's Constitution, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 413, 415-16 (2017) (critiquing the "conventional account" of the "relationship
between family law and constitutional aw," id. at 415, for "fail[ing] to appreciate the ways in which
family law exerts influence over constitutional law," and arguing that "family law shapes the terrain
on which constitutional adjudication occurs, structures constitutional conflict, and orients constitu-
tional reasoning," id. at 416); id. at 417 (exploring how constitutional marriage equality was the
result, rather than the cause, of "family law work" dealing with same-sex couples' relational and
parenthood rights); id. at 432 (arguing that scholars "have largely failed to notice [the] dynamic
[between family law and constitutional aw], continuing to view family law outside the lens of na-
tional, constitutional, civil rights law"); id. at 437-46 (contemplating the ways in which "family law
reform of parental recognition may one day reshape constitutional approaches to parenthood," id.
at 437); NeJaime, supra note 47, at 343-61 (discussing this dynamic in the context of marriage
equality specifically and suggesting its application to the law of parenthood).
67 Douglas NeJaime, Differentiating Assimilation, 75 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y I, 35 (2018)
(providing an example of the dialogic relationship between exceptionality and the mainstream). On
the relationship between the margins and the mainstream in the regulation of kinship, see Courtney
Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-traditional Kinship and the Legal Regulation of
Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 52-65 (2012).
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become an integral feature of constitutional sex equality doctrine.6 In
the 1960s and 1970s, five to seventeen percent of all U.S. births were to
unmarried women.69 In 2018, that number was around forty percent.70
Even so, the law deploys the idea of maternal certainty to constrain the
rights not just of unmarried fathers, but also of same-sex couples, non-
biological mothers, transgender individuals, and even biological mothers.
What is significant, though, is the impact that the new maternity
could have on constitutional law. Part IV considers what that impact
might be, suggesting that the new maternity could not only render con-
stitutional maternity more inclusive, but also challenge constitutional
sex equality law's logic of reproductive difference. Constitutional law
has long reasoned that biological justifications are constitutional
whereas sex-role stereotypes are not and that the most significant bio-
logical difference between women and men pertains to maternal cer-
tainty: the fact that birth ostensibly renders mothers more knowable
than fathers. Part IV uses the new maternity to suggest that this par-
ticular formulation of biology - biological reasoning seemingly at its
most biological - is in fact a sex-role stereotype. Finally, recognizing
that some readers might object to the vision of maternity offered here,
Part IV responds to anticipated criticisms.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW'S LOGIC OF MATERNAL CERTAINTY
The logic of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty has evolved
in Supreme Court doctrine and has persisted in legal reasoning about
unwed fathers, parentage law, and transgender discrimination. This
Part charts the evolution of that logic and showcases its enduring power.
It unites under a common theme - maternal certainty and paternal
uncertainty - diverse bodies of law and doctrine that, with notable ex-
ceptions, many scholars tend to evaluate separately."
68 See supra pp. 2225-26 for a fuller explanation of this jurisprudence.
69 CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, RL3 47 56, NONMARITAL
CHILDBEARING: TRENDS, REASONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS 9 tbl.i (2008).
70 Percentage of Births to Unmarried Mothers by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/unmarried/unmarried.htm [https://
perma.cc/83E8-BB4V].
71 See, e.g., Antognini, supra note 19, at 409 (challenging the "conventional understanding of the
citizenship transmission cases" as "examples of immigration law exceptionalism" and urging com-
mentators to view those cases instead as an extension of the Court's "treatment of unwed American
fathers and mothers in its equal protection doctrine domestically"); Mayeri, supra note 49, passim
(arguing that the Supreme Court's resolution of unwed fathers' constitutional claims has remained
consistent across multiple doctrinal domains); NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2279-85 (discussing the
Supreme Court's illegitimacy cases, domestic unwed-father cases, and citizenship transmission cases
as a constitutional collective that relies on the idea of "gender differentiation," id. at 2285).
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A. Maternal Certainty and Paternal Uncertainty in the Supreme Court
Maternal certainty first emerged in the Supreme Court's review of
illegitimacy laws under the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. These laws punished nonmarital children
and the parents of nonmarital children in a variety of areas because the
parents engaged in sex and procreation outside of marriage. Some ille-
gitimacy laws prohibited nonmarital children and unmarried parents
from bringing wrongful death actions for the death of their kin. Others
prohibited unmarried parents from being eligible heirs of their deceased
children's estates. Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court struck down
many - though not all - of these laws as violative of the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's first two illegitimacy decisions, Levy v. Louisiana2 and
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,' 3 addressed
Louisiana's illegitimacy laws as applied to nonmarital children and their
mothers. In Levy, the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that de-
nied nonmarital children a right to recover for the wrongful death of
their mother.7 4 In Glona, a companion case decided the same day as
Levy, the Court struck down a Louisiana law that denied an unmarried
mother the right to recover for the wrongful death of her nonmarital
children.5 Both decisions expressed discomfort with the state's refusal
to protect a relationship that was "plainly" 6 maternal, even if "illegiti-
mate."" "These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on [their
mother]; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers
in the biological and in the spiritual sense," reasoned Levy.', To be sure,
Levy and Glona criticized all illegitimacy classifications for their tenuous
connection to the law's overriding objective: punishing nonmarital sex.7 9
However, Levy and Glona signaled that it was particularly unsavory for
72 391 U.S. 68 (ig68).
391 U.S. 73 (i968).
74 Levy, 391 U.S. at 69-72.
75 Glona, 391 U.S. at 73-76.
76 Id. at 76.
77 Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
78 Id. (emphasis added).
79 See id. ('[I]t is invidious to discriminate against [the children] when no action, conduct, or
demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother." (footnotes omitted));
Glona, 391 U.S. at 75 (reasoning that Louisiana's illegitimacy classification "hardly has a causal
connection with the 'sin"' of nonmarital sex). Professor Melissa Murray understands these illegiti-
macy cases as reflecting the Court's discomfort with the idea that the state would punish morally
and fiscally responsible nonmarital families, like those in Levy and Glona. Melissa Murray, What's
So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 397-98 (2012).
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the law to punish a biological mother-child relationship, which, unlike
paternity, was not beset by problems of "proof." 0
Levy and Glona's rhetoric of maternal certainty over time grew more
pronounced in the Court's illegitimacy doctrine, particularly in its deci-
sions dealing with paternal illegitimacy."' Admittedly, in several im-
portant illegitimacy decisions after Levy and Glona, the Court struck
down federal and state illegitimacy laws under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' equal protection guarantees, even though the government
defended those laws by adverting to questions of proof and often to
questions of proof surrounding paternity.82 However, in other key ille-
gitimacy cases decided after Levy and Glona, the Court embraced the
so See Glona, 391 U.S. at 76. In the immediate wake of those decisions, some, though by no
means all, lower courts limited the scope of Levy and Glona to maternal illegitimacy, and experts
of illegitimacy classifications questioned whether Levy and Glona could seamlessly apply to paternal
illegitimacy, which raised more serious questions of proof. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ortiz, 303
N.Y.S.2d 806, 812-13 (Sur. Ct. 1969) (holding that a state law denying nonmarital children the right
to share in the proceeds of their putative father's wrongful death action violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, but acknowledging that "some difference does exist in [pa-
ternal] relationships at least with respect to the greater difficulty in ascertaining paternity," and
observing that whether "the child is the child of a particular woman is rarely difficult to prove,"
whereas "[p]roof of paternity ... as experience has shown is a much more difficult problem," id. at
812); Baston v. Sears, 239 N.E.2d 62, 63 & n.* (Ohio 1968) (denying a nonmarital child paternal
support and distinguishing Levy on the ground that Levy "[was] based on the intimate, familial
relationship which exists between a mother and her child"). But see Levy v. State, 216 SO.2d 88,
820 (La. 1968) (interpreting the Supreme Court's holding in Levy as prohibiting laws that prevent
nonmarital children from recovering from either parent); Schmoll v. Creecy, 254 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J.
1969) (rejecting the contention that the holding in Levy "deals only with the relation of the mother
and child"). For commentary discussing whether Levy and Glona apply (or should apply) to pater-
nal illegitimacy classifications, see John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges
the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,
118 U. PA. L. REV. I, 19-20 (1969) (observing that paternal relationships raise "more difficult," id.
at ig, and "more serious" questions "of proof," id. at 20, than maternal relationships"); Harry D.
Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana - First Decisions on Equal
Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 341, 349 (1969) (observing that "[t]he carelessness
of the reasoning in the Levy case invites an attempt to delineate the direction further cases [involv-
ing fathers and nonmarital children] should take," id. at 341, and rejecting differential treatment of
unwed mothers and unwed fathers where "proof" of paternity exists, id. at 349).
1 See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 19, at 358 (arguing that the illegitimacy cases might be under-
stood to reflect "the challenge of identifying the father" in nonmarital relationships).
82 In those cases, the Court rejected paternal uncertainty, among other asserted rationales, as a
permissible basis for illegitimacy classifications, most of which automatically disqualified nonmar-
ital children from recovering benefits based on a paternal relationship. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 764-65, 776 (1977) (striking down as unconstitutional an Illinois law prohibiting a
nonmarital child from inheriting from his or her father if the father failed to legitimate the child
through marriage to the biological mother); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634, 637-38 (1974)
(striking down a provision of the Social Security Act that discriminated against asubset of nonmar-
ital children notwithstanding the government's asserted concern about "open[ing] the door to spu-
rious claims," id. at 634); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 536-38 (1973) (per curiam) (striking down
a Texas law denying nonmarital children a judicially enforceable right to child support from their
"natural fathers," despite "the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity," id. at 538); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 4o6 U.S. 164, 165, 174-75 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional Louisiana's
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sex-specific logic of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty when
upholding illegitimacy classifications that targeted paternal relationships.3
For instance, in Fiallo v. Bell,8 4 the Court upheld a provision of fed-
eral immigration law that gave special preference to the children of un-
wed U.S. mothers but not to the children of unwed U.S. fathers. 5 Re-
jecting the federal equal protection challenge of three unwed fathers and
their nonmarital children, 6 the Court reasoned that "paternity determi-
nations" typically involve "serious problems of proof."' Unlike mater-
nity determinations, the Fiallo Court wrote, "determining the paternity
of an illegitimate child" is marked by "inherent difficulty."
denial of workmen's compensation benefits to nonmarital children who were never formally
acknowledged by their father and explicitly discounting the state's professed concern for curtailing
"potentially difficult problems of proof," id. at 174); see also Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300, 307
(5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974) (rejecting the distinction between paternal uncertainty and
maternal certainty as a legitimate basis for disadvantageous treatment of nonmarital children under
federal law and citing Weber for the proposition that illegitimacy classifications were impermissible
under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of whether they targeted a maternal or a paternal
relationship (citing Weber, 4o6 U.S. at 175)). The Trimble Court acknowledged the truth behind
much of the logic of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty, even though it ultimately rejected
it as a constitutionally insufficient basis for maintaining an illegitimacy classification. See Trimble, 430
U.S. at 770-71.
83 The earliest decision upholding a paternal illegitimacy classification, Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532, 537-40 (1971), was relatively silent on the issue of paternal proof, basing its holding in-
stead on the state's prerogative to draw distinctions between "legitimate[s]" and "illegitimate[s]" and
between "wives" and "concubines" in the property domain, id. at 538. The law at issue prohibited
even acknowledged nonmarital children from inheriting from an intestate father if he left any other
surviving relative. Id. at 537. The possibility that this law rested on concerns about paternal proof
was raised by Justice Brennan, who, in dissent, suggested that "Louisiana might be thought to have
an interest in requiring people to go through certain formalities in order to eliminate complicated
questions of proof and the opportunity for both error and fraud in determining paternity after the
death of the father." Id. at 552 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Dismissing this conjectural concern, Justice
Brennan maintained that paternal fraud anxiety "offer[ed] no justification for distinguishing be-
tween a formally acknowledged illegitimate child [as in that case] and a legitimate one." Id.
84 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
85 Id. at 797, 799-8oo. For scholarship that explores how concerns over paternal proof weave
their way throughout - and in the process tie together - the Court's illegitimacy jurisprudence
and immigration jurisprudence, see Antognini, supra note 19, at 410. Professor Albertina Antognini
explains that "a close reading of the Court's equal protection cases addressing unwed parents across
borders, both geographical and doctrinal, shows that its decisions consistently reflect an assumption
that the unwed father is absent and the unwed mother is present - not just at birth but in the
child's life thereafter." Id.
86 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 79o.
87 Id. at 799.
88 Id. at 799 n.8. Moreover, in response to the challengers' contention that "existing adminis-
trative procedures ... could easily handle the problems of proof involved in determining the pater-
nity of an illegitimate child," the Court simply responded that such a possibility "should be ad-
dressed to the Congress rather than the courts." Id. at 799 n.9. Dissenting, Justice Marshall
reminded the Court that in Trimble, a case decided the same day as Fiallo, the Court explicitly
rejected "lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity" as a reason "to shield otherwise in-
vidious discrimination." Id. at 813 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
7 62, 7 7l (197 7#.
2236 [Vol. 133:2221
THE NEW MATERNITY
Similarly, in Lalli v. Lalli, 9 the Court upheld a New York law re-
quiring that an unwed father (but not an unwed mother) judicially prove
his paternity to his children while alive in order for those children to
recover a share of his estate under state intestacy law.9o Justifying New
York's imposition of procedural demands on unwed fathers but not on
unwed mothers, the Court reasoned that "[e]stablishing maternity is sel-
dom difficult," whereas establishing paternity involves "peculiar prob-
lems of proof."9 1
Finally, in Parham v. Hughes,9 2 the Court invoked the logic of ma-
ternal certainty when upholding a Georgia law that prohibited certain
unwed fathers (but not unwed mothers) from maintaining a wrongful
death action for the death of their children.9 3 "Unlike the mother . . . whose
identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will frequently
be unknown," Parham reasoned.9 4
The Court's later illegitimacy cases justified different treatment of
unwed mothers and unwed fathers principally on account of maternal
and paternal biology - the fact that paternity involved "peculiar prob-
lems of proof," whereas "maternity [was] seldom difficult." 9 5  Even so,
ideas about maternal and paternal biology blurred quickly into ideas
about maternal and paternal behavior.9 6  For instance, Lalli assumed
that fathers, unlike mothers, were not invested in their children because
their identity was always uncertain.97 "'That the child is the child of a
particular woman is rarely difficult to prove[]' . . . [whereas p]roof of
paternity . . . frequently is difficult," Lalli reasoned.98 "The putative
father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a child. Even if
conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence
of any ties to the mother."99 Importantly, then, the biologically grounded
"9 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
90 Id. at 261-62, 264 (plurality opinion).
91 Id. at 2 6 8.
92 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
93 Id. at 348-49, 358-59.
94 Id. at 355 (citing Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268-69 (plurality opinion)).
95 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268 (plurality opinion).
96 Antognini makes a similar point when arguing that, in the context of unwed fathers and
federal immigration law, "[t]he fact of birth quickly assumes legal relevance for both the government
and the Court, to the exclusion of any other reality, including the father's potential presence at that
moment." Antognini, supra note 19, at 432. For an analysis of a similar phenomenon (the discount-
ing of unwed fathers' actual parenting work) in Supreme Court decisions addressing the rights of
unwed fathers in the adoption context, see Allison Anna Tait, A Tale of Three Families: Historical
Households, Earned Belonging, and Natural Connections, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1386-88 (2012).
97 See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 269 (plurality opinion).
98 Id. at 268-69 (quoting In re Estate of Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d 8o6, 812 (Sur. Ct. 1969)).
99 Id. at 269 (quoting Estate of Ortis, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 812).
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"fact" of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty reflected and re-
produced stereotypes about mothers, fathers, and their respective social
roles. 100
The logic and language of maternal certainty that influenced the
Court's reasoning in later illegitimacy decisions, like Parham, eventually
emerged in a more robust way in a line of Supreme Court decisions
addressing the constitutional rights of unwed fathers, first in the context
of state adoption law and later in the context of federal citizenship trans-
mission law. The laws in these cases did not (and still do not) treat
unmarried fathers as automatic legal fathers, even though they treated
(and still treat) biological mothers as automatic legal mothers. Rather,
the laws imposed more procedural burdens on fathers than on mothers
in order for fathers to prove and enjoy a legally protected parental rela-
tionship. If unwed fathers failed to satisfy those burdens, then they
risked losing their parental rights, as sex-differentiated adoption law
made it easier for a biological mother to place her child for adoption
without the biological father's consent. Unwed fathers also risked ren-
dering their children non-U.S. citizens, as sex-differentiated citizen-
transmission law made it more difficult for biological fathers to transmit
U.S. citizenship to their children.
In the adoption law setting specifically, the logic of maternal cer-
tainty originally occupied a minority position in important dissents in
Caban v. Mohammed.10 1 There, disagreeing with the majority's holding
striking down a sex-specific adoption law, Justice Stewart remarked that
different treatment of mothers and fathers was permissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment because "[t]he mother carries and bears the
child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear."102 He also
noted that the "mother is always an identifiable parent"103 and that "only
100 For a more complete discussion of the stereotypes that flow from the logic of maternal cer-
tainty, see infra section IIA, pp. 2253-57. See also Antognini, supra note ig, at 461-64. On the
law's use of biological reasoning to justify different (and often disadvantageous) legal treatment of
women generally, see Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). On the law's use of
biologism to justify different (and often disadvantageous) legal treatment of sexual minorities, see
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, g8 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 83 (2013); and NeJaime,
supra note 34.
101 441 U.S. 380 (igg).
102 Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). A majority in Caban struck down as unconstitutional sex
discrimination a provision of New York's adoption law that gave unwed mothers but not unwed
fathers veto power over a third-party adoption of their child on the ground that unwed mothers
and unwed fathers were sometimes similarly situated. Id. at 391-94 (majority opinion). Justice
Stewart dissented on the grounds that, in his view, mothers and fathers were never similarly situated
with respect to parental identity in cases of infant adoption, id. at 398-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting),
and that the state had a strong interest in "promoting the welfare of illegitimate children" by facil-
itating their adoptions, id. at 395.
103 Id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
2238 [Vol. 133:2221
THE NEW MATERNITY
the mother carries and gives birth to the child." 10 4 Justice Stevens noted
that "the mother's identity is known with certainty" at birth, whereas
"[t]he father . . . may not be present."105
By 1983, however, when the Court revisited the question of whether
gender-specific adoption laws passed constitutional muster in Lehr v.
Robertson,10 6 maternity (and paternity) logic moved from dissent to ma-
jority. Lehr upheld as constitutional under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment a provision of state
adoption law that extended unwed fathers fewer procedural protections,
such as notice and veto power, than unwed mothers before termination
of parental rights through adoption.107 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens emphasized the clarity and certainty of motherhood relative to
fatherhood, reasoning that because "[t]he mother carries and bears the
child . . . her parental relationship is clear," whereas "the father's paren-
tal claims must be gauged by other measures."108s While an unwed fa-
ther's biological connection to his child was significant, Justice Stevens
observed, the father needed to prove social and legal paternity through
"other measures" - like an established father-child bond - in order to
enjoy full constitutional protection akin to that of the mother.10 9 On
this view, social and legal parenthood followed inevitably from biologi-
cal maternity but not from biological paternity.
The maternal certainty that surfaced in the Court's early illegitimacy
decisions blossomed fifteen years later into a fixed feature of its consti-
tutional doctrine relating to the nonmarital family, and particularly to
unwed fathers.1 10 Unwilling during this time to uphold laws embodying
sex stereotypes under the Equal Protection Clause,111 the Court tolerated
104 Id.; see also id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('Only the mother carries the child .
105 Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
106 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
107 Id. at 250, 264-65, 266-67.
108 Id. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
109 See id. at 261-62.
110 Indeed, the Court's invocation of the logic of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty in
response to unwed fatherhood was so habitual that its absence in a key unwed-father case from
around this time - Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 11o (1989) - was conspicuous. See id. at
113, 120-30 (upholding as constitutional under the federal Due Process Clause a state marital pre-
sumption that could be rebutted by biological mothers and marital fathers, but not by nonmarital
presumed biological fathers).
111 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (striking down under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause a public nursing school policy prohibiting ad-
mission to males); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92, 204-05 (1976) (striking down under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause a state law that set the age for consuming low-
alcohol beer at twenty-one for males but at eighteen for females); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 637-39 (1975) (striking down under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee a
provision of the Social Security Act allowing widows but not widowers to claim survivor benefits);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (striking down under the Fifth Amendment's
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laws reflecting "real" reproductive differences1 1 2 - and the real repro-
ductive difference that often mattered most to the Court concerned ma-
ternal certainty relative to paternal uncertainty. In addition, as the logic
of maternal certainty became more firmly settled in constitutional sex
discrimination law, that law became more adamant about the constitu-
tional mother's presumed obviousness. In Lalli and Parham, "[e]stab-
lishing maternity [was] seldom difficult," 1 3 and maternal "identity" was
"rarely . .. in doubt."1 1 4 By the time the Court decided Lehr just a few
years later, the mother's maternal relationship was "clear."115
For this reason, it was little surprise that, starting in the late 1990s,
the Court once again deployed the logic of maternal certainty in its con-
frontation with discrimination against unwed fathers - this time in the
context of federal citizenship transmission laws. While maternal cer-
tainty played a role in the plurality's decision in one of those cases,
Miller v. Albright,1 1 6 it commanded a majority of the Court in the 2001
Due Process Clause a military policy that required dependents of female but not male service mem-
bers to prove dependency in fact before receiving supplemental benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 74 (1971) (striking down under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause a state
statute that automatically preferred males over females as estate administrators).
112 See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1219-21
(2016) (discussing judicial reliance on biological difference to justify laws that treat unwed fathers
"as legally inferior," id. at 1220, to unwed mothers); Cary Franklin, The Anti-stereotyping Principle
in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 125-72 (2010) (discussing cases
rejecting sex stereotypes on constitutional equality grounds as well as cases upholding biological
difference as a limit on this antistereotyping principle); Mayeri, supra note 49, at 2391 (discussing
how the Court rejected different treatment of husbands and wives but permitted different treatment
of unwed fathers and unwed mothers by resorting to biological difference); NeJaime, supra note 34,
at 2280 (remarking that "as the Court forged constitutional sex-equality doctrine in the ig7os and
i9g80s, it generally resisted claims that the differential treatment of unmarried mothers and fathers
constituted impermissible sex discrimination"); id. at 2352-55 (discussing the role of biological dif-
ference in immigration law and in the law of unwed fathers and adoption).
113 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
114 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Indeed, it
is worth noting here that in Glona, Justice Douglas raised the possibility that Glona's holding
"[could] conceivably be a temptation to some to assert motherhood fraudulently." Glona v. Am.
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (emphasis added).
115 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
116 523 U.S. 420 (1998). Writing for the plurality in an opinion joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Stevens explained that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children differ in at
least two ways relevant to the claimant's equal protection claim. Id. at 427. First, "[t]he blood
relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious," whereas "the relationship to the . .. father
may often be undisclosed and unrecorded in any contemporary public record." Id. at 436. Second,
a child is likely to establish a relationship with the mother, who "certainly knows of her child's
existence," whereas the child might not even know the identity of the father, let alone have culti-
vated a relationship with him. Id. at 438. Drawing an explicit doctrinal connection between the
Court's existing unwed-father jurisprudence and its constitutional understanding of citizenship
transmission, Justice Stevens reasoned that the plurality's Miller holding was "directly supported
by [the Court's] decision in Lehr v. Robertson." Id. at 441.
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decision Nguyen v. INS,11' which upheld as constitutional a federal law
imposing more burdensome requirements on unwed fathers than on un-
wed mothers in order to transmit citizenship to a child born overseas.118
More than any other decision addressing the equality rights of unwed
fathers, Justice Kennedy's majority decision in Nguyen was insistent
about the obviousness of maternity and motherhood. (Notably, even
Justice O'Connor's condemnatory Nguyen dissent agreed that a
"mother . . . is by nature present at birth," whereas a father is present
"by choice."1 19) Importing the reasoning of maternal certainty used to
justify sex-specific adoption statutes in Lehr and in Justice Stewart's
Caban dissent,1 20 the Nguyen majority reasoned that "the mother is al-
ways present at birth" 1 2 1 as well as that "proof of motherhood . . . is
inherent in birth itself." 1 2 2 Furthermore, Nguyen maintained that moth-
ers' obvious and uncomplicated biological relationship to their children
guaranteed the opportunity for a social "relationship between [the] citi-
zen parent and child." 1 2 3 Paternity, by contrast, presented "serious prob-
lems of pro[ofl" 12 4 with respect to biological and social connection alike.
For these reasons, Nguyen concluded, Congress did not engage in uncon-
stitutional sex discrimination under the Fifth Amendment by requiring
more of unwed fathers than of unwed mothers.1 25
Remarkably, the Nguyen Court's conception of maternity under the
Federal Constitution was in tension with federal law itself. When Nguyen
was decided, the State Department determined maternity for certain
classes of women citizens - including unmarried women - who had
children overseas on the basis of gametes (or genetics), not gestation and
birth.1 2 6 Congress sets the rules for how mothers transmit citizenship to
children born overseas and outside of wedlock (the issue in Nguyen).1 27
The State Department, however, is charged with determining who qual-
ifies as a "mother" in the first place.128 Indeed, before the State
117 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
118 Id. at 58-6o.
119 Id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
120 Id. at 62 (majority opinion).
121 Id. at 64.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 67.
124 Id. at 63 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (19)).
125 Id. at 73.
126 See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Baby Without a Country: Determining Citizenship for Assisted
Reproduction Children Born Overseas, g1 DENy. U. L. REV. 335, 352 (2014).
127 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2018).
128 See Joanna L. Grossman, Flag-Waving Gametes: Biology, Not Gestation or Parenting, Determines
Whether Children Born Abroad Acquire Citizenship from U.S. Citizen Parents, VERDICT (Apr. 3,
2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/03/flag-waving-gametes [https://perma.cc/gUBL-43NA]
(discussing the case of an unmarried American woman who had children in Israel through in vitro
fertilization with donor eggs and donor sperm, and the United States's denial of citizenship to her
children). For the policy, see BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
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Department changed its rules in 2013,129 the federal government refused
to recognize an unmarried American woman who had twins in Israel
through in vitro fertilization with donor eggs as a "mother" capable of
transmitting American citizenship,13 0 even though Nguyen confidently
asserted that gestation and birth were "inherent" and irrefutable proof
of maternity. 131 When Nguyen was decided, then, federal law was at
odds with itself on this question of who was a mother, suggesting that
maternity was more socially and legally constructed than Nguyen's bi-
ologism and maternal naturalism made it appear.
Today, Nguyen's notion that maternity is certain, uncomplicated,
basic, and obvious, whereas paternity is the obverse of all of those
things, remains a foundational aspect of constitutional sex equality law.
As mentioned, that law has rejected much official sex discrimination on
antistereotyping grounds, but it has preserved some official sex discrim-
ination by adverting specifically to the logic of maternal certainty. 132 In
fact, the idea that the government may treat mothers and fathers differ-
ently because mothers, unlike fathers, are obvious even emerged in the
Court's most recent constitutional sex discrimination decision - one in
which the Court rejected a provision of federal citizenship transmission
law as an unconstitutional sex stereotype.1 3 3
That decision, Sessions v. Morales-Santana,1 3 4 struck down federal
law's requirement hat unwed American fathers reside in the United
States for a longer time than unwed American mothers must in order to
transmit their citizenship to a child born overseas.1 3 5 The government
justified that requirement by invoking the same logic of maternal cer-
tainty at play in Nguyen, arguing that differential treatment of unwed
mothers and fathers passed constitutional muster because mothers, un-
like fathers, were obvious at birth. 1 3 6  This time, however, the Court
ACQUISITION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AT BIRTH BY A CHILD BORN ABROAD,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/us-citizenship/Acquisition-
US-Citizenship-Child-Born-Abroad.html [https://perma.cc/B934-3YGW].
129 See Knaplund, supra note 126, at 352 ('In late 2013, the State Department quietly amended
its website to recognize giving birth as a means to prove maternity.").
130 See Grossman, supra note 128.
131 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (stating that "proof of motherhood ... is inherent in
birth itself').
132 See supra pp. 2239-40. Indeed, even the Nguyen majority made clear that sex stereotypes
were unconstitutional. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (distinguishing between laws based on "real"
biological difference, which are permitted under the Constitution, and those based on a "stereo-
type[]," which are not).
133 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
134 137 S. Ct. 1678.
135 Id. at 1686.
136 See Brief for the Petitioner at 30-31, Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (No. 15-1191); see also
Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over "Inherent Differences" Between the
Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 200 (observing that, as in Nguyen, "the government focused again
on the moment of birth, noting that because unmarried mothers are invariably present at a child's
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rejected maternal certainty as a constitutionally adequate rationale, con-
tending that it reflected not a biological truth but rather "stunningly
anachronistic" beliefs about men and women and their relative caretak-
ing roles.131
The Court's repudiation of biological reasoning in Morales-Santana
means that "[a]fter Morales-Santana, courts and litigants cannot as eas-
ily assert or assume that the reach of heightened scrutiny for sex-based
state action runs out early, either at the water's edge of citizenship law
or when it comes to the rights of unmarried parents."a13 Even so,
Morales-Santana preserved space for biological reasoning in sex equal-
ity doctrine when it distinguished the residency requirement at issue
there from the proof- of-parentage law at issue in Nguyen. Nguyen was
still good law, Morales-Santana reasoned, because the law in Nguyen,
unlike the law in Morales-Santana, reflected a biological truth: mater-
nity, unlike paternity, is obvious by a woman's act of "giving birth."1 3 9
In other words, the same decision that exposed the stereotypic logic that
lay behind maternal certainty in one context (duration of residency) up-
held that logic as constitutionally adequate in another (proof of
parenthood).
In preserving a distinction between the biological reality of the proof-
of-parentage requirement and the stereotypic logic of the duration-of-
residence requirement, Morales-Santana implicitly certified the Nguyen
Court's confidence that "proof of motherhood . . . is inherent in birth
itself." 1 4 0 To be sure, federal law's proof-of-parentage requirement was
not at issue in Morales-Santana, and so the majority might have ap-
proached the question of its constitutionality differently given the op-
portunity.141 In addition, as Professor Cary Franklin notes, "[t]he nexus
between biological differences and the sex distinction in Nguyen was
arguably closer than the nexus between biological differences and the
birth, and because their parentage is thereby assured, they are recognized at that moment as the
child's only legal parent").
137 Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693.
138 Franklin, supra note 136, at 202.
139 Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694.
140 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). In this regard, the Morales-Santana majority bears
some similarities to the Nguyen dissent, which Justice Ginsburg - who authored the majority opin-
ion in Morales-Santana - joined. In Nguyen, Justice O'Connor asserted that "it is doubtless true
that a mother's blood relation to a child is uniquely 'verifiable from the birth itself' to those present
at birth." Id. at 81-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphases added) (quoting id. at 62 (majority
opinion)). Similarly, in the appellate court decision in Miller v. Albright, Judge Wald, although
condemning the requirement that fathers - but not mothers - take additional steps beyond prov-
ing a biological connection to transmit citizenship to their children, remarked that a requirement
that fathers specifically prove a biological connection might be acceptable. See Miller v. Christopher,
96 F.3 d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. igg6) (Wald, J., concurring in the judgment).
141 The Morales-Santana Court recognized as much itself. See 137 S. Ct. at 1694 (noting that
"Morales-Santana's challenge does not renew the contest over" the law at issue in Nguyen).
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sex distinction in Morales-Santana," given that Nguyen involved proof
of parenthood (more biological in nature) whereas Morales-Santana in-
volved duration of residency (more social in nature).14 2
Nevertheless, Morales-Santana's unquestioning belief in maternal
certainty - in the proof-of-parentage context - is worthy of note for
at least two reasons. First, it shows that maternal certainty can escape
meaningful constitutional review even when the Court is acutely aware
of the sex stereotypes that lie behind it.143 In addition, and as later Parts
will elaborate in greater detail, it shows that the Court has inherited a
way of thinking about maternity, pregnancy, biology, and birth that is
simply inaccurate - especially in 2017, the year when Morales-Santana
was decided and a time by which alternative reproductive technologies
had created a situation where "giving birth" was far from conclusive
evidence of maternity.
B. Maternal Certainty and Paternal Uncertainty
Outside the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's logic of maternity and paternity has influenced
lower courts' dispositions of issues relating to a variety of groups, in-
cluding biological fathers, nonbiological mothers, same-sex parents, and
transgender individuals. In this sense, the biologically grounded justifi-
cation of maternal certainty has traveled widely in the law. Emerging
first as a response to domestic family-related issues in cases like Lalli v.
Lalli1 4 4 and Lehr v. Robertson,1 4 5 maternal certainty eventually ex-
panded to apply to federal immigration issues in cases like Miller v.
Albright1 4 6 and Nguyen v. INS.1 47 In turn, lower courts have absorbed
Nguyen's discourse on maternal certainty when addressing everything
from nontraditional parentage1 4 8 to transgender rights.
142 Franklin, supra note 136, at 202. Franklin also argues that the sex classification at issue in
Nguyen - unlike the sex classification at issue in Morales - "passed constitutional muster only
because the Court did not actually scrutinize it with much rigor." Id. "If the Court had actually
applied the same level of scrutiny in Nguyen that it applied in Morales-Santana . .. it would have
detected the fairly substantial gaps between the government's stated ends and its use of a sex dis-
criminatory rule." Id.
143 On this point, see Kristin A. Collins, The Supreme Court, 20i6 Term - Comment: Equality,
Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 203 (2017) ('[L]aws that
regard biological mothers as a child's 'natural guardian,' with rights and responsibilities that dwarf
those of . . . biological nonmarital fathers (as in Nguyen) . . . are in significant tension with Morales-
Santana's deep skepticism of gender-based allocations of parental rights and status.").
144 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
145 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
146 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
147 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
148 See Collins, supra note 143, at 195 (observing that "Nguyen became a resource for lawyers
defending the gender-based regulation of parentage and, more generally, the family," and that "state




. Unwed Biological Fathers. - Constitutional law's logic of ma-
ternal certainty has influenced courts' approaches to the rights of unwed
biological fathers in at least three different settings: adoption law, the
marital presumption, and custody law. Following Lehr, adoption law in
many states accords unwed fathers fewer procedural protections than it
does unwed mothers prior to releasing their biological children for adop-
tion by third parties - procedural protections like notice of the adoption
proceeding and a veto power over it.149 When such laws are challenged
on due process or equal protection grounds (or both), courts routinely
uphold them by invoking the binary of maternal certainty and paternal
uncertainty.
One court, for instance, reasoned that it was constitutional for a state
to accord different protections to unwed fathers and unwed mothers in
the adoption process since "identification of a child's mother is auto-
matic because of her role in the birth process, while identification of the
father is not."1so Others have cited to Lehr, Nguyen, and Justice Stewart's
Caban dissent for the proposition that "[tihe mother carries and bears
the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear," whereas
"[tihe validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other
measures."151
On this last point, consider In re Adoption of J.S.,152 a recent Utah
Supreme Court case that illustrates the continuing resonance of mater-
nal certainty in constitutional challenges to sex-specific adoption stat-
utes. After discovering that a woman with whom he was sexually in-
volved was pregnant, and shortly before the birth of his son, Bolden
filed a petition in court seeking to establish paternity, custody, and child
support; he also registered under Utah's putative father registry.153
What he failed to do prior to his son's birth was file a separate affidavit
promising that he would be his son's physical custodian and support
149 See, e.g., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONSENT
To ADOPTION (2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HS3 K-7 ET 3] (listing consent-to-adoption statutes as of March 2017); Mary Beck, Toward a National
Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1031, 1039-42 (2002) (describing
how putative father registries "place[] increasing responsibility on the man to protect his own pater-
nal rights," id. at 1042).
150 C.E v. D.D. (In re Adoption of B.B.D.), 984 P.2d 967, 972 (Utah iggg) (quoting Swayne v.
L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P2d 637, 641 (Utah 990)).
151 E.g., Helen G. v. Mark J.H. (In re Adoption Petition of Bobby Antonio R.), 175 P 3d 914, 924
(N.M. 2007) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see,
e.g., Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.), 358 P3 d 1009, 1027-28 (Utah 2014). In several of these
cases, courts have relied on maternal certainty when upholding parental terminations of unwed
fathers, even when the fathers were deceived by birth mothers who gave up infants for adoption
upon birth. See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P 3 d 118o, 1184-85, 1195 (Kan. 2008) (mother
lied about having an abortion); In re Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3 d 904, 906-o7, 914-15 (Tex. App. 2013)
(mother never informed father of the pregnancy).
152 Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.), 358 P 3 d oog.
153 See id. at 1012-13.
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him financially.154 When the child's mother initiated adoption proceed-
ings shortly after the child's birth, the prospective adoptive parents ar-
gued that Bolden's consent to the adoption was unnecessary because he
failed to comply with Utah's affidavit requirement.s5 5 Bolden chal-
lenged that requirement - unsuccessfully - in the state trial court be-
fore appealing his case to the Utah Supreme Court, where he argued
that Utah's law violated state and federal due process and equal protec-
tion guarantees because it imposed burdens on unwed fathers from
which unwed mothers were exempt.156
Rejecting Bolden's constitutional claims, a divided Utah Supreme
Court explained that "mothers are identified . . . as parents by virtue of
their biological connection," whereas "fathers require something more
(both biologically and legally)."157 An unwed mother's biological rela-
tionship to her child is "objectively apparent" at birth, the majority rea-
soned, and her social relationship to her child is "objective[ly]" estab-
lished by her decision "to carry the child to term (and not end[ the
pregnancy] by abortion or emergency contraception).15  "An unwed
father's role," by contrast, "is inherently different."15 9 Like his biological
connection to the child, which is "indeterminate" at birth,160 the unwed
father's social connection is also unclear at that time and must be gauged
by other measures - like the timely filing of an affidavit.16 1 Where a
mother's "decision" not to terminate her pregnancy through abortion
"express[es] [her] commitment to [her] offspring," the court continued,
fathers must "express" their commitment in a different way.16 2 For all
of these reasons, Bolden concluded, Utah's different treatment of moth-
ers and fathers passed constitutional muster.163
Just as courts have invoked maternal certainty to justify sex-specific
adoption laws, they also have invoked it to justify sex-specific marital
presumption laws, as Grimes v. Van Hook- Williams1 6 4 illustrates. There,
a Michigan court rejected the equal protection claim of a biological fa-
ther who, under state law, lacked standing to rebut the marital presump-
tion and thereby prove his legal paternity of a child who was born into
an extant marriage - wherein he was not the husband.165 Where Michigan
154 Id. at 1013.
155 Id.
156 See id. at 1012.
157 Id. at 103o n.32.
158 Id. at 1030.
159 Id. at 1031.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 1031-32.
162 Id. at 1032.
163 See id.
164 839 N.W.2d 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
165 Id. at 239-40.
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law gives all birth mothers standing to rebut the presumption, it gives
only certain alleged fathers that ability.166 The plaintiff in Grimes did
not qualify as one of those alleged fathers.16
Holding that it was constitutional for the state to treat men and
women differently by allowing all biological mothers but only certain
nonmarital fathers to rebut the presumption, Grimes favorably cited
Nguyen for the proposition that mothers and fathers are not similarly
situated for constitutional purposes.168 "[Tihe identity of the mother is
rarely, if ever, in question," it observed, whereas "the identity of the
child's biological father may well be uncertain."1 69 In addition, Grimes
reasoned that "[t]he mother is the only necessary actor at all stages of
the process, from conception through pregnancy and delivery, including
all the physical and medical implications of each stage."10 The court
noted further that "the mother is usually the child's primary caregiver
during the infant's first weeks of life."" "These are genuinely differen-
tiating characteristics,"17 2 Grimes concluded.
Finally, some courts have invoked constitutional law's logic of ma-
ternal certainty to justify custody laws that assign legal and physical
custody of nonmarital children to mothers upon birth.17 3 When unwed
fathers have challenged those regimes on equality grounds, courts have
upheld them by relying on Nguyen and its language of maternal cer-
tainty. As a Minnesota court stated in In re Custody of J.J.S.,174 the
state does not violate constitutional equality guarantees by investing
mothers with exclusive custody of their nonmarital children because
birth renders mothers, but not fathers, identifiable.175
2. Nonbiological Mothers. - Constitutional law's logic of maternal
certainty also has played a role in curtailing the rights of nonbiological
mothers. Take, for instance, the "presumption of maternity" for same-
166 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.I441(3)(a)(i) (West 2020) (imposing an additional re-
quirement on alleged fathers, in cases of children born into a married household, that they show
they "did not know or have reason to know that the mother was married at the time of conception").
167 Grimes, 839 N.W.2d at 242.
168 Id. at 245.
169 Id. (emphasis added).
170 Id. (quoting Rose v. Stokely, 673 N.W.2d 413, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)).
171 Id. (quoting Rose, 673 N.W.2d at 421).
172 Id. (quoting Rose, 673 N.W.2d at 421).
173 For a list and critique of state statutes that invest biological mothers with sole physical and
legal custody of their children at birth, but require fathers to affirmatively seek custodial responsi-
bility through legal action, see Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 204 n.204 (2015). See also id. at 227 ('The fifteen
states that currently grant sole custody to an unmarried mother should repeal these laws and replace
them with a legal rule that grants custody to both parents." (footnote omitted)).
174 Hassinger v. Seeley (In re Custody of J.J.S.), 7o7 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
175 Id. at 71o.
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sex married female couples. States initially refused to extend the pre-
sumption to that class, and courts justified those refusals by relying on
Nguyen, reasoning that the marital presumption existed as a way of "de-
termining whether a man is a child's biological father," not whether a
woman is a biological mother.1 6 Invoking the language of Nguyen, one
court noted that "fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with
regard to proof of biological parenthood."17 Whereas "it is generally
not difficult to determine the biological mother of a child,"" the court
continued, "birth reveals nothing about the identity of the child's bio-
logical father."17 9 Another court remarked in a related context hat "[i]t
does not violate equal protection to acknowledge basic biological truths,"1 0
quoting Nguyen for the proposition that failing to do so "risks making the
guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so disserving it."181
Today, most jurisdictions that have considered this issue have ex-
tended the marital presumption to the wives of birth mothers,18 2 often
citing to Obergefell v. Hodges 1 3 and its mandate of sexual orientation
equality in matters relating to marriage and parenthood.18 4  Even so,
some significant holdouts remain. A Texas court, for instance, recently
refused to apply the presumption to the wife of a birth mother.18 5  Sim-
ilarly, the State Department has refused to extend the presumption to
married same-sex couples - indeed, has refused to recognize married
same-sex couples as even married - for the purpose of recognizing their
children born overseas as children born "in wedlock."186  In addition,
176 E.g., Turner v. Steiner, 398 P3 d 110, 114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Hall v. Lalli, 977 P2d
776, 780-8' (Ariz. iggg) (en banc)), abrogated by McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P 3 d 492 (Ariz. 2017).
177 Id. at 115 (quoting Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001)).
178 Id. (quoting Adoptive Parents of M.L.V v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1og (Ind. 1992)).
179 Id. (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63).
180 Smith v. Pavan, 5o5 S.W.3 d 169, 181 (Ark. 2016), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2076-77 (2017) (per
curiam) (holding that Arkansas's refusal to record the wife of a birth mother on a birth certificate,
even as the state required a hospital to record the husband of a birth mother on a birth certificate,
violated Obergefell v. Hodges's holding that the Constitution requires the state to extend same-sex
marriage as well as its attendant benefits to same-sex couples).
181 Id. (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73).
182 For a list of these states, see NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2363 app. A.
183 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (holding that the Federal Constitution protects a right to marry
that includes same-sex couples).
184 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P 3 d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017). Courts (like in McLaughlin)
also have cited to Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, see, e.g., McLaughlin, 401 P 3 d at 498, which
itself cited to Obergefell for the proposition that the Constitution requires that the state afford same-
sex couples the entire "constellation of benefits" afforded to married opposite-sex couples, including
the right to be listed on a marital child's birth certificate, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (quoting Ober-
gefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
185 See In re A.E., No. o9-16-ooo9, 2017 WL 1535101, at *1, *8 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 2017).
186 Currently, the State Department considers children born overseas to a married, opposite-sex
couple, at least one member of which is a United States citizen, to be born "in wedlock," but treats
children born overseas to a married, same-sex couple as born "out of wedlock." See Dvash-Banks
v. Pompeo, No. CV 18-523, 2019 WL 911799, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019); see also id. at *7-8
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the maternal presumption today remains unavailable for nonbiological
mothers in opposite-sex marriages - mothers for whom the maternal pre-
sumption has proven unavailing because of the logic of maternal certainty.
Cases from California further illustrate this point. In one, Amy G. v.
M. W, 187 a court refused to extend a maternal presumption to the wife
of a man who became a father with another woman, even though state
law extended a paternal presumption to the husband of a woman who
became a mother with another man.18 8 Citing Nguyen, the court re-
marked that different treatment of the wives of biological fathers and
the husbands of biological mothers passed constitutional scrutiny since
"[tihe difference between men and women in relation to the birth process
is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid [the
Legislature] to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each
gender."i1s9
In another, In re D.S.,1 90 a nonbiological mother who had raised her
husband's biological child for several years, while the biological mother
was absent, argued that California law ought to allow her to bring a
maternity action against the biological mother, just as it allows third
(rejecting the State Department's argument and holding that a child born overseas to a married,
same-sex couple, one member of which is a United States citizen, was a child born in wedlock for
federal immigration purposes). In other words, the State Department applies the parental presump-
tion to married, opposite-sex couples but not to married, same-sex couples. The State Department's
"in wedlock/out of wedlock" distinction has made it difficult, if not impossible, for certain children
born overseas to married, same-sex couples to get United States citizenship, given that the eligibility
requirements for children born abroad to married parents are easier to satisfy than the eligibility re-
quirements for children born abroad to unmarried parents. See, e.g., Sarah Mervosh, Gay U.S. Couple
Sues State Dept. for Denying Their Baby Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2SyxS7U [https://perma.cc/SNY7-LLNT] (noting that three same-sex couples were
suing the State Department for denying citizenship to their children born abroad, and that "gay
couples argue that they are far more likely to be questioned about their conception methods when
applying for citizenship"). The State Department contends that for children born overseas to be
considered born "in wedlock," they must be born to two biological parents, see 8 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2 (2018), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/oSFAM/
oSFAMo304oJ.html [https://perma.cc/CgMW-5GCM], even though the Department does not genet-
ically test the children born overseas to a married, opposite-sex couple to determine a biological
connection to both parents, see id. § 304.1-1. If the traditional parental presumption assumed bio-
logical connection because of marriage, then the State Department's current interpretation of the
presumption assumes marriage because of (presumed) biological connection. Put differently, the
appearance of biological relatedness here creates marriage, whereas traditionally marriage created
the appearance of biology. In this sense, married, same-sex couples are triply punished: first, be-
cause their children are denied a legal relationship to both parents; second, because their children
are denied United States citizenship; and third, because the couples are denied a legal marriage
under federal law.
18 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Ct. App. 2006).
188 Id. at 299, 304.
189 Id. at 308 (second alteration in original) (quoting Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001)).
190 Elizabeth D. v. San Diego Cty. Health & Human Servs. Agency (In re D.S.), 143 Cal. Rptr.
3d go8 (Ct. App. 2012).
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parties to bring a paternity claim against a biological father.19 1 Reject-
ing her claim, the In re D.S. court recognized that California law allowed
certain women to contest the maternity of birth mothers, but reasoned
that such a situation did not apply outside the "rare" case, like surrogacy
or two mothers in a same-sex relationship.1 9 2 Notably, In re D.S. also
rejected the biological mother's claim that California law ought to rec-
ognize conclusive acknowledgments of maternity (by birth mothers), just
as it recognizes conclusive acknowledgments of paternity 193 In support
of its rejection of both maternal claims, In re D.S. cited to Nguyen, de-
claring that mothers and fathers are inherently different and reasoning
that "proof of motherhood . . . is inherent in birth itself," 1 9 4 whereas
"[ildentifying a child's father is not as obvious."1 9 5
Finally, while subtle, the logic of maternal certainty could also ani-
mate another form of discrimination against nonbiological mothers: the
law's refusal to uphold surrogacy agreements when intended mothers
lack a genetic relationship to the children that surrogates bear.196
NeJaime argues that this genetic-relatedness requirement for intended
mothers suggests that modern law continues to "organize the legal fam-
ily around a biological mother,"197 and that biological maternity, unlike
biological paternity, continues to anchor the legal family, even amidst
advances in alternative reproduction that facilitate nonbiological mater-
nity.198 Surrogacy law's continuing obsession with genetic maternity
(but not genetic paternity)199 in the modern era hearkens back to the
logic of maternal certainty because it suggests that the law is unable to
envision the family without a certain and obvious mother. Put differ-
ently, the law has grown so habituated to the idea of maternal certainty
that it struggles to envision the family in its absence.
3. Transgender Discrimination. -Constitutional law's logic of ma-
ternal certainty has recently influenced a setting that is unrelated to
parenthood and parental rights: transgender discrimination. In a Title
VII transgender discrimination case that is now before the Supreme Court,
for example, an employer has cited to the section in Nguyen addressing
maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty to support the employer's
191 Id. at 919-20, 922-23.
192 Id. at 924.
193 Id. at 923, 927.
194 Id. at 924 (omission in original) (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64).
195 Id. (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65).
196 See infra section III.A.I, pp. 2266-76; see also NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2326.
197 NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2316.
198 Id. at 2314-16.
199 To clarify: genetic maternity states require intended mothers that are parties to a surrogacy
agreement, but not intended fathers, to have a genetic connection to the child in order for the agree-
ment to be valid. For a discussion of this issue, see id. at 2309-16.
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refusal to recognize an employee's sex and gender identity.200 A school
district in Jacksonville, Florida, also appealed to Nguyen to justify the
school's decision to prohibit a transgender male high school student
from using the male restroom.20 1  In the school's view, Nguyen sup-
ported the school's argument that essential biological differences be-
tween the sexes justified a policy under which a student's sex assigned
at birth determined which bathroom he could use. 2 0 2
In some of these cases, defendants' invocation of Nguyen and its ma-
ternal (and paternal) logic has been unsuccessful. The court in Florida's
transgender bathroom case, for instance, reasoned that Nguyen and sim-
ilar cases were inapposite because "[t]he school bathroom policy does
not depend on something innately different between the bodies of boys
and girls or what they do in the bathroom."2 0 3 In other cases, however,
courts have credited such arguments, reasoning that the unwed-father
cases and their notions of maternal certainty and paternal uncertainty
are relevant to the constitutional question of bathroom choice for
transgender people.
Representative here is Carcafio v. McCrory2 0 4 a federal district court
decision addressing the legality of a (now partially defunct)2 0 5 North
Carolina law, which, among other things, required individuals through-
out the state to use public bathrooms corresponding to their "biological
sex. "206 While Carcafio found that the law likely violated Title IX's
proscription against sex discrimination,2 07 it did not hold that the law
200 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note ii, at 14, 35 (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68); Reply
Brief for Petitioner, supra note ii, at 5 (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68).
201 Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd., 318 E Supp. 3 d 1293, 1318, 1320, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2018)
(finding that a public school's refusal to allow a transgender male student to use the male restroom
violated Title IX's proscription against sex and gender discrimination as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
202 Id. at 1317-18 (summarizing these arguments).
203 Id.
204 203 E Supp. 3 d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
205 The provision of the law at issue in Carcaho - the mandatory bathroom provision for
transgender individuals - was repealed in 2017. See Camila Domonoske & James Doubek, North
Carolina Repeals Portions of Controversial "Bathroom Bill," NPR: THE Two-WAY (Mar. 30, 2017,
3:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/03/30/522009335/north-carolina-
lawmakers-governor-announce-compromise-to-repeal-bathroom-bill [https://perma.cc/5JRX-E8Rg].
206 2Q16 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, H§ 1.2-1.3, repealed by 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4, § I.
207 See Carcaho, 203 E Supp. 3 d at 639. When Carcaho was decided, the Department of Education
interpreted Title IX to include transgender discrimination within that law's definition of proscribed
sex discrimination. See Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students from Catherine E.
Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy
Assistant Atty Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Justice 2 (May 13, 2Q16),
https://WWW2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-2oI6o5-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XgB6-3WZ8]. However, in 2017, the Department of Education rejected this interpreta-
tion. See Jeremy W. Peters, Jo Becker & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Rescinds Rules on Bathrooms




violated the Equal Protection Clause.208 Finding that physiological dif-
ferences (rather than unconstitutional sex stereotypes) justified the law,
Carcailo cited to and quoted Nguyen at length,2 0 9 favorably channeling
Nguyen's recognition that "[t]here is nothing irrational or improper in
the recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the mother's knowledge
of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way
not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father."2 1 0
Judicial reliance on Nguyen - and specifically on Nguyen's idea that
maternal identity is always obvious and certain - to justify transgender
discrimination shows just how far the logic of maternal certainty and
paternal uncertainty has traveled in the law, from the illegitimacy and
unwed-fathers' rights cases to more recent decisions dealing with non-
biological mothers and transgender discrimination. It also shows that
this logic has seeped into nonconstitutional settings, even though it orig-
inally emerged as a constraint on the constitutional rights of unwed fathers.
Consider in this regard the role that maternal certainty has played
and, indeed, is playing in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v.
EEOC,2 11 the transgender discrimination case mentioned above currently
before the Supreme Court. R. G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes addresses
the question whether transgender discrimination constitutes impermis-
sible sex discrimination under Title VII, not the Constitution.2 1 2 Nev-
ertheless, just as other bodies of constitutional doctrine have influenced
interpretations of Title VII,213 constitutional law's logic of maternal cer-
tainty has emerged in the arguments made by R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes's defendant-employer, who has contended that maternal
certainty supports a reading of Title VII that limits that statute to pro-
hibiting sex, but not gender identity, discrimination.2 14 In a brief, the
defendant-employer cited Nguyen for the proposition that "'[p]hysical
differences between men and women' relating to reproduction - the
208 See Carcalho, 203 E Supp. 3 d at 645.
209 Id. at 642-43.
210 Id. (omission in original) (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001)).
211 No. I-lo7 (U.S. argued Oct. 8, 2019).
212 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note ii, at i.
213 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 E3 d 339, 349-52 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating, in
holding that sexual orientation discrimination is impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII,
that "[t]oday's decision must be understood against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's decisions,
not only in the field of employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation," id. at 349, and citing cases like Obergefell v. Hodges in support
of that idea, see id. at 349-5o). But see id. at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (faulting the Hively majority
for "conflat[ing] the distinction between state action, which is subject to constitutional limits, and
private action, which is regulated by statute," and for importing the "Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses" into its Title VII analysis).
214 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note ii, at 5.
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very features that determine sex - are not 'gender-based stereo-
type[s]."'1215 The defendant-employer did so to support its argument that
refusing to recognize an employee's ex and gender identity is not a Title
VII violation, since "sex itself . .. is not a stereotype."216 The defendant-
employer's argument suggests that maternal certainty is not just a re-
productive difference associated with sex, but the reproductive differ-
ence that defines sex. On this view, maternal certainty and paternal
uncertainty lie at the heart of sex itself.
The deficiencies of the defendant-employer's argument are beyond
the scope of this Article, but suffice it to say here that a constitutional
idea relating to unwed mothers, fathers, and sexual reproduction is being
deployed to support discrimination against a transgender employee for
her gender identity. Somehow, the logic of maternal certainty has be-
come the justificatory backdrop for discrimination against employees
for their sex and gender presentation. Constitutional law's logic of ma-
ternal certainty has leached not only into nonconstitutional terrain, such
as Title VII, but also into territory that bears little resemblance to the
one in which that logic originally took root.
II. THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Constitutional law's image of maternity warrants reform for several
reasons. Constitutional maternity perpetuates stereotypes about men
and women, generalizes about pregnant women, and is in tension with
constitutional law's disestablishment idea. This Part considers each de-
ficiency in turn.
A. Constitutional Maternity Perpetuates Sex Stereotypes
Constitutional maternity reflects and reproduces harmful stereotypes
about mothers and fathers because it assumes that mothers have special
relationships with their children that fathers lack, in large part because
of mothers' "certain" biological relationship to their children.2 17  "An
215 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68).
216 Id.
217 Of course, not all women (or mothers) are presumed to be naturally maternal, as this assump-
tion is itself dependent on racial and class priors. A rich body of scholarship explores and exposes
how the law, including constitutional law, privileges, protects, and idealizes white and affluent
mothers but disciplines, controls, and punishes mothers of color and economically disadvantaged
mothers. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY io (Vintage Books iggg) (1997) (observing that "[c]ontrary to
the ideal white mother, Black mothers had their own repertory of images that portrayed them as
immoral, careless, domineering, and devious"); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public
Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER II3, I16-17 (201I) (arguing that a Medicaid program designed
to subsidize prenatal healthcare functions as a "gross and substantial intrusion by the government
into poor, pregnant women's private lives," id. at ii6); Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657, 1664 (2008) (arguing that the law "polic[es] reproduction" through
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unwed mother's connection to her child is objectively apparent" through
pregnancy and birth, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned in In re Adoption
of J.S., and her social relationship to her child is objectively established
by her decision "to carry the child to term (and not ending [the pregnancy]
by abortion or emergency contraception).218 "An unwed father's role,"
it continued, "is inherently different."2 1 9
Pregnancy alone, however, is insufficient "proof" of commitment,220
as not all women bond with the genetically related child that they bear
in the same way, notwithstanding their genetic and gestational attach-
ments to that child; some women might never form a maternal bond at
all.221 Moreover, many fathers create significant attachments to their
children, sometimes after birth and sometimes in utero.2 2 2 Witness the
father in Nguyen v. INS, who raised his son in the United States from
the time his son was six years old, 2 2 3 or the father in In re Adoption of
J.S., who tried to develop a relationship with his son but whose efforts
were frustrated by the Utah Supreme Court on the barest of technical
grounds.2 24
In addition, even assuming that maternal nonbonding and paternal
bonding were exceptional circumstances - neither of which likely is,
given the definition of "exceptional" as "unusual," "special," and "out of
the uneven application of fetal drug laws to "the less sophisticated, less powerful members of soci-
ety," and particularly "poor women of color"); Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN.
L. REV. 367, 431 (2017) (stating that "[m]any women ... are seen as undesirable mothers," and that
"any discussion of the rules of maternity must acknowledge that large numbers of women are told
not to be mothers at all").
218 Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.), 358 P 3 d Joog, 1030 (Utah 2014).
219 Id. at 1031; see also In re S.D., 250 So. 3 d 1o97, log8-gg (La. Ct. App. 2018) (favorably citing
Adoption ofJ.S. and Lehr for the proposition that state laws requiring unwed fathers to take af-
firmative steps to preserve their rights to biological children did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
and reasoning that "[a]n unwed mother's connection to her child is objectively apparent," id. at
iogg, whereas an unwed father's connection is "inherently different," id.).
220 Future work by the author will explore this relationship between pregnancy and "proof" in
the context of parentage disputes, the criminal law, and even employment law, where women's
pregnancies often function as "proof" of behavior to which the employer might object on religious
grounds (for example, premarital sex, artificial reproduction, surrogacy). On this latter point, see
generally Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083,
2135-40 (201 7).
221 See ORNA DONATH, REGRETTING MOTHERHOOD: A STUDY (2017) (documenting the
personal experiences of women who regret having children); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, i S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 143 (1992) ('Not all women
feel so passionately about their babies, and not all women feel immediately such intense emotions.").
222 See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 44, at 311 n.5 (listing authorities that discuss "prena-
tal attachment from both maternal and paternal perspectives").
223 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001).
224 See Adoption ofJ.S., 358 P 3 d at 1011-12 (noting that the putative father failed to file a
paternity affidavit within the time prescribed by state law).
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the ordinary"2 2 5 - the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions sug-
gested that the government engages in unconstitutional sex stereotyping
when it treats men and women as types rather than as individuals. 2 2 6
This idea did much of the work in United States v. Virginia,2 27 which
suggested that the government violated the Constitution's antistereotyp-
ing principle by failing to recognize the exceptional woman (that is, the
woman who could satisfy Virginia Military Institute's rigorous require-
ments) as well as the exceptional man (that is, the man who could not).2 28
Sex discrimination decisions predating Virginia also support the notion
that the government violates constitutional equality guarantees when it
constrains individual men and women by treating them on the basis of
generalities.229 Professor Mary Anne Case refers to this principle as
constitutional law's "sex-respecting rule," writing: "[T]he assumption at
the root of the sex-respecting rule must be true of either all women or
no women or all men or no men; there must be a zero or a hundred on
one side of the sex equation or the other."2 3 0  On this view, the state
engages in unconstitutional sex stereotyping when it fails to protect the
exceptional case.2 3 1
225 Exceptional, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
226 See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2007); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25, 729-30 (1982);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
227 51S U.S. 515.
228 Id. at 550 (observing that a gender-inclusive "remedy must be crafted" for the fraction of
women who "would want to attend [VMI] if they had the opportunity" and who "are capable of all
of the individual activities required of VMI cadets" and "can meet the physical standards [VMI]
now impose[s] on men" (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va. 1991); then quoting id. at 1412; and
then quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 89o, 896 (4th Cir. 1992))). For Justice Scalia's
criticism of this reasoning, see id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('There is simply no support in our
cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to characteristics that
hold true in every instance.").
229 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama exrel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.II (1994)('[G]ender classifications
that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statis-
tical support can be conjured up for the generalization."); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725; Craig, 429 U.S.
at 198-99. For a case decided after Virginia that also stands for this idea, see Morales-Santana, 137
S. Ct. at 1692-93.
230 Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449-50 (2000).
231 The idea that the Constitution protects the individual or exceptional case has shaped the
Court's doctrine in other areas. For instance, in Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 5o5 U.S. 833 (1992), exceptionality informed the Court's understanding of what the Constitution
requires as a matter of due process. See id. at 887, 895 (plurality opinion) (striking down as an
undue burden Pennsylvania's law requiring that a married woman notify her husband prior to
procuring an abortion). There, the joint opinion rejected the state's contention that the spousal-
notification law would have at most a de minimis effect since most married women would notify
their husbands anyway, observing that constitutional "analysis does not end with the one percent
of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there," as well as that "[1]egislation is measured
for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects." Id. at 894.
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To be sure, constitutional law's "antistereotyping principle" draws a
distinction between unconstitutional sex stereotyping and "real" biolog-
ical difference, the latter of which operates as a constitutionally ade-
quate justification for sex discrimination.2 3 2  Even here, though, the
Court has cautioned against using presumed biological differences -
even presumed biological differences relating to pregnancy - as a pre-
text for laws grounded in sex stereotypes.2 3 3 The "'[ilnherent differences'
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for
artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity."234 Maternal cer-
tainty is one such seemingly "inherent" pregnancy-based ifference that
shades quickly into a stereotype - that is, into an overbroad generali-
zation that fails to see individuals as individuals.2 35 While "it is a bio-
logical reality that a father need not be present at birth," the In re Adoption
But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141-43, 167-68 (2007) (rejecting a facial constitutional
challenge to a federal law criminalizing a certain method of abortion despite the lack of a health
exception as required under Casey on the ground that most women would not need to use the
abortion method prohibited by the law). For a critique of Carhart's logic, see id. at 188-89 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (remarking that "[i]t makes no sense to conclude that this facial challenge fails because
respondents have not shown that a health exception is necessary for a large fraction of second-
trimester abortions, including those for which a health exception is unnecessary," since "[t]he very
purpose of a health exception is to protect women in exceptional cases"). Exceptionalism has cut
in less progressive directions in the Court's jurisprudence on race under the Equal Protection
Clause, operating as a reason to condone discriminatory state action that is neutral on its face and
to constrain official attempts to foster race equality through affirmative measures. For an example,
see Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. i, 551 U.S. 701, 730, 733-
35 (2007) (striking down official programs designed to foster racial equality in public schools for
failing to satisfy strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring requirement, id. at 733-35, and stating that "[a]t
the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class," id. at 730 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. goo,
go, (1995))).
232 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1981) (upholding a sex-specific
statutory rape law by adverting to the uniqueness of pregnancy); Franklin, supra note 136, at go
('The Burger Court declined to apply the anti-stereotyping principle in domains where it had iden-
tified 'real' differences between the sexes, so in practical terms, the doctrine was limited. It failed
to reach pregnancy, abortion, rape, and sexuality - areas where sex-role stereotyping was often
strongest."); Siegel, supra note ioo.
233 See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 (2003) (observing that
state regulation of pregnancy might reflect and perpetuate unconstitutional sex-role stereotypes
reachable by Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Franklin, supra note 136, at
16o (observing that cases like Virginia and Hibbs "suggest that the biological nature of pregnancy
no longer immunizes reproductive regulation from skeptical scrutiny and that this form of regula-
tion should arouse constitutional equality concerns when it reinforces stereotyped conceptions of
motherhood and women's role in the family").
234 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (emphasis added).
235 Part IV will argue that maternal certainty in an era of alternative reproduction and nontra-
ditional family formation is always a stereotype, at least according to the Court's definition of an
unconstitutional stereotype. See infra section IVB.2, pp. 2 295-96.
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of J.S. dissent observed, "[iut is not a biological reality that a woman is
committed to the best interest of her child." 2 3 6
On this latter point, return to Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, which
upheld as constitutional a state law that gave all birth mothers, but only
certain alleged fathers, standing to rebut the marital presumption.237
Moving seamlessly from an "at birth" situation (maternal certainty) to a
"post-birth" situation (maternal caregiving), Grimes deployed the biolog-
ical logic of maternal certainty ultimately to justify uneven parenting
demands on mothers. That is, Grimes cited to Nguyen for the proposition
that mothers and fathers were differently situated in terms of biology,2 38
but in the next breath reasoned that maternal biology naturalized pri-
mary responsibility for children, even referring to the mother's singular
caregiving role after birth as a "genuinely differentiating characteris-
tic[]."1239 In so doing, Grimes obscured the fact that a mother's role as
the "primary caregiver" of her children, far from a "genuinely differen-
tiating characteristic[" 2 4 0 of women relative to men, is often a product
of social conventions and sex stereotypes - the very conventions and
stereotypes long shored up by the rhetoric and reasoning of maternal
certainty.241
236 Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.), 358 P3 d oog, 1043 (Utah 20I4) (Nehring, J., dissenting).
237 839 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); see supra pp. 2246-47.
238 See Grimes, 839 N.W.2d at 245 (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001)).
239 Id. (quoting Rose v. Stokely, 673 N.W.2d 413, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)). For another exam-
ple of this slip from maternal biology to maternal caregiving, see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 405-o6 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that maternal certainty at birth
means that after birth "the mother and child are together" whereas "[t]he father . . . may or may not
be present," id. at 405, and that "it is virtually inevitable that from conception through infancy the
mother will constantly be faced with decisions about how best to care for the child," id. at 4o6
(emphases added).
240 Grimes, 839 N.W.2d at 245.
241 Examples of that social convention abound. See, e.g., Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note
44, at 332-42 (discussing the various bodies of law, including constitutional law, that assume that
"carework during pregnancy ... whether biological or not" is women's work before birth, id. at
332-33). One prime example is just the kind of law upheld as constitutional in Hassinger v. Seeley
(In re Custody ofJ.J.S.), 7o7 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006): a mother-specific custody statute,
see id. at 7og-0o. That case, too, relied on Nguyen for constitutional support. See id. at 71o (citing
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73). To be sure, many unwed mothers might very well desire primary custody
of their children. The problem, however, is that the law automatically assigns all unwed mothers
that responsibility regardless of whether they want it or not. Contrary to Grimes's intuition, then,
"the mother is usually the child's primary caregiver," Grimes, 839 N.W.2d at 245 (quoting Rose, 673
N.W.2d at 421), not because of nature, but because of law - the very law that is authorized and
naturalized by the Constitution. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1204 n.I24 (1992); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers'Rights Are Mothers'
Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 0og YALE L.J. 1669, 1704 (2000).
Related to this point, Professor Serena Mayeri observes that a brief filed in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977), which upheld a paternal illegitimacy classification in immigration law on the basis of
paternal uncertainty and maternal certainty, see id. at 797-99, argued that "eliminating the sex-
based discrimination in the challenged [immigration] laws would actually benefit nonmarital moth-
ers," who were effectively saddled with sole parental responsibility under those laws. Mayeri, supra
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B. Constitutional Maternity Generalizes About Pregnant
Women (and Pregnant Persons)
Constitutional maternity generalizes about pregnant women by as-
suming that pregnancy (as conduct) is inherent proof of motherhood (as
status).2 4 2 In this sense, constitutional maternity coincides with - in-
deed, may have given rise to - other legal discourses that "homolo-
giz[e]"243 pregnancy and motherhood in ways that do not fully capture
the reality of pregnancy for all women.24 4 One such discourse is abor-
tion jurisprudence;245 another is recent breastfeeding legislation and the
reasoning that sustains it.246 The automatic conflation of pregnancy and
motherhood that occurs in these settings is harmful because it ascribes
the responsibilities of parenthood to a person who may lack the intention
to adopt that role. It also treats the pregnant person in reductive terms -
as a synecdoche for motherhood rather than as a full person.
Consider Roe v. Wade,247 which first established the constitutional
abortion right,248 and Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey,2 4 9 which reaffirmed that right nearly twenty years later.2 5 0
Both of those decisions repeatedly refer to women who seek to avoid
motherhood through abortion as "mothers"2 5 1  and conceptualize
note 49, at 2328 (citing Brief for Appellants at 24 n.17, Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297)). Finally,
for an analysis of this dynamic in the context of citizenship transmission laws, see Collins, supra, at
1704. There, the author explains that "[t]he legal default rule that mothers assume parental respon-
sibility for nonmarital children generally serves as the 'reasonable' or 'substantial' justification for
a concomitant allocation of parental rights: [o]ne sex-based legal rule is used to justify another." Id.
(footnote omitted).
242 See Julia E. Hanigsberg, Essay, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration
of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 374, 394 (1995).
243 Id. at 374.
244 See id. at 374-79.
245 See id. at 391-97.
246 See infra pp. 2259-60. But see Saru M. Matambanadzo, Reconstructing Pregnancy, 69 SMU
L. REV. 187, 226-27 (2016). Professor Saru Matambanadzo cites Ames v. Nationwide Mutual In-
surance Co., No. II-cv-oo359, 2012 WL 12861597 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012), as a case that distin-
guished between lactation and breastfeeding. See Matambanadzo, supra, at 226-27. Matambanadzo
explains that in denying the plaintiff's claim of nursing discrimination, "Judge Pratt noted that ...
a lactating mother[] may not even be a member of the class of persons protected under Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination," since lactation is a "medical
condition" that does not inherently involve breastfeeding. Id. at 227.
247 41o U.S. 113 (1973).
248 See id. at 153.
249 5o5 U.S. 833 (1992).
250 Id. at 846 (plurality opinion).
251 Hanigsberg, supra note 242, at 394 & n.io (remarking that "[c]ourts frequently refer to the
pregnant woman as a mother," id. at 394, and observing "this legerdemain in action" in Roe and
Casey, id. at 394 n.io, as well as in "the context of so-called 'fetal protection' cases, in which a
court is called upon to restrict a woman's behavior during pregnancy or to intervene forcibly on
behalf of the intrauterine life," id. at 394). Hanigsberg notes that Roe referred to pregnant women
in maternal terms "[forty-two] times" and Casey did so "[twenty-one] times." Id. at 394 n.io.
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women's potential health needs in the abortion setting as needs relating
to "maternal health."2 5 2 Similarly, Gonzales v. Carhart,2 5 3 a 2007 Supreme
Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a federal law that crim-
inalized an abortion method popularly known as "partial-birth abor-
tion," referred to women who underwent this method of abortion as
"mothers."2 5 4  The Court's most recent abortion decision, Whole
Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,2 5 5 is unusual in not referring to the preg-
nant woman seeking an abortion in a maternal lexicon. Rather, Whole
Woman's Health refers to the woman who exercises her right to choose
as a "woman."256
Of course, motherhood and abortion are not inherently incompatible,
as women who seek abortions might very well consider themselves to
be mothers for any number of reasons.2 57 The problem, however, is that
the law - including abortion rights landmarks - often affixes the label
of "mother" on all pregnant women contemplating abortion, regardless
of how they see themselves.
Consider also contemporary lactation law, which treats pregnancy
and motherhood interchangeably.258 In recent work, Professor Meghan
Boone shows that lactation law sometimes prohibits nonmothers from
publicly breastfeeding or expressing breast milk in the workplace.2 5 9 In
so doing, lactation law perpetuates the idea that previously pregnant
women are presumptive mothers - but in reverse, by suggesting that
only previously pregnant people who are mothers are entitled to the
panoply of benefits associated with pregnancy. If under abortion logic
all pregnant women are (and must be) mothers, then Boone's work
252 See, e.g., Casey, 5o5 U.S. at 86o (plurality opinion); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
253 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
254 Id. at 16o, 168. Carhart also credited the statute with recognizing the fact that "[r]espect for
human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child." Id. at
igg. For an analysis of the law's characterization of pregnant women seeking abortions as "moth-
ers," see Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 930 n.55 (2010). Professor Khiara Bridges argues that "within the
worldview" cultivated by Carhart, a woman seeking an abortion "is already a'mother' by virtue of
her pregnancy." Id.
255 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
256 E.g., id. at 2311. The word "mother" does not appear pertinently in the opinion.
257 For instance, in one study of the reasons why women seek abortions, twenty-nine percent of
women reported a "need to focus on other children." See M. Antonia Biggs et al., Understanding
Why Women Seek Abortions in the U.S., 13 BMC WOMEN'S HEALTH, no. 29, 2013, at 6. Addi-
tionally, a woman might seek an abortion in order to preserve her own health or because of either
perceived or actual fetal issues. Surveys suggest, however, that most women obtain abortions for
reasons other than either their own health or the health of the fetus. See Lawrence B. Finer et al.,
Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 1o (2005); see also Biggs et al., supra, at 4-8.
258 See Meghan Boone, Lactation Law, io6 CALIF. L. REV. 1827, 145-48 (2018).
259 See id. at i85o-5i.
2020] 2259
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
shows that under lactation logic all previously pregnant people who are
breastfeeding are (and must be) mothers, and not simply milk providers.260
Other examples exist of the law's treatment of pregnant women as
presumptive mothers, and of its assumption that pregnancy as conduct
and motherhood as a status are interchangeable.2 6 1 The bigger point
here is that constitutional maternity - and its insistence that "mater est
quam gestation demonstrat (by gestation the mother is demonstrated)"2 6 2
reflects and reinforces that assumption. That assumption has never held
true in all circumstances - see, for example, the case of abortion - and
is especially problematic in a world where the pregnant, or previously
pregnant, person might not be a mother, but rather a surrogate or even
a gestational father, as later Parts will address in greater detail.2 6 3 Most
important here, that assumption harms pregnant women and pregnant
persons by treating them in partial terms and by assigning a role to them
that they might reject.
C. Constitutional Maternity Reflects and Reinforces
the Traditional Family
Constitutional maternity reflects and reinforces traditional ideas
about sex (as an act), sexuality, and the family, and therefore is in tension
with constitutional principles disfavoring sexual exceptionalism and
heterosexism in familial and intimate life. For more than fifty years,
federal constitutional law has witnessed the decline of different forms of
260 Such logic has often percolated through the Supreme Court's reasoning. For instance, in a
dissent in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), a landmark case extending parental rights to an
unwed biological father, id. at 658, Chief Justice Burger emarked that the state did not violate
equal protection by recognizing unwed biological maternity but not unwed biological paternity
since "the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds ...
than the bonds resulting from the male's often casual encounter," id. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). There, maternal certainty worked in conjunction with value-laden beliefs about
breastfeeding, including the beliefs that all mothers breastfeed and that breastfeeding will neces-
sarily create a bond that is different in kind from the other types of bonds that might exist between
children and parents.
261 For an examination of the pregnancy/motherhood homology - and its disruption - in the
criminal law, for example, see Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and
Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457, 485-91 (2013). Bridges explores the disconnect between the criminal
law, which sometimes sees pregnancy as an injury in the context of rape, and cultural conceptions
of pregnancy that regard it in monolithically positive terms. See id.
262 Hill, supra note 37, at 370.
263 The problematic nature of this assumption manifests in jurisdictions where intended mothers
obtain prebirth orders declaring them, and not the surrogate, to be legal mothers before a child is
even born. See Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in
Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 634 (2005).
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sexual and heterosexual supremacy. This story begins with Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 6 4 Eisenstadt v. Baird,265 Roe v. Wade,266 and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,267 all of which pro-
tected a right not to procreate. It continues with Lawrence v. Texas,268
which held that sex does not need to be procreative - nor penetrative
in a traditional heterosexual sense - to warrant constitutional shelter.269
It culminates (so far) with the successful movement for marriage equal-
ity and its key decisional precedents, including United States v.
Windsor27 0 and Obergefell v. Hodges,27 1 which rejected the idea that formal
marriage requires heterosexual procreation in order to qualify as a funda-
mental right.27 2
These precedents collectively stand for the related propositions that
neither sex nor marriage needs to be procreative (let alone sexually pro-
creative) to receive constitutional protection. Some of them - particu-
larly Obergefell but even earlier decisions like Roe - also support the
argument that the Constitution protects procreation regardless of
whether it occurs through sexual or alternative means.27 3 Viewed to-
gether, they reject the idea that the Constitution establishes a singular
vision of sex, marriage, and the family grounded in heterosexual, procre-
ative sex.2 7 4  They also suggest that constitutional liberty and
264 381 U.S. 479, 481-82, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause protects a right to marital privacy that prohibits the government from criminalizing married
persons' use of contraception).
265 405 U.S. 438, 443, 453 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause prohibits the government from treating single persons and married persons differently with
respect to their decisions to use contraception).
266 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
limits the government's ability to infringe on a woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate
a pregnancy).
267 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (upholding the right to
abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause but permitting greater regulation
of abortion by the state during the entire pregnancy).
268 539 U.S. 58 (2003).
269 Id. at 563, 578 (striking down Texas's criminal sodomy law for violating the right to sexual
autonomy under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
270 570 U.S. 744, 752, 774 (2013)(striking down the provision ofthe Defense of Marriage Act that
prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriage).
271 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that same-sex marriage exclusions violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
272 Id. at 2601.
273 For a discussion of this possibility, see Courtney Megan Cahill, Obergefell and the "New"
Reproduction, 00 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES I, 8-1I (2oi6); Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduction
Reconceived, i0i MINN.L.REV. 617, 666 & n.248, 673-76 (2016); and Courtney Cahill, Disestablishing
the Mother, TAKE CARE (May 20, 20Ig), https://takecareblog.com/blog/disestablishing-the-mother
[https://perma.cc/NQ6U-F8WU].
274 See Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived, supra note 273, at 681.
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equality guarantees work in synergistic ways to promote more egalitar-
ian and pluralistic formulations of kinship.27 5
Constitutional maternity is in tension with constitutional law's "anti-
establishment" principle in at least two ways.27 6  First, constitutional
maternity reflects sexual and heterosexual norms by assuming that only
"[tihe mother carries and bears the child" 277 and that maternity is
"rarely . . . in doubt"278 - statements that channel a vision of procrea-
tion that is in equal parts sexual and heterosexual. Second, constitu-
tional maternity reinforces sexual and heterosexual norms by working
to curtail nonsexual, nonheterosexual parenthood. For instance, courts
have invoked the constitutional mother to deny parental rights to non-
traditional parents like same-sex couples.279 In so doing, they establish
traditional kinship even in a context where sexual reproduction is absent.
Even more, the law has deployed constitutional motherhood to sus-
tain conventional gender identity. Recall the role that maternal cer-
tainty has played in the transgender discrimination context. There, ad-
vocates and courts have reasoned that transgender discrimination does
not amount to impermissible sex discrimination because like the sex-
specific proof-of-parentage requirement in Nguyen, laws that require
people to use bathrooms associated with the sex they were assigned at
birth simply "'take[] into account a biological difference' between men
and women."12o In concluding that a trans-discriminatory law was not
based on improper stereotypes, one court emphasized the Nguyen
Court's conclusion that "[tihere is nothing irrational or improper in the
recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the mother's knowledge of
the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not
guaranteed in the case of the unwed father."28 1
The fact that the unwed-father doctrine - stating that men and
women are fundamentally different with respect to the obviousness of
maternal identity relative to that of paternal identity - is now surfacing to
justify transgender discrimination suggests that constitutional maternity
275 For analysis of the synergies between equality and liberty in Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence, see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, I17 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902-07, 1902 n.32 (2004).
276 For an explanation of the constitutional disestablishment idea, see sources cited supra note 61.
277 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
278 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (plurality opinion).
279 See, e.g., Turner v. Steiner, 3 9 8 P 3 d 110, 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2ol7) (justifying the state's refusal
to extend a marital presumption to the wife of a birth mother by citing to Nguyen and its disquisition
on maternal certainty), abrogated by McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P 3 d 492 (Ariz. 2017).
280 Carcaijo v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3 d 615, 642 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (quoting Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 64 (2001)).
281 Id. at 642-43 (omission in original) (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68).
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habitually appears to establish not just the sexual and heterosexual fam-
ily, but also the normative gender roles that render it possible. Because
mothers and fathers are inherently different with respect to parenthood,
the argument goes, it is legal to discriminate against someone for their
perceived sex and gender nonconformity. The law of sex and gender
discrimination begins with the family, notwithstanding the rich body of
constitutional law that requires the family's disestablishment.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE MATERNAL MODEL
Constitutional law's idea of maternal certainty has grown stronger
and more expansive over time, evolving from a "bloodless" justification
for illegitimacy classifications28 2 into a freestanding and independent
justification for constitutionally challenged sex and gender discrimina-
tion both in and outside of parenthood. Constitutional law's idea of
maternal certainty also warrants reform, tethered as it is to outmoded
conceptions and stereotypes about sex, gender, parenthood, and the family.
This Part offers a model for reform: the vision of maternity unfolding
today on the ground under state family law, which has had to grapple
with maternity disputes arising from alternative reproduction and new
forms of kinship. That maternity, referred to as "the new maternity,"
descriptively departs from constitutional law's paradigmatic mother: a
singular and obvious woman in whom biological, social, and legal moth-
erhood converge. It also offers a richer and more normatively satisfying
account of motherhood than the one that dominates constitutional law,
which remains grounded in regressive understandings of sex, gender,
parenthood, and the family.
Of course, motherhood has always been less tidy and more compli-
cated than constitutional law assumes, even before the advent of alter-
native reproductive technologies and novel family formation. Paternal
uncertainty has been a cultural obsession at least since Oedipus Rex, but
it bears remembering that Oedipus was just as mistaken about his
mother, Jocasta, as he was about his father, Laius. 28 3 Uncertain maternity
also concerned the writers of the first Book of Kings, which recounts the
story of King Solomon and his solution to contested maternity,284 and
282 Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF.
L. REV. 1277, 1333 (2015) (referring to the illegitimacy cases that upheld illegitimacy classifications
because of concerns relating to paternal proof as "relatively bloodless decisions").
283 See SOPHOCLES, THE OEDIPUS CYCLE 65-75 (Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald trans.,
1949). In the first play of Sophocles's trilogy, Oedipus Rex, Oedipus learns that he has married his
mother (Jocasta) after killing his father (Laius). Id. at 62-63.
284 1 Kings 3:16-28. Kings 3:16-28 relates the story of King Solomon's decision to divide a con-
tested baby in half in order to determine the baby's true mother. The King determined that the




was a familiar literary device for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
writers captured by the idea of babies switched at birth, particularly
during a time when the Industrial Revolution was destabilizing the tra-
ditional family.28 5
Furthermore, contested, disputed, complicated, or unknown mater-
nity is not just the stuff of religion, myth, and fiction. In early twentieth-
century America, contested maternity became a real phenomenon -
and a litigated issue - as women increasingly opted for hospital rather
than home births.28 6 In her recent book on the history of paternity test-
ing in the United States, Europe, and Latin America, Professor Nara
Milanich recounts these American "baby swap" cases in fascinating de-
tail, observing that the advent of hospital birthing destabilized the as-
sumption that the woman who gave birth was a child's legal mother.28 7
"In law and culture, maternity was supposedly certain, empirically ver-
ifiable at the moment of birth," Milanich writes.288 "Yet in the modern
hospital nursery, this most intimate and indelible of ties could be severed
forever by a moment of banal carelessness."289
As a more general matter, sexually produced children placed in adop-
tive families at birth might consider their biological mothers to be non-
obvious, especially if the identities of their birth mothers are sealed upon
adoption. Moreover, maternal fraud is technically possible by women;
the majority opinion in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co. in 1968 acknowledged as much when raising the possibility that its
holding "[could] conceivably be a temptation to some to assert mother-
hood fraudulently."2 9 0 Such a statement is hardly imaginable today in
unwed-father doctrine, which assumes without reflection that maternity
is "inherent[ly]" obvious and uncomplicated.2 91
Complicated even in a world of sexual reproduction, however, ma-
ternity has become especially complex in light of alternative reproduction
285 See, e.g., Lori Merish, Melodrama and American Fiction, in A COMPANION TO AMERICAN
FICTION 1780-1865, at 191, 192 (Shirley Samuels ed., 2004) (surveying this device in American
fiction); cf. Ruth Perry, Incest as the Meaning of the Gothic Novel, 39 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
261, 261-62, 264 (1998) (arguing that the prevalence of incest themes in numerous eighteenth-century
texts is a reflection of the transformation of the family and rise of the middle class that were taking
place at the time).
286 See MILANICH, supra note i, at 79-87.
287 See id.
288 Id. at 82.
289 Id.
290 Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968).




and the new forms of kinship it enables.2 9 2 Under the "new reproduc-
tion,"293 maternal identity is complicated in many of the ways associated
with paternity in constitutional law. For instance, under the new repro-
duction, maternity is sometimes "in doubt"294 and sometimes "difficult"
to determine;295 often, maternity is something that must be "gauged" by
"measures"1296 other than pregnancy and birth - measures that include,
but are not limited to, intent and conduct. Moreover, under the new
reproduction, biological, social, and legal maternity might coalesce not
in one woman, but in two.2 97 Finally, under the new reproduction, state-
ments like "[o]nly the mother carries the child," 2 98 "a mother must be
present at birth but the father need not be,"299 and "[tihe mother
is the only necessary actor at all stages of the process, from concep-
tion through pregnancy and delivery,"3 0 0 are simply wrong.
This Part challenges constitutional law's assumption that maternity
is obvious and uncomplicated because it exists in an easily ascertainable
woman who is at once a biological, social, and legal mother. It does so
by turning to family law - specifically, to parentage disputes that have
arisen under state law as a result of alternative reproductive technolo
292 While not the subject of this Article, the emerging alternative reproductive technologies that
comprise the "new ART," or "second reproductive revolution," will render maternity even more
contested and less obvious than it was under the old ART. See Cohen, supra note 38 (discussing
the "second reproductive revolution"). One such technology, mitochondrial transfer, splits not ge-
netic and gestational maternity, like surrogacy, but rather genetic maternity itself by allowing two
women to combine different DNA from their eggs to form an embryo. See Reardon, supra note 39.
Another technology is in vitro gametogenesis, which involves the creation of eggs and sperm
through human stem cells known as "induced pluripotent stem cells," or "human iPSCs"; this pro-
cess could allow a man to create an egg cell, and therefore to be a "mother" himself. See GREELY,
supra note 40, at 131-35; Sonia M. Suter, In Vitro Gametogenesis: Just Another Way to Have a
Baby?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 87, 88 (2016); Rachel Lehmann-Haupt, Get Ready for Same-Sex
Reproduction, MEDIUM: NEOLIFE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/neodotlife/same-sex-
reproduction-artificial-gameteS-2739206aa4co [https://perma.cc/6UB7 -3 5KV] (stating that with in
vitro gametogenesis a "mind-bending trick is . . . possible: that cells from a man could be turned
into egg cells and cells from a woman could be turned into sperm cells").
293 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 935
(1996) (referring to alternative reproduction as "the new reproduction"); see also Naomi Cahn, The
New Kinship, 'oo GEO. L.J. 367, 369 (2012) (describing the "new families" created by alternative
reproduction).
294 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (plurality opinion) (implying that paternal identity
is often "in doubt").
295 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 269 (1978) (plurality opinion).
296 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Helen G. v. Mark J.H. (In re Adoption Petition of Bobby Antonio
R.), 175 P 3 d 914, 924 (N.M. 2007) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
297 See supra note 292.
298 Caban, 441 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
300 Rose v. Stokely, 673 N.W.2d 413, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
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gies and the "new kinship."3 0 1 Section A looks at cases that have adju-
dicated the question of maternity in the surrogacy and co-maternity con-
texts, resolving it by looking alternatively at gestational labor, genetics,
conduct, and intent. Section B turns to more recent statutory reform
efforts, particularly the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 3 0 2 which at times
dissociates gender, pregnancy, and birth entirely by referring to the per-
son who gives birth as a gender-neutral "individual."3 0 3 Section C con-
siders state law addressing situations where the pregnant person is not
a woman, as in the case of gestational fatherhood. Collectively, these
sections challenge the factual assumptions that underlie constitutional
maternity. They also offer a maternal model that - when compared to
constitutional law's maternal paradigm - depends less on biology and
is less saddled by sex and gender stereotypes.
This Part does not provide an exhaustive overview of the new ma-
ternity in every state; other scholars have already undertaken that val-
uable project.304 Rather, this Part captures trends surrounding mater-
nity and charts the broad contours of its evolution as a result of
alternative reproduction. Its principal objective in so doing is to unsettle
constitutional law's insistence that maternity, unlike paternity, is "rarely,
if ever, in question."305
A. Decisional Law on Dual (or Dueling) Mothers
Collaborative reproduction takes many shapes and has generated a
number of legal disputes that have preoccupied courts for nearly five
decades. The decisions featured here involve surrogacy and co-maternity
disputes. Many of them involve women who have competing legal
claims to the children who result from collaborative reproduction. All
of them involve individuals pressing courts to recognize new forms of
maternity through a variety of common law, statutory, and constitu-
tional mechanisms. These decisions are as notable for their expansion
of maternity as they are for their deployment of constitutional unwed-
father doctrine to support that expansion.
i. Surrogacy. - Surrogacy goes at least as far back as the Bible,3 0 6
but became popular in the United States with the advent and eventual
increased use of two first-wave alternative reproductive technologies:
301 See Cahn, supra note 293, at 369 (using the phrase "the new kinship" to refer to the "new
communities" and families made possible by alternative reproductive technologies like artificial
insemination, gamete donation, and embryo donation).
302 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 20I7).
303 See id. § 201.
304 See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2337-47.
305 Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 839 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
306 Bernstein, supra note 28, at IIO7-o8 (observing that "[s]urrogacy by natural means ... was
practiced since biblical times," id. at iio7, and that "[t]he [B]ible tells the story of three slaves ...
who gave birth and handed their children over to their mistresses," id. at iio7-o8).
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artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.3 07  In 1976, the re-
nowned surrogacy lawyer and "undisputed father of surrogate mother-
hood"o3 0  Noel Keane negotiated the first recorded, uncompensated sur-
rogacy contract.3 0 9  While the practice of surrogacy during this early
phase was not widespread,3 1 0 it was very much in the public eye - as
well as on legislators' minds.3 11 Keane promoted surrogacy in national
media outlets as well as in his 1981 book, The Surrogate Mother,3 1 2 as
did Elizabeth Kane - one of the first surrogate mothers3 13 - who pub-
licized her surrogacy in People magazine and on the enormously popular
Donahue show.3 1 4 Kane was not alone - other women also appeared
on the Donahue show during the early 1980s to discuss their experiences
with surrogacy.3 15
In addition, in 1983, journalist Elisabeth Bumiller published a
lengthy lifestyle piece on surrogacy in The Washington Post.3 16 In that
article, Bumiller wrote, among other things, of the "[ten] surrogate-
mothering agencies [then in existence] across the country, 317 and of the
"bills [that had] already . .. been introduced in Michigan and other
states to either regulate [surrogacy] or ban it entirely." 1 She also pro-
vided intimate details about the experiences of three surrogates, one of
307 See GREELY, supra note 40, at 46-53.
308 See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 67, 83 (2007) (quoting James S. Kunen, Childless Couples Seeking Surrogate Mothers
Call Michigan Lawyer Noel Keane - He Delivers, TIME, Mar. 30, 1987, at 93).
309 See Van Gelder, supra note 56. A "typical" surrogacy agreement involved intended married
parents and a woman who became pregnant through artificial insemination, see id., and therefore
the surrogate was genetically related to the child or children that resulted. This is known as "tra-
ditional surrogacy." See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 1114.
310 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Mothers for Others, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 1983), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/I983/03/og/mothers-for-others/e6944450-foff-4174-
a5c4-9e5cegi6fbb4 [https://perma.cc/ZTC2-gTP6] (noting in 1983 that "[f]ewer than '00 babies
have been born to American surrogate mothers in the last few years"). That said, surrogacy was
certainly not negligible, either. See id. (describing the surrogacy industry that had taken hold in
the United States by the early ig8os); see also Sanger, supra note 308, at 83-84 (same).
311 See Bumiller, supra note 310.
312 NOEL P. KEANE & DENNIS L. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981).
313 See Sarah Mortazavi, Note, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for
International Surrogacy, 1oo GEO. L.J. 2249, 2250 (2012); Elizabeth Kane, Surrogate Mother
Elizabeth Kane Delivers Her "Gift of Love" - Then Kisses Her Baby Goodbye, PEOPLE (Dec. 8,
1980), http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/o,,2007805i,oo.html [https://perma.cc/V4AG-6UE6].
314 See ELIZABETH KANE, BIRTH MOTHER: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST LEGAL
SURROGATE MOTHER 75-80, log-i6 (1988). Following her experience as a surrogate and her
public promotion of surrogacy, Kane published a book condemning it. See id.
315 See, e.g., William Raspberry, "Layaway Baby," WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 1983),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/i983/02/04/layaway-baby/bi 7265 i5-a4c6-4a5o-
8ob4-o69ca345o643 [https://perma.cc/U593-BQRA].





whom remarked that she and the intended parent "talk about [the baby]
as being [the intended mother's] baby, not my baby or our baby." 3 19
As early as 1983, then, surrogacy had already started to complicate
motherhood as a social, cultural, and legal category - notwithstanding
the Supreme Court's statement hat same year in Lehr v. Robertson that
motherhood, unlike fatherhood, was an altogether easy matter.3 20  In-
deed, the Supreme Court itself was no stranger to surrogacy in 1983.
Early that year, the Court denied a petition for certiorari in a Michigan
surrogacy case,321 one in which intended parents argued that Michigan's
effective surrogacy ban violated the Federal Constitution's right to pri-
vacy as embodied in decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v.
Wade.3 2 2 Invoking Roe to support a right to parenthood through surro-
gacy made some sense, as Roe not only reaffirmed an individual right
to privacy but also explicitly suggested that alternative reproductive
technologies - including "implantation of embryos, artificial insemination,
and even artificial wombs"3 2 3 - were relevant to certain constitutional
questions, including the question of "what is life?" as well as, perhaps,
the question of "who is a mother?"3 2 4
By the mid-to-late i 980s, surrogacy was no longer a completely novel
social, cultural, or legal issue. In 1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court
decided the nation's first high-profile surrogacy case, In re Baby M, in
which the court unanimously held that a traditional surrogacy contract
between intended married parents and a surrogate was void. 3 2 5  Just
five years later, in 1993, the California Supreme Court upheld a surro-
gacy agreement in Johnson v. Calvert.3 26
Unlike Baby M, Johnson directly confronted the question of "who is
a child's mother?,"3 27 as the contract at issue therein involved gestational
319 Id.
320 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
321 Doe v. Kelley, 459 U.S. 1183, 1183 (1983), denying cert. to 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App.
'98'); Doe, 307 N.W.2d at 441 (upholding as constitutional a Michigan law applying sections of its
adoption law to surrogacy).
322 See Doe, 307 N.W.2d at 440-41.
323 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973). The Roe Court cited these alternative reproductive
technologies to justify why it refrained from extending independent due process protection to po-
tential life, lest the Court undermine the abortion right entirely. See id. at 159-62 (rejecting Texas's
argument that life begins at conception in part because of technological advances that render the
questions of "what is life" and "when does it begin" resistant to judicial resolution).
324 See id. at 159-61.
325 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
326 8951 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Cal. 1993).
327 That is, Baby M was a dispute between the child's biological father and the surrogate. See
Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237. Johnson v. Calvert, by contrast, was a dispute between two women who
had equal claims to maternity under state law. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 788 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing) (framing the issue in Johnson as "who . . . [a] child's legal mother" is when "a woman who
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rather than traditional surrogacy,328 as well as an intended mother who
was genetically related to the child. 3 2 9  Upholding the contract under
California's Uniform Parentage Act, the Johnson court reasoned that
procreative intent was the tiebreaker between the competing maternal
claims of two women who could equally establish parentage under the
Act, one by virtue of giving birth and the other by virtue of her genetic
connection to the child.3 3 0
Notably, Johnson invoked Lehr v. Robertson and other unwed-father
decisions not to support the surrogate, but rather to support the genetic
mother. This is contrary to what one might expect, given those deci-
sions' emphasis on pregnancy and birth as the central meaning of moth-
erhood.3 3 1 Johnson reasoned that "certain language" in Lehr and other
unwed-father cases "reinforces the importance of genetic parents'
rights."3 3 2 In so doing, Johnson drew at least an implicit analogy be-
tween Johnson's genetic mother and Lehr's unwed father, given that the
"certain language" from unwed-father doctrine to which Johnson was
referring applied to the importance of genetics for unwed fathers, not
mothers.3 3 3
To be sure, Johnson was not an altogether radical decision. The
court, for instance, rejected the possibility that a child could have two
mothers under California law.334 It also reasoned that procreative intent
was a tiebreaker in that case only because the two women could both
claim a biological connection to the child, one through birth and the
other through genetics.3a5 Had the intended mother used an egg donor,
in other words, the surrogate might have prevailed - despite the lack
of procreative intent.
Nevertheless, Johnson recognized something that the Supreme Court
had rejected during this time (as it had for decades): that motherhood,
like fatherhood, could sometimes be "difficult"3 3 6 and open to question.
wants to have a child provides her fertilized ovum to another woman who carries it through preg-
nancy and gives birth to a child").
328 Whereas traditional surrogacy uses artificial insemination, gestational surrogacy uses in vitro
fertilization, and thus "both the ovum and the sperm ... belong[] to the intended couple." Bernstein,
supra note 28, at 1I14.
329 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
330 Id. at 781-82.
331 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Justice Stewart's dissent
in Caban, which discussed maternity in terms of pregnancy and birth).
332 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786.
333 See id. That is, Johnson elaborated on the "certain language" from Lehr supporting the rights
of genetic parents by quoting the section of Lehr that states: "The significance of the biological
connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship with his offspring." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262).
334 Id. at 781 ('[F]or any child California law recognizes only one natural mother. . .
335 See id. at 782.
336 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1978)(plurality opinion) ('Proof ofpaternity ... frequently
is difficult," id. at 269, whereas "[e]stablishing maternity is seldom difficult," id. at 268.).
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Johnson went so far as to suggest that the very acts that had long con-
stituted incontrovertible proof of motherhood for the Supreme Court -
pregnancy and birth - had never been essential features of motherhood,
even before alternative reproductive technologies had complicated maternity:
It may be that the language of [California's] Uniform Parentage Act [which
recognizes genetic as well as gestational maternity] merely reflects "the an-
cient dictum mater est quam [gestation] demonstrat (by gestation the mother
is demonstrated). This phrase, by its use of the word 'demonstrated,' has
always reflected an ambiguity in the meaning of the presumption. It is ar-
guable that, while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not the
sine qua non of motherhood. Rather, it is possible that the common law
viewed genetic consanguinity as the basis for maternal rights. Under this
latter interpretation, gestation simply would be irrefutable evidence of the
more fundamental genetic relationship."3 3 7
While arguably replacing one form of maternal certainty (gestation)
with another (genetics), the Johnson majority nevertheless reasoned
about legal maternity in language that suggested that maternal status,
much like paternal status, was open to legal question - something that
had to be "demonstrated" just as paternity had to be "gauged."3 38  The
Johnson majority also rendered sex less relevant in parenthood by im-
plicitly associating fathers and mothers through genetics, which is "itself
not a sex-based reproductive difference." 3 3 9  In Johnson's telling, the
logic of maternity consolidated in Supreme Court doctrine on unwed
fathers "[had] always reflected an ambiguity,"3 4 0 and the self-evident in-
dicators of motherhood from those decisions - pregnancy and birth -
337 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781-82 (third alteration in original) (emphases added) (quoting Hill, supra
note 37, at 370 (footnotes omitted)).
338 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (observing that a mother's relationship to her child was clear
through gestation and birth whereas a father's relationship "must be gauged by other measures"
(emphasis added) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting))).
For analysis on how surrogacy during this time rendered maternity a "contested" and "contingent"
legal category, see NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2302-03. NeJaime uses Johnson and other early
surrogacy cases to conclude that "the emerging legal regulation of gestational surrogacy and egg
donation made motherhood a contested biological, social, and legal status," id. at 2303 (emphasis
added), and that "[w]ith the expansion of women's reproductive and parental options, motherhood
became contingent on social factors," id. (emphasis added).
339 NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2326 (discussing jurisdictions where "[g]enetics - itself not a sex-
based reproductive difference - can ground legal motherhood"). Johnson also pushed motherhood
and fatherhood closer together as legal categories by suggesting that California's parentage act
should be read in a gender-neutral way. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 (stating that California par-
entage law "applies to any parentage determination, including the rare case in which a child's ma-
ternity is in issue").
340 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 (emphasis added) (quoting Hill, supra note 37, at 370).
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were not, in fact, the "sine qua non of motherhood."3 4 1 "[T]he use of arti-
ficial reproductive techniques," Johnson concluded, merely "highlighted"
an "ambiguity"3 4 2 surrounding motherhood that had always existed.3 4 3
Since Baby M in 1988 and Johnson in 1993, surrogacy has surged in
popularity and use,3 4 4 leading to numerous cases across the country
where courts have had to resolve the legal question of "who is a mother?"
In some jurisdictions, courts have favorably cited to Baby M and its
exclusive focus on gestation as the legal determinant for motherhood,
even in instances where the surrogate carried a child created with donor
eggs.3 4 5  At the other extreme is a jurisdiction like California, where
courts after Johnson have conferred maternity on intended nonbiologi-
cal mothers who were parties to gestational surrogacy agreements on the
basis of procreative intent. Representative here is In re Marriage of
Buzzanca,3 4 6 a 1998 California Court of Appeal decision that held that
a child conceived with donor gametes and a gestational surrogate was
the legal child of the nonbiological intended parents who "initiated" the
surrogacy contract.347
Increasingly, courts have steered a middle path by settling maternity
in surrogacy cases on the basis of genetics, or on some combination of
genetics and intent.348 Intended genetic mothers have fared well in these
341 Id.
342 Id. at 782.
343 Id. at 781.
344 Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body Is Your Business, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 647, 651 (2010) ('Surrogacy statistics are difficult to obtain, but the U.S. government conser-
vatively estimates that more than iooo births from surrogacy occur every year."). Moreover, "[i]n
2000, the CDC reported 121o attempted gestational surrogacy arrangements, twice the number
attempted just three years earlier." Id. at 65i n.14 (citing David P. Hamilton, She's Having Our
Baby: Surrogacy Is on the Rise as In-Vitro Improves, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2003, at Di).
345 See, e.g., A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-o9-ooi838-o7, 200g N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at
*9-o (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009) ('The lack of [a gestational surrogate's] genetic link to the
twins is . . . a distinction without a difference significant enough to take the instant matter out of
Baby M.').
346 Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. gg8).
347 Id. at 282. Buzzanca located maternity in the intended mother even though she lacked both
a gestational and a genetic relationship to the child. Id. The court reasoned that California law
must confer maternity on a married woman who consents to in vitro fertilization using donor gam-
etes and gestational surrogacy with a third party, just as California law confers paternity on a
husband who intends to conceive with his wife through alternative insemination with donor sperm.
Id. In both cases, intent and consent, rather than biology, were the bases for legal parenthood. Id.
at 286. Importantly, marriage also did considerable work in Buzzanca to shore up parental intent.
See NeJaime, supra note 49, at I211 (observing that "[m]arriage served as a way to understand and
legally recognize the intent to parent" for the Buzzanca court).
348 For a survey and discussion of these jurisdictions, see NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2309.
NeJaime observes that in most states, "[t]he gestational surrogate, who is not the legal mother when
the intended mother is the genetic mother, is the legal mother when the intended mother uses a
donor egg." Id. at 2309. He also notes that it is only "in a minority of states" that "surrogacy
statutes and appellate decisions expressly recognize nonbiological mothers engaging in egg-donor
gestational surrogacy as parents without requiring them to adopt their children." Id.
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jurisdictions, some of which have found that federal sex equality guar-
antees require the state to issue "declarations of maternity" on par with
"declarations of paternity" in cases where intended mothers share a ge-
netic relationship to a child born through gestational surrogacy. A New
York court, for instance, recently rejected the State's reliance on Nguyen
v. INS to justify the State's decision to place an intended genetic father,
but not an intended genetic mother, on the birth certificate of a child
carried by a gestational surrogate.3 4 9 The State's gender discrimination,
the court reasoned, amounted to "an impermissible gender-based classi-
fication between [mothers and fathers] after the birth of the child."3 5 o
Intended parents who fare less well in these genetic maternity-required
surrogacy states include single men, same-sex male couples, and nonbi-
ological intended mothers - none of whom can claim a genetic (or a
gestational) connection to the child who results from third-party surro-
gacy. As NeJaime has shown, these jurisdictions continue to ground the
legal family in biological mothers, replacing maternal gestation with ma-
ternal genetics.35 1 Courts here struggle with the idea of biologically
"motherless" families, as did a Texas court when declaring a gestational
surrogate, rather than an intended biological father who was unmarried
but partnered, to be the legal parent of twins born out of a surrogacy
agreement.352 "1n essence," the court stated, "[the intended father] seeks
a declaration that he is the sole parent and the children have no
mother."35 3
In one sense, courts adjudicating maternity in genetic maternity-
required surrogacy states are perpetuating the idea of maternal certainty
even though the traditional indicators of that certainty - gestation and
birth - have been replaced with a different indicator: genetics. As this
Article has earlier argued, the biologically certain mother is so deeply
rooted in the law's conception of motherhood that even in an alternative
reproductive era, some courts struggle to envision the family in her ab-
sence.3 5 4 The law has adapted to paternal uncertainty - and to the
possibility of nongenetic paternity - through a number of mechanisms.
For instance, the common law's paternal presumption has long recognized
349 TV. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142, 152 (App. Div. 2011). The State
there cited Nguyen for the proposition that "the biological differences between men and women in
relation to the birth process cannot be disputed." Id. at 142.
350 Id. at 15 2.
351 See NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2315 ('Same-sex couples, who are not similarly situated to
different-sex couples with respect o biological parenthood, remain particularly vulnerable in a non-
marital parentage regime organized around biological connection.").
352 In re M.M.M., 428 S.W.3 d 389, 392, 396 (Tex. App. 2014).
353 Id. at 392.
354 See supra pp. 2 239-44.
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the social rather than biological aspects of fatherhood.3 55 Similarly, vol-
untary acknowledgments of paternity, recognized in all states,35 6 might
blossom into legal fatherhood notwithstanding DNA evidence indicat-
ing a mismatch between biological and legal paternity.35 In many ju-
risdictions, however, the law continues to reach for a biologically obvious
and certain mother to render kinship legible and complete.
In another sense, though, decisional law in genetic maternity-required
surrogacy states challenges the notion of a basic and unchanging mother.
Since its appearance in the illegitimacy and unwed-father cases, mater-
nal certainty has never been an altogether lucid or stable concept. When
the Supreme Court first invoked maternal certainty in the 1960s and
1970s, it was difficult to tell whether that logic captured the genetic
certainty of the maternal relationship or the relational bond between
mother and child made possible by pregnancy and birth (or both).358 As
the California Supreme Court noted in Johnson v. Calvert, the "ancient
dictum . . . [that] by gestation the mother is demonstrated"3 5 9 has always
been ambiguous, appearing to refer to one thing - gestation - when it
might easily have been capturing another: genetics.360 This tension was
3ss See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in
the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 229 (2006) (providing an example of a court ap-
plying the presumption that the person married to a child's mother is the father despite evidence
that this person was not the genetic parent); Leslie Joan Harris, A New Paternity Law for the
Twenty-First Century: Of Biology, Social Function, Children's Interests, and Betrayal, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297, 297 (2007) (stating that historically "the legal father of most children
was also the social father, the man who functioned as their father - their mother's husband," and
that while "[t]his man was usually also their biological father, . . . even when he was not, few people
were likely to know for sure"); NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2289 ("The marital presumption histori-
cally facilitated the parental recognition of men who were not in fact biological fathers.").
356 See Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 467, 469 (2012) (observing that "in all states, opposite-sex
couples who cannot or do not wish to marry can establish the man as a child's legal father by
signing a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP) and filing it with the state vital statistics
office" and that such VAPs "have become the most common way to establish the legal paternity of
children born outside marriage").
357 See id. at 480-82 (observing that "eight states have held that a VAP should not be vacated,
despite evidence that the man was not the biological father," id. at 480-81, and that "a man who is
not the biological father can still sign a VAP, since genetic testing cannot be required," id. at 482).
358 For instance, when Justice Stewart stated in Caban v. Mohammed that "[t]he mother carries
and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear," 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)
(Stewart, J., dissenting), it was unclear whether by "parental relationship" he was referring to a
mother's genetic connection to her children or to her gestational relationship to her children - or
both. Justice Stevens later endorsed this language in Lehr v. Robertson, without clarifying what
was meant by "parental relationship." See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting
Caban, 441 U.S. at 397). The collapse of genetic maternity and gestational maternity into each
other continued in Nguyen v. INS, where the majority appeared to suggest that women have social
bonds with their children not necessarily because of gestation per se, but rather because of the
genetic connection that gestation ostensibly guarantees. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
359 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Hill, supra note 37, at 370).
360 Id. at 781-82.
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also evident in Nguyen v. INS, which insisted that birth was the consti-
tutionally relevant basis for maternity when federal law at that exact
time indicated that maternity was produced through genetics.36 1
By choosing genetics over gestation as the defining feature of mater-
nity, courts in genetic maternity-required surrogacy states are sharpen-
ing the contours of what maternity means. These states preserve the
certain mother from the past, but at the same time clarify her in ways
that disrupt one of the bases that initially rendered her distinctive: preg-
nancy. This alone is significant, as it shows that maternal meaning has
shifted and evolved over time - even in those places where the law
clings to the idea of a monolithic and unequivocal mother.
A 2018 surrogacy decision from the Iowa Supreme Court shows that
surrogacy continues to shape and clarify the boundaries of motherhood,
even decades after law's and culture's initial exposure to collaborative
reproduction. Decided nearly thirty years to the day after In re Baby
M, PM. v. TB. 36 2 upheld as statutorily and constitutionally valid a
surrogacy agreement between a gestational surrogate and an intended
father who used his sperm (and a donor's eggs) to conceive.36 3 Unlike
some of the other surrogacy decisions discussed so far, PM. did not ar-
bitrate between conflicting mothers and did not directly confront the
question of "who" is a mother. Rather, PM. was a parentage dispute
between the intended genetic father and the gestational surrogate, the
former of whom successfully asserted exclusive legal parentage of a baby
born by the latter.364
Nevertheless, PM. contributes to the question of "what makes a
mother?" through negation when it lists the reasons why the surrogate
in that case was not a legal mother. Unlike the surrogate in Baby M,3 65
PM. reasoned, the surrogate in PM. was not "choosing to give up her
own genetically related child." 3 6 6 In addition, the court then immedi-
ately noted that the surrogate's pregnancy and birth were the result of
361 See supra pp. 2241-42.
362 PM. v. T.B., 9o7 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 2018).
363 See id. at 5 24-25, 540, 544.
364 See id. at 525. Though this issue was not before the court, PM. suggested that Iowa, like
other genetic maternity-required surrogacy states, did not consider the wife of the intended genetic
father to be the mother of the child at birth because she lacked a genetic relationship to the child;
as a nonbiological parent, the wife's sole route to legal parentage was through adoption. See id. at
536 ('When the intended mother is not the egg donor, she may replace the birth mother on a new
certificate of live birth through a formal adoption.").
365 See id. at 534.
366 Id. at 537.
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the "acted-on intention" of the intended parents, not that of the surro-
gate.3 67 "But for the acted-on intention of the [intended parents]," the
court stated, "[the baby] would not exist." 6 s
Furthermore, the PM. court rejected the surrogate's argument that
enforcement of the agreement violated her federal due process and equal
protection rights.3 6 9 In an attempt to align herself with the paradigmatic
mother from unwed-father doctrine, the surrogate cited to Lehr v. Robertson
and Nguyen v. INS, contending that those decisions supported a finding
of legal maternity in her favor given their emphasis on pregnancy and
birth as inherent indicators of motherhood.37 0 As the court explained:
"[The surrogate] relies on Lehr v. Robertson, in which the United States
Supreme Court stated, 'The mother carries and bears the child, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear.'"3
71
Rejecting the surrogate's analogy, P.M. reasoned that "Lehr dealt not
with a surrogate mother but, rather, with a 'traditional' mother - the
child's genetic parent. Lehr is distinguishable for that reason. The same
is true for Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S."37 2 Rather than center mother-
hood on pregnancy and birth - as Lehr and Nguyen had done - PM.
centered it instead on genetic connection, observing that unwed-father
doctrine "based . . . constitutional rights on the father's biological con-
nection to the child, which here is superior to any parental interest
claimed by the gestational surrogate." In so doing, PM. unbundled what
unwed-father doctrine appeared to put together: genetics and gestation.
The surrogate in PM. appealed the Iowa Supreme Court's decision
to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in her petition for certiorari, she asked
the Court for a "resolution" on the question of Lehr's and Nguyen's
meaning.37 4 Specifically, the surrogate asked: "Is a pregnant mother's
interest in her actual relationship with the child she carries during preg-
nancy and after birth protected as a substantive due process liberty un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment whether or not she is genetically related
to the child?"37 5  In October 2018, the Court denied her petition.316
367 Id.
368 Id. Similar to Johnson v. Calvert, RM. moved seamlessly between genetics and intention as
indicators of parenthood - so seamlessly, in fact, that RM. at least implicitly gestured toward a
theory of parenthood by pure intention.
369 See id. at 542-43.
370 See id.
371 See id. at 542 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting))).
372 Id. at 543.
3 Id.
374 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26, TB. v. P.M., 139 S. Ct. 125 (2018) (No. 17-1631).
375 Id. at i.
376 TB. v. P.M., 139 S. Ct. 125.
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Nevertheless, PM. shows that fifty years after the law and culture
were first introduced to surrogacy, and thirty years after the New Jersey
Supreme Court confronted the question of who is a mother in Baby M,
the question of motherhood remains a "difficult"3 7  and complicated is-
sue - despite constitutional doctrine's insistence that "the identity of
the mother is rarely, if ever, in question."s3" Although the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in PM., the fact that the Court was even asked
in 2018 for a "resolution" on something that some Justices believed was
"known with certainty"37 9 is significant. It shows that constitutional
motherhood has never been self-evident, even before the practice of sur-
rogacy threw its complexity into relief.
2. Co-maternity. - Maternity also has evolved and taken new shape
in alternative reproductive settings that involve two women having chil-
dren within a preexisting relationship. Here, courts have pushed the
boundaries of motherhood even more than in the surrogacy space by
recognizing the concept of dual maternity under state parentage law -
a concept considered, and rejected, by earlier decisions like Johnson v.
Calvert.3 s0 Courts have done so not just by invoking a combination of
factors relating to intent, conduct, and biology, but also by interpreting
the unwed-father cases - which consolidated maternity in one mono-
lithic and epistemologically certain mother - to support the expansion
and distribution of maternity over more than one person.
Over the last two decades, courts have been considering co-maternity
petitions on behalf of two women who, as part of a relationship, bear
children together. In 1999, a San Francisco court granted a judgment
of parentage recognizing as the legal parents of a child two women who
jointly and intentionally participated in the child's creation, one as the
egg donor and the other as the gestational carrier.38s Since then, state
courts have increasingly recognized legal parentage claims made by two
women - even in the absence of biological connection - as a matter of
state parentage law, state and federal constitutional law, or both.
For instance, in 2005, the California Supreme Court decided on the
same day a series of cases that found that two women were the legal
mothers of children born to them during an intact, marriage-like rela-
tionship. In one of them, K.M. v. E.G., 38 2 the court extended legal par-
entage under California's parentage law to two women on the basis of
377 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (plurality opinion) (describing the question of paternity
as "difficult").
378 Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 839 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
9 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 405 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
380 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P2d 7 76, 781 (Cal. 1993)(rejecting the possibility of dual motherhood).
381 See NeJaime, supra note 49, at 1214 (describing this case as "the first of its kind").
382 K.M. v. E.G., 117 P 3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
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biology,38 3 limiting Johnson v. Calvert's declaration that "for any child
California law recognizes only one natural mother" to its facts.38 4  In
another, Elisa B. v. Superior Court,38 5 the court found that a woman
was the legal parent of twins born to her former partner even though
she lacked a biological connection to them.38 6  Grounding maternity in
intent and conduct, Elisa B. reasoned that the nonbiological mother was
a legal parent because she demonstrated an intent to parent the twins
(prior to conception)387 and functioned as a parent prior to the dissolu-
tion of the couple's relationship.38 8
More recently, the Supreme Court of Florida held that state and fed-
eral due process and equal protection guarantees required the state to
recognize two women as the legal mothers of a child born to them
through collaborative reproduction.38 9 That case, D.M.T v. TM.H., 390
considered whether the former partner of a birth mother qualified as a
legal parent under Florida law,391 which at the time did not recognize
dual maternity.392 Opening the decision of a divided court by quoting
Lehr v. Robertson and giving the nod to its recognition of the "constitu-
tional protection" afforded the parent-child relationship, 3 93 the court
held that the former partner qualified as a legal mother because she
intended to become a parent with the birth mother,3 9 4 functioned in a
parental capacity before the relationship dissolved, 3 95 and, as the egg
provider, was genetically related to the child.3 96
The D.M.T majority squarely placed the genetic mother in the same
position as the unwed father from Lehr, reasoning that she was a genetic
383 In that case, one of the women carried and gave birth to twins created with the eggs of her
partner. Id. at 68o (stating that one mother's "relationship with [children born to her partner]
constitutes evidence of a mother and child relationship under" California's Uniform Parentage Act
because she donated the eggs); id. (recognizing that the other mother was also a legal parent under
California's Uniform Parentage Act through "birth").
384 See id. at 681 (quoting Johnson, 851 P2d at 781).
385 117 P 3 d 66o (Cal. 2005).
386 Id. at 662.
387 See id. at 670 (stating that the nonbiological mother "actively assisted [the biological mother]
in becoming pregnant, with the understanding that they would raise the resulting children together").
388 See id. ('Having helped cause the children to be born, and having raised them as her own,
[the nonbiological mother] should not be permitted to later abandon the twins simply because her
relationship with [the biological mother] dissolved.").
389 D.M.T v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 327-28 (Fla. 2013).
390 129 So. 3d 320.
391 See id. at 327.
392 See id. at 356 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
393 Id. at 327 (majority opinion) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983)).
394 Id. at 338 ('TM.H. and her former partner D.M.T demonstrated an intent to jointly raise the
child.. . .").
395 Id. ('TM.H. actively participated as a parent for the first several years of the child's life.").
396 Id. at 327, 338 ('In this case, the biological connection between mother and daughter is not
in dispute." Id. at 338.).
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parent who more than fulfilled a parental role "until her contact with
her child was suddenly cut off." 3 97  It also implicitly rejected the dis-
sent's invocation of the exclusive and obvious mother from the common
law.s s That is, reaching for the maternal certitude of a former era, the
D.M.T dissent cited a 1934 case that declared that "maternity is never
uncertain";399 the dissent also rejected the possibility of "multiple moth-
erhood."4 0 0 By contrast, the D.M.T majority recognized that maternal
status - under both statutory and constitutional law - had evolved
and shifted with "advancements in reproductive technology . .. that
were not contemplated by society centuries or even decades ago."4 0 1
Courts in other jurisdictions also have extended legal maternity to
women who have engaged in collaborative reproduction as a method of
family formation based on a combination of intent, function, biology,
and even contract.402 For instance, recognizing that maternity determi-
nations in an alternative reproductive age "can be more complicated
than [they were] in the past,"403 the Nevada Supreme Court recently
elaborated on "[tihe multiple ways to prove maternity"404 under state
law - ways that line up with the "variety of ways" in which "[p]aternity
may be established."4 05
Courts in other states have established dual maternity even in the
absence of genetic maternity. They have done so by interpreting the
marital presumption to apply to the wives of birth mothers,406 by rec-
ognizing nonbiological, nonadoptive mothers as second mothers through
397 Id. at 338.
398 See id. at 337 (crediting the genetic mother's invocation of the unwed-father cases to support
her federal constitutional due process claim).
399 See id. at 355 (Polston, C.J., dissenting) (citing Gossett v. Ullendorff, 154 So. 177, 181 (Fla. 1934)).
400 Id. at 356 (alteration omitted) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. l1o, 131 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
401 See id. at 338 (majority opinion).
402 See, e.g., St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P 3 d I027 (NeV. 2013).
403 Id. at 1032.
404 Id. (emphasis added). In Damon, co-maternity was established through genetics, see id. at
1034, as well as through intent and contract, see id. at 1035-36 (accepting the argument that two
mothers' "co-parenting agreement demonstrates the parties' intent regarding parentage and custody
of the child," id. at 1035).
405 Id. at 1032.
406 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones, 40 P 3 d 492, 498 (AriZ. 2017) (finding that federal equal pro-
tection guarantees required the state to extend the marital presumption to the wife of a birth
mother); Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 45 Misc. 3 d 574, 593, 595-96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (applying
New York's common law marital presumption to the wife of a birth mother).
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the de facto parent doctrine407 or "hold out" provisions in state law,408
or by extending full legal maternity to second mothers through mater-
nity proceedings analogous to paternity proceedings.4 0 9  As one court
stated, "paternity proceedings ... should be made available to les-
bian . . . mothers"4 1 0 who intentionally engage in alternative reproduc-
tion to form a family, regardless of whether they are biologically con-
nected to their children.4 1 1
Decisional law on co-maternity shows that the pathways to mother-
hood are "multiple"412 and manifold, extending beyond gestation and
birth and approximating many of the pathways traditionally reserved
for fatherhood. Decisional law on co-maternity also shows that mater-
nity, by some courts' own admission, "can be [as] complicated" as pater-
nity.413 In this sense, co-maternity law blurs the boundaries between
mothers and fathers, renders sex or gender less relevant in the law of
parenthood,4 14 and challenges the idea - deeply embedded in constitu-
tional jurisprudence - of a naturally given, "basic," and epistemologi-
cally unproblematic mother.
On this latter point, consider the way in which co-maternity law has
simultaneously relied on the unwed-father doctrine surveyed in Part I
and unsettled that doctrine - and to an even greater degree than has
surrogacy law. Like surrogacy law, co-maternity law places genetic in-
tended mothers in the same position as Lehr's and Nguyen's unwed ge-
netic fathers in order to justify why genetic mothers are entitled to legal
407 See, e.g., Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 491, 501 (N.Y. 2016) (finding that
New York recognizes some rights attendant o legal parentage for nonbiological parents - like the
nonbiological mother in that case - who "prove[] by clear and convincing evidence that [they] ...
agreed with the biological parent of the child to conceive and raise the child as co-parents," id. at
5o); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d gg, 961, g68 (R.I. 2000) (permitting lower court to recognize de
facto parental relationship for nonbiological mother in a same-sex relationship); see also, e.g., VC.
v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42, 555 (N.J. 2000) (recognizing a nonbiological mother in a same-sex
relationship as a de facto mother); Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 P3 d 161, 163
(Wash. 2005) (same).
408 See, e.g., Chatterjee v. King, 280 P 3 d 283, 284, 286 (N.M. 2012) (finding that an adoptive
mother's former same-sex partner qualified as a legal mother under the "hold out" provision of New
Mexico's Uniform Parentage Act); see also id. (describing New Mexico's hold out provision).
409 See A.E v. K.H., 57 N.Y.S. 3d 352, 357-58 (Fam. Ct. 2009) (finding that a nonbiological former
partner of a birth mother qualified as a "parent" under New York law for all purposes because she
intended to parent a child).
410 Id. at 358 (omissions in original) (quoting In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 69o
(Sur. Ct. 2009)).
411 See id. at 357.
412 St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P3d 1027, 1032 (Nev. 2013).
413 See id. at 1032.
414 NeJaime makes a similar point when observing that courts that recognized gestational surro-
gacy agreements when intended mothers were genetically related to their children (as in Johnson v.
Calvert) "cleaved the biological process of reproduction from the legal status of motherhood, thus
weakening the justification for differences between motherhood and fatherhood." NeJaime, supra
note 34, at 2305.
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maternity as a matter of federal constitutional law. Unlike surrogacy
law, however, co-maternity law invokes unwed-father doctrine not to
replace one mother (the gestational mother) with another mother (the
genetic mother), but rather to disperse and distribute maternity over
multiple mothers. In so doing, co-maternity law disrupts a foundational
premise of the very jurisprudence on which it relies: that maternity and
paternity are not just different, but different because maternity, unlike
paternity, is located in one obvious, certain, and easily identifiable woman.
Furthermore, co-maternity law demonstrates the flexibility of
unwed-father doctrine in expanding the concept of motherhood. In the
surrogacy context, courts have turned to unwed-father doctrine to sup-
plant the gestational mother with a genetic mother.4 15 By contrast, in
the co-maternity context, courts have turned to unwed-father doctrine
to supplement the gestational mother with the genetic mother. Judicial
reliance on the same doctrine to achieve different varieties of maternity -
heterosexual maternity (Johnson) and same-sex maternity (D.M.T) -
shows just how malleable that doctrine has become, shifting and evolving
to adapt to the changing realities of parenthood generally and of maternity
specifically - the very maternity assumed by unwed-father doctrine to
be naturally given and incontestable.
To be sure, it is important not to overstate unwed-father doctrine's
progressivism in state decisional law on either surrogacy or co-maternity.
In both contexts, many courts have deployed that doctrine to reinforce
the traditional biological family grounded in genetic motherhood.4 16
Consider in this regard co-maternity cases that do not involve two bio-
logical mothers, where courts have invoked unwed-father doctrine to
deny nonbiological mothers parental rights. For instance, Russell v.
Pasik,4 17 a recent Florida district court of appeal decision, relied on
unwed-father doctrine to deny two children's nonbiological mother -
and former partner of the children's biological mother - parental recog-
nition on a de facto parent theory of parenthood.4 18 In response to the
nonbiological mother's claim that "her due process rights as a parent
[were] being infringed upon by the [biological mother's] refusal of visit-
ation,"419 the Russell court cited D.M.T for the proposition that "it is the
415 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (deciding between two mothers). The
Iowa Supreme Court in PM. would also have been deciding between two mothers had the genetic
father's wife in that case been genetically related to the child carried by the surrogate. See P.M. v.
T.B., 9o7 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa 2018).
416 See supra p. 2275.
417 178 So. 3d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
418 See id. at 59-61.
419 Id. at 6o.
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biological connection between parent and child" that matters for federal
constitutional purposes.4 2 0
At the same time, not all courts invoke Lehr to reinforce the tradi-
tional biological family. Some courts, in fact, have appeared to rely on
Lehr to support nonbiological maternity.421 Moreover, even when courts
do rely on the more conservative aspects of unwed-father jurisprudence
when extending parental rights to genetic mothers, they simultaneously
weaken other aspects.
For instance, in relying on Lehr to recognize two mothers, D.M.T
disturbed Lehr's idea of a single and monolithic mother. It also at least
implicitly unsettled a different aspect of later unwed-father doctrine: its
insistence that the Constitution does not recognize constitutional
parenthood for two members of the same sex simultaneously.422 In ad-
dition, in relying on Lehr to supplant the surrogate with a genetic mother
(akin to Lehr's genetic father), Johnson disturbed Lehr's idea that moth-
ers and fathers (and therefore women and men) are fundamentally dif-
ferent with respect to parenthood.
While not always viewed as paradigms of progressive family law, the
Court's unwed-father decisions are being reworked on the ground in
progressive ways to challenge unwed-father doctrine's foundational as-
sumptions - and particularly its assumption that paternity and mater-
nity are inherently different. Often, as these co-maternity and surrogacy
420 Id. (citing D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3 d 320, 338 (Fla. 2013)). Russell recognized that "parents
who are involved in the process of raising a child most certainly have a protected and fundamental
due process right in being a parent," even citing Lehr to support that idea. Id. (citing Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)). Nevertheless, it ultimately fell back on genetic connection as
a necessary condition of constitutional parenthood. Id.; see also Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3 d
297, 308 (Ct. App. 2006) (invoking Nguyen v. INS to justify the state's refusal to extend a marital
presumption to a nonbiological parent who was the wife of the biological father).
421 Take, for instance, Rubano v. DiCenso, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). There, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court extended de facto parent recognition to a nonbiological mother who was the former
partner of the biological mother. See id. at 961, 968. Rubano did not directly confront the consti-
tutional rights of the nonbiological mother. See id. at 961. Rather, it limited its constitutional
analysis to whether the biological mother had a "constitutional liberty interest in exercising freedom
of personal choice to prevent unwanted third parties from exercising parental rights with respect to
her natural child," citing cases like Lehr for the proposition that "a biological parent who has never
shouldered any responsibility for the rearing of that parent's biological child does not have a[n
exclusive] constitutional right" over that child. See id. at 973. But in an intriguing recent analysis
of Rubano, NeJaime suggests that "the court read constitutional dimensions into" the unwed-father
decisions' protections "of parents who lack biological ties and are not married to the child's mother."
NeJaime, supra note 47, at 330. On NeJaime's reading, Rubano deployed Lehr to reinforce not the
traditional biological family, but an alternative nonbiological one. See id. at 330-31. If he is right,
then unwed-father law has the capacity to facilitate not just nontraditional, genetic maternity (of
the sort featured in Johnson and D.M.T) but also nontraditional, nonbiological maternity (of the
sort featured in the de facto parenthood cases).
422 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 11o, 118-24 (1989) (plurality opinion) (choosing a mar-
ried, de facto father over a biological, de facto father as the legal father of a child and observing
that the Constitution does not recognize dual fatherhood).
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decisions show, mothers and fathers are more similarly situated with
respect to parenthood than the law assumes, both because of and in spite
of the constitutional jurisprudence that says otherwise. Put differently,
the body of family law addressing the new maternity uses the same con-
stitutional doctrine that creates space between women and men to nar-
row the daylight between them.
B. Proposed Statutory Reform: The 201 Uniform Parentage Act
Statutory developments in some states have kept pace with the
changing meaning of motherhood enabled by alternative reproduction,
with many states now recognizing as a matter of law the different vari-
eties of maternity discussed so far by this Article. 4 2 3 Exemplary also is
the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which could have significant
effects on statutory definitions of maternity in the near future in at least
three ways.4 2 4
First, the 2017 UPA expands how someone might become a mother
under the law beyond pregnancy, birth, and genetics. It does so by "ex-
pressly" applying "most methods of determining parentage [recognized
under prior Acts] ... without regard to gender," and by "consolidat[ing]
those methods into a single, gender-neutral ist."425 In so doing, the UPA
recognizes that men as well as women can become parents by "[holding]"
themselves "out" as legal parents even in the absence of a marital rela-
tionship to the birth parent or of a biological relationship to the child426
- a route to legal parentage previously reserved for only men under the
former UPA. 4 27 Similarly, the 2017 UPA recognizes that men as well as
women can become parents through "voluntary acknowledgments of
423 For an overview of states that now recognize de facto parentage, see Michael J. Higdon, The
Quasi-Parent Conundrum, go U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 986-ioii (2019). For an overview of state
surrogacy laws, see ALEX FINKELSTEIN ET AL., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER
LAW CLINIC, SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S. 8-11, 55 app. A (2oI6); and NeJaime,
supra note 34, at 2376 app. E. It is important to note that scholars have also been integral to the
flourishing of new forms of legal parentage, including new forms of legal maternity. See, e.g., AM.
LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 2.03(I)(c) (2002) (recognizing de facto parentage).
424 The 2017 UPA has already been adopted in full in two states. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. i5(c)
(2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A (2019).
425 COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, UNIFORM PARENTAGE
ACT (2017): WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 2 (2018); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 cmt.
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) ('Most of the mechanisms for establishing parentage apply equally
without regard to gender."); id. ('UPA (2017) merges into a single list what had been separate sub-
sections for establishing the parentage of women and men.").
426 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (gender-neutral "holding out" provision).
427 See, e.g., id. § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002) ('A man is presumed to be the father of
a child if[,] ... for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the
child and openly held out the child as his own.").
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parentage428 - another route to legal parentage previously reserved for
only men under the former UPA. 4 2 9 In addition, the 2017 UPA supple-
ments birth as the sole route to legal maternity by recognizing that some
women might become mothers through orders or judgments, as when
an intended mother receives "an order or judgment . .. declaring [her to
be the mother of a child born by a gestational surrogate] ... on the birth
of the child." 4 3 0 All of these provisions show that birth is not a necessary
condition of maternity, challenging the notion that having given birth is
essential to maternity.431 They also suggest that maternity can be
"demonstrated"4 3 2 through formal law and process (orders, judgments,
acknowledgments) as well as through biology, just as paternity has long
been "gauged" by nonbiological "measures."433
Second, the UPA expands who might qualify as a mother beyond the
monolithic mother envisioned in constitutional jurisprudence, and even
beyond the dualistic mothers discussed above. The UPA does so by
recognizing that a child could have more than two legal parents - and
therefore more than two mothers - in "rare circumstances."434 Poly-
parentage - and, by implication, poly-maternity - "is consistent with
an emerging trend permitting courts to recognize more than two people
as a child's parents,"435 the comment to the UPA states.
Third, the UPA at times unsettles the link between pregnancy and
maternity by referring to the person who gives birth as a gender-neutral
"individual" or "person" rather than as a "mother" or even a "woman."436
For instance, under its "gender-neutral ist" addressing the "establishment
of a parent-child relationship,"4 37 the UPA first lists "the individual
[who] gives birth to the child." 4 38 To be sure, the UPA does not eliminate
gender entirely, as other key provisions refer to the person who gives
428 Id. § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) ('A woman who gave birth to a child and an alleged
genetic father of the child, intended parent under [Article] 7, or presumed parent may sign an ac-
knowledgment of parentage to establish the parentage of the child." (alteration in original)).
429 Id. art. 3 cmt. (stating that "Article 3 of UPA (2002) referred only to the establishment of
paternity through this administrative process," whereas "UPA (2017) makes Article 3 gender neutral
and refers to the establishment of parentage through the acknowledgment process for an alleged
genetic father, an intended parent, and a presumed parent, allowing Article 3 to apply to both men
and women").
430 Id. § 81(a)(i).
431 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) ('[P]roof of motherhood ... is inherent in birth
itself. . . .').
432 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Hill, supra note 37, at 370).
433 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
434 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613 cmt. (UNiF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
435 Id.
436 Id. § 201(I) (referring to the "individual [who] gives birth to the child").
437 Id. § 201.
438 Id. § 201(I) (emphasis added).
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birth as a "woman."439 Nevertheless, by using gender-neutral anguage
at some points when discussing pregnancy, the UPA disaggregates sex
from constitutional law's most relevant sex-based difference.
C. Gestational Fathers
Another on-the-ground development that complicates traditional
maternity is the rise of transgender gestational fathers and nonbinary
pregnant persons, both of whom decouple sex, gender, and gestation. If
alternative reproduction and the new parenthood destabilize the consti-
tutional mother by showing that sometimes the woman who gives birth
is not the mother, then gestational fatherhood and nonbinary pregnancy
destabilize the constitutional mother by showing that sometimes the per-
son who gives birth is not a woman.
Statistical data on the actual numbers of transgender and nonbinary
pregnancies in the United States do not exist. That said, numerous un-
official sources, including "news reports, documentaries, social media
list-serves and video-sharing sites," suggest that the "numbers of
transgender individuals . . . seeking family planning, fertility, and
pregnancy services could certainly be quite large."4 4 0 That this might
be so should come as no surprise. The numbers of self-identified
transgender and nonbinary individuals have increased significantly in
recent years,4 4 1 likely as a result of growing cultural acceptance of
transgender and gender-nonbinary people4 4 2 and of the passage of more
robust state443 and federal 4 4 4 legal protections for them. In addition,
439 Id. § 204(a)(1)(A) ('An individual is presumed to be a parent of a child if ... the individual
and the woman who gave birth to the child are married to each other and the child is born during
the marriage." (emphasis added)). Use of the word "woman" rather than "individual" to refer to the
individual who gives birth predominates throughout the statute.
440 Juno Obedin-Maliver & Harvey J. Makadon, Transgender Men and Pregnancy, 9 OBSTETRIC
MED. 4, 4 (2016) (footnotes omitted). For one such unofficial social media source, see Birthing and
Breast or Chestfeeding Trans People and Allies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
groups/TransReproductiveSupport [https://perma.cc/GPXg-NAPg]. See also Clarke, Pregnant People?,
supra note 45, at 179 ('Media coverage characterizes the 'pregnant man' as a rare phenomenon, but
a number of indicators suggest pregnant transgender men are not so unusual.").
441 The out adult trans population in the United States has more than doubled in the last ten
years to 1.4 million. See ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., How MANY ADULTS
IDENTIFY As TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (2006), https://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KDgB-549D].
442 For a discussion of the increased visibility of nonbinary and gender-queer identities in culture,
see Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, supra note 45, at 898-99 ('Nonbinary gender identities are not
new, but media attention to nonbinary people in the United States has increased significantly since
2015." Id. at 898 (footnote omitted).).
443 For a recent overview of state protections for gender identity in employment and public ac-
commodations, see KAREN MOULDING & NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, I SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW § 10:7 (2019).
444 More federal courts are recognizing transgender discrimination as impermissible sex discrim-
ination under both Title VII and Title IX. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,
2284 [Vol. 133:2221
THE NEW MATERNITY
young people make up the largest share of those who self-identify as
trans or nonbinary,445 and fewer trans and nonbinary people are opting
for hormonal and surgical interventions, like hysterectomies, that would
render them incapable of pregnancy.4 4 6
It is important not to overstate legal and cultural gains in the area
of transgender and nonbinary gender rights. Transgender and nonbinary
people continue to be targets of discrimination in all areas, including in
sports,4 47 medicine,448 education,449 the armed forces,450 the family,451
884 F.3 d 56o, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that transgender discrimination amounts to illegal sex
discrimination under Title VII), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v.
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. i Bd. of Educ., 858 E3 d 1034, 1049-50 (7 th Cir. 2017) (holding that
gender-identity discrimination is impermissible sex discrimination under Title IX); see also Glenn
v. Brumby, 663 E3 d 1312, 1316 (iith Cir. 2011) (holding that discrimination on the basis of transgender
identity is illegal sex stereotyping under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
445 See Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, supra note 45, at 9og.
446 See Clarke, Pregnant People?, supra note 45, at 179 ("In the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey,
only fourteen percent of transgender men and two percent of nonbinary individuals reported having
had a hysterectomy." (citing SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.,
THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 101 figS.7.I2 & 7.13 (2oi6),
https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF [https://
perma.cc/YDN4-2L6T])). This shift is likely due in part to the fact that states no longer require
surgical interventions before recognizing legal changes on birth certificates and other formal docu-
ments. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal & Ilona M. Turner, Transparenthood, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1593,
1596 (2019) ('State legislatures and courts across the country have lowered barriers to obtaining
legal recognition by, for example, removing the requirement hat a person undergo surgery before
they can change the gender marker on a driver's license.").
447 See, e.g., Julie Moreau, Dozens of Anti-LGBTQ State Bills Already Proposed in 2020,
Advocates Warn, NBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020, 1:26 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/
dozens-anti-lgbtq-state-bills-already-proposed-202o-advocates-warn-nll21256 [https://perma.cc/
7 PV3 -F5DC] (discussing state bills that would prohibit transgender athletes from competing in their
self-identified gender category by basing athletes' competition category on their sex assigned at birth).
448 See, e.g., Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Doctors Could Face Criminal Charges for Treating
Transgender Teens, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2t4YBko [https://perma.cc/N5QC-
9 UBV] (reviewing bills proposed in South Dakota and elsewhere that impose criminal liability on
doctors providing healthcare services such as puberty-blocking medication or transgender surgery
to young transgender patients). Following the publication of this New York Times article, the bill
passed in South Dakota's House of Representatives, but it ultimately failed in the Senate. See
Devan Cole, Bill Banning Gender Reassignment Treatments for Transgender Youth Fails in South
Dakota, CNN (Feb. 10, 2020, 7:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/o2/Io/politics/transgender-
health-bill-fails-south-dakotalindex.html [https://perma.cc/7XJJ-TWWH].
449 See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., & T.E. Wheeler II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't
of Justice (Feb. 22, 2017), https://WWW2.ed.gov/about/offi ces/list/ocr/letters/colleague- 201702-title-
ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/68M3-QJLE] (withdrawing Obama-era protections extended to transgender
students in public schools under Title IX).
450 Several federal courts enjoined the implementation of Trump's transgender service ban, al-
though the ban went into effect last year when the Supreme Court lifted those courts' preliminary
injunctions. See Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.); Trump v. Stockman, 139 S. Ct.
950 (2019) (mem.).
451 See, e.g., Katyal & Turner, supra note 446,passim (reviewing and critiquing custodial decisions
that discriminate on the basis of a transgender parent's gender identity and gender transition).
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and employment.45 2 As the transgender community becomes more pub-
lic and wins legal victories in one domain, it suffers devastating defeats
in others.4 5 3 In addition, transgender and nonbinary people are frequent
victims of disgust,4 5 4 alienation, and homicidal violence,455 and are
much more likely to commit suicide than the average person is.456 Ges-
tational fathers in particular experience significant amounts of revulsion
and ridicule, as did Thomas Beatie, the first public "pregnant man,"457
and Wyley Simpson, a transgender man who said he experienced some
"abuse" when he decided in 2018 to carry through with an unintended
pregnancy.458
Nevertheless, states are starting to grapple with gestational father-
hood in ways that suggest a willingness to think about pregnancy as a
status decoupled from sex or gender. For instance, in 2014, an Arizona
appeals court reversed a lower court decision that refused to find that a
transgender man - Thomas Beatie - was legally male under Arizona
law.459 Even though Beatie had changed his birth certificate in Hawaii
452 The Department of Justice has argued that sex discrimination laws like Titles VII and IX do
not protect transgender individuals from discrimination, though courts, including circuit courts,
have increasingly held otherwise. Id. at 1596-97. Most states do not list gender identity as a pro-
tected status in their employment discrimination statutes. See State Maps of Laws & Policies,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment [h tps://perma.cc/N6L3-XK5T].
453 See, e.g., Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, The First Time I Said, "I'm Trans," N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3aHIaeS [https://perma.cc/3WNK-A3F3] (observing that while "[i]t
is awesome to think of how far" transgender people like Boylan "have come," "it's also scary ...
[b]ecause now that we're on the radar, conservatives (and others) have developed a new language
with which to demonize us").
454 Patrick R. Miller et al., Transgender Politics as Body Politics: Effects of Disgust Sensitivity
and Authoritarianism on Transgender Rights Attitudes, 5 POL. GROUPS & IDENTITIES 4, 7-8
(2017); LGBT Politics and the Impact of Disgust, U. MICH. INST. FOR Soc. RES.,
https://isr.umich.edu/news-events/insights-newsletter/article/1gbt-politics-impact-disgust [https://
perma.cc/EBH7-N5H8] (featuring empirical research investigating the relationship between disgust
and transgender-discriminatory policies).
455 Transgender women of color are especially vulnerable. See Rick Rojas & Vanessa Swales, 18
Transgender Killings This Year Raise Fears of an "Epidemic," N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2mdsCuR [https://perma.cc/YCV5-VTCY].
456 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 446, at 114 (reporting that the lifetime attempted suicide rate
for surveyed transgender individuals is nearly nine times that of the general population).
457 See AMEL ALGHRANI, REGULATING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 229
(2018) (recounting the media's "pejorative responses" to Beatie when he went public, including David
Letterman's description of Beatie as an "androgynous freak show" and other public figures' com-
ments that Beatie was "disgusting" and "useless" (quoting Alex Blaze, Hate Starts Rolling In for
Thomas Beatie, BILERICO PROJECT (Apr. 5, 2008, 3:36 PM), http://bilerico.lgbtqnation.com/
2008/04/hate startsrollinginforjthomas beatie.php [https://perma.cc/74ZY-S3MR])).
458 Char Adams, Transgender Man Opens Up About Being Pregnant, Giving Birth: "I Had to
Deal with a Lot of Stigma," PEOPLE (Mar. 7, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://people.com/human-interest/
wyley-simpson-pregnant-man-baby-boy-texas [https://perma.cc/Y7 QM-CX3 T].
459 Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3 d 754, 757, 760 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
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to male following a "sex change operation,"460 and even though he had
married a woman in Hawaii,4 6 1 the lower court held that Beatie was
still legally female and thus in an invalid same-sex marriage (in Arizona
in 2014) because he carried and gave birth to the couple's children.4 6 2
Reversing that decision, the Arizona appeals court found that Beatie's
marriage was valid in Arizona because it was "'valid by the law of the
place where contracted,' as reflected by the issuance of the marriage
license by the State of Hawaii."4 6 3
Although the appeals court decision in Beatie v. Beatie4 64 turned
principally on full faith and credit, it also addressed some of the broader
issues related to sex and pregnancy that are implicated by gestational
fatherhood. For instance, the court observed that as a matter of fact,
"there is no apparent basis . . . for the proposition that in the event
Thomas gave birth after having modified his gender designation, it
would have abrogated his 'maleness,' as reflected upon the amended
birth certificate."4 6 5 In addition, the court suggested that as a matter of
constitutional law, the state likely could not condition a birth certificate
amendment on an individual's agreement o forgo the right to procreate.
"Arizona's statute [addressing sex amendments] does not require specific
surgical procedures be undertaken or obligate the applicant to forego
procreation," the court observed.4 6 6 In a footnote, the court suggested
that if Arizona did the latter - "obligate the applicant to forego procre-
ation" - Arizona would likely violate the applicant's right to have chil-
dren, "a liberty interest afforded special constitutional protection."467
Where Beatie considered whether gestational fatherhood changes
the father's sex designation on his own birth certificate, other states have
considered whether gestational fatherhood affects the father's status on
his children's birth certificates. Representative here is California, which
now uses the gender-neutral term "parent" on all birth certificates, and
which gives parents the choice to identify as "mother," "father," or "par-
ent" on those certificates.4 68 Similarly, Illinois today allows parents to
460 Id. at 758.
461 Id. at 756.
462 Id. at 756-57.
463 Id. at 760 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112(A) (2020)).
464 333 P.3 d 754.
465 Id. at 759.
466 Id.
467 Id. at 759 n.io (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
468 Rich Vaughn, New CA Birth Certificate Law Allows LGBT Parents to Identify as Mother,





identify in the gender of their choosing on their children's birth certifi-
cates.4 6 9 A few months ago, the state refused to recognize a gestational
father as a father on his child's birth certificate, informing him prior to
the child's birth that Illinois would identify him as the child's mother
because he was the gestational parent.47 0 The state also informed the
mother, a transgender woman, that Illinois would identify her as the
child's father.47 1 After Lambda Legal challenged the misgendering of
the parents in an advocacy letter to the state, the state reversed course,
identifying the mother and father in their correct sex categories on their
daughter's birth certificate shortly after she was born.47 2 Illinois has
signaled a commitment to respecting parents' self-identification on their
children's birth certificates moving forward.47 3
IV. THE NEW MATERNITY
Family law's conception of maternity in an alternative reproductive
era - what this Article calls the new maternity - is not perfect. It
sometimes reenacts the most traditional aspects of constitutional mater-
nity, like its obsession with maternal biology.47 4 It also reinforces -
even while simultaneously pushing back on - some of the sex and gen-
der differentiation associated with constitutional maternity.475
Nevertheless, the new maternity is a good starting point for reform-
ing constitutional law's paradigm of motherhood. The new maternity
better captures today's maternal pluralism. It also has the potential to
counteract some of the most regressive features of constitutional mater-
nity, like its automatic conflation of pregnant women and mothers4 76
and its stereotypic assumptions about male and female parenting.477 In
addition, the new maternity shows that men and women are more sim-
ilar with respect to certain aspects of parenthood than constitutional
maternity presumes. In so doing, the new maternity casts doubt on legal
regimes that justify sex, sexual orientation, and gender-identity discrim-
ination by adverting to constitutional law's certain and monolithic
469 See Nara Schoenberg, In a First for Illinois, Transgender Man Who Gave Birth Will Be Listed







474 See supra p. 2250 (discussing the law in many states that requires intended mothers who are
parties to gestational surrogacy agreements to have a genetic relationship to the child in order for
the agreement o be upheld).
475 See NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2330 (discussing how the genetic maternity-surrogacy require-
ment reenacts gender differentiation in parenthood law).
476 See supra section I., pp. 2 258-60.
477 See supra section IIA, pp. 2253-57.
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mother and distinguishing her from constitutional law's uncertain and
fragmented father.
For all of these reasons, this Part contemplates how the new mater-
nity might trickle up from the family law domain where it has largely
resided and unsettle constitutional maternity, with its hidebound ideas
about motherhood, parenthood, sex, and gender.
Trickle-up maternity is not a radical idea. In some ways, trickle-up
maternity has already happened, and is an accurate depiction of how
constitutional law is made. What is significant, though, is the impact
that trickle-up maternity could have on the law writ large. Trickle-up
maternity could expand the constitutional status of motherhood to make
it more inclusive of the new maternity. It could also contract the pre-
sumed differences between mothers and fathers (and women and men)
that currently exist under constitutional maternity and its sex-based
logic of reproductive difference.
A. Trickle-Up Maternity
Trickle-up maternity - or the notion that family law's more plural-
istic and inclusive maternity might unsettle constitutional law's more
monolithic and exclusive maternity - is not a radical idea. To some
degree, it has already happened. Even more, trickle-up maternity accu-
rately reflects the way in which constitutional law is made.
Part III has shown that state family law on the new maternity has
already altered the federal constitutional mother. Unwed-father juris-
prudence establishes a singular and monolithic mother whose meaning
is self-evident through pregnancy and birth, and in whom biological,
social, and legal parenthood converges. Courts addressing the new ma-
ternity, however, have relied on that jurisprudence to locate maternity
in something other than pregnancy and birth, and to disperse biological,
social, and legal maternity over more than one mother. In addition,
unwed-father jurisprudence assumes that mothers and fathers are in-
herently different with respect to all aspects of maternity and paternity.
Courts addressing the new maternity, however, have relied on that ju-
risprudence to narrow the differences between mothers and fathers -
in a way that the unwed-father doctrine's logic of biological and repro-
ductive difference would appear to resist.
The fact that the new maternity evolved from doctrine on the old
maternity suggests that there is space for thinking about how unwed-
father doctrine might help to generate, rather than stymie, a progressive
vision of sex and the family. The Court's unwed-father decisions were
progressive in the sense that they eliminated formal marriage as the sole
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constitutional basis of fathers' parental rights,47 8 established that some-
times the constitutional rights of men and women were equal,47 9 and
prompted states to "reform[] their family law systems" to extend legal
protection to nonmarital children and unmarried parents.4 0 Neverthe-
less, scholars more commonly remember those decisions for their marital
supremacy,48 1 their molding of nonmarital parenthood in the image of
ideal marriage482 and ideal parenthood,48 3 and their logic of "real" bio-
logical sex difference48 4 - none of which is especially progressive. This
Article's look at the retrofitting of unwed-father doctrine with the doc-
trine of the new maternity suggests that even the most regressive fea-
tures of constitutional law contain the seeds of progressive reformation.
To be sure, by their own admission, courts addressing the new ma-
ternity turn to unwed-father law to clarify constitutional motherhood,
not necessarily to transform it. Return here to PM. v. TB. There, the
Iowa Supreme Court cited to Lehr v. Robertson and Nguyen v. INS not
to upend their vision of constitutional motherhood, but rather to locate
it in genetics rather than gestation.485 Moreover, as did the California
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert, the PM. court appealed to unwed-
father law to suggest that all along, the Supreme Court's unwed-
father decisions meant to protect genetic, rather than gestational,
motherhood.486
But the problem with this reading is that it conflicts with what Lehr
and Nguyen actually said. Nguyen unambiguously stated that birth, not
genetics, is "inherent" "proof of motherhood."48 7  The point here is not
to argue what the Court really meant to say in the unwed-father cases
478 Importantly, in later unwed-father decisions, the Court reestablished marital fatherhood as
the constitutionally superior form of legal parenthood for men. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 128-29 (Ig89) (plurality opinion) (ranking the constitutional rights of married, nonbi-
ological fathers above those of unmarried, biological fathers).
479 See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979).
480 NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2276.
481 See Mayeri, supra note 49, at 2334-72 (viewing the evolution of the Court's unwed-father
decisions through the lens of marital supremacy).
482 See Murray, supra note 79, at 409 (arguing that the Court fashioned the constitutional rights
of unwed fathers in the image of marital fatherhood).
483 See Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 620-21 (2013) (arguing
that the Court's unwed-father decisions required unmarried fathers to satisfy an idealized image of
male parenting that emphasized economic well-being).
484 See NeJaime, supra note 34, at 2275-76 ("[E]ven as the Court eradicated longstanding in-
equalities [in the unwed-father decisions], it preserved gender differentiation in parentage, appeal-
ing to differences in reproductive biology to justify legal differences between mothers and fathers.").
485 See P.M. v. TB., 9o7 N.W.2d 522, 542-43 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting Lehr and Nguyen as cases
that protected genetic, not gestational, motherhood).
486 See id. at 543 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993)).
487 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001).
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when it addressed constitutional motherhood, but rather to suggest hat
state courts have already reinvented the mother from unwed-father law
by unsettling that law's deeply rooted notions of maternal certainty, in-
herent reproductive difference, and unified biological, social, and legal
motherhood.
If it is true that state family law on the new maternity has already
altered constitutional maternity, then this process accurately reflects
how constitutional law is made. The conventional narrative of that pro-
cess sees "family law and constitutional law . . . [as] occupy[ing] rela-
tively separate spheres,"4 8 8 only "occasionally meet[ing] when constitu-
tional law, exercising power in a top-down way, dictates new directions
for family regulation."489 On this view, constitutional law tends to hap-
pen from above in a process of trickle-down constitutionalism that starts
with the Supreme Court and ends with state law.
Important recent scholarship reveals the deficiencies of this conven-
tional account. For example, NeJaime argues that the conventional
reading "fails to capture the dialogic relationship between family law
and constitutional aw,"490 underappreciating "the ways in which family
law exerts influence over constitutional law" by "shap[ing] the terrain
on which constitutional adjudication occurs, structur[ing] constitutional
conflict, and orient[ing] constitutional reasoning."491
Using the specific example of marriage equality, NeJaime explains
that constitutional marriage equality originated as a family law matter
long before state and federal courts began to credit constitutional objec-
tions to restrictive marriage laws in 2003.492 Starting in the 1980s, and
continuing into the early 2ooos, LGBT advocates successfully obtained
relationship recognition493 and parental rights 494 for their clients by
analogizing same-sex couples to married couples, "mapping same-sex
couples onto marital norms,"495 and "appeal[ing] to the marriage-like
relationships of unmarried couples."496 In the process, LGBT claimants
not only gained relational and parental protection, but also altered the
meaning of marriage and parenthood, loosening both of those institutions
488 NeJaime, supra note 47, at 273.
489 NeJaime, supra note 66, at 415.
490 Id.
491 Id. at 416.
492 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (striking down
Massachusetts's marriage exclusion on state constitutional grounds). National marriage equality
was not achieved until twelve years later in Obergefell v. Hodges. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
493 See Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition
and Its Relationship to Marriage, I02 CALIF. L. REV. 87, II2-54 (2014).
494 NeJaime, supra note 49, at oo88.
495 NeJaime, supra note 47, at 346.
496 NeJaime, supra note 49, at oo88.
2020] 2291
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
from their traditional grounding in "heterosexuality, gender differentia-
tion, and sexual procreation," and locating them instead in function and
intent.497 Those altered understandings in turn paved the way for na-
tional marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges, which incorporated
family law's rejection of sexual and heterosexual supremacy in mar-
riage498 and constitutionalized an image of marriage and parenthood
that could touch - indeed, has already touched - a far greater swath
of people than the minority actors for whom it was most immediately
relevant.499
NeJaime's alternative reading of the dynamic between family law
and constitutional aw suggests that there is no longer any such thing as
family law exceptionalism and "exceptional cases" within it.500 It might
also be an analogue for what is happening today with the new maternity,
as well as a prediction of what the new maternity could hold for the
future. Some courts have reasoned that maternity disputes today con-
stitute "rare" cases. For instance, in refusing to allow a nonbiological
(and functional) mother to contest the maternity of a traditional mother,
In re D.S. reasoned that contested maternity disputes were reserved
under California law for the "rare" situation like surrogacy and co-
maternity - neither of which applied in that case.5 01  On this view, co-
maternity and surrogacy were exceptional situations that had no bearing
on the court's approach to mainstream motherhood.
But if NeJaime is correct, then those "rare" or "exceptional" cases
unfolding in state court under state law might, over time, transform
constitutional maternity and its mainstream mother.5 0 2  Even to call
those cases "rare" is to obscure their frequency in contemporary family
law. In 1993, Johnson v. Calvert described contested maternity as a legal
rarity.5 03 But that was over a quarter century ago, when surrogacy was
less common. Today, the mother described by the new maternity is
497 NeJaime, supra note 47, at 346.
498 See id. at 351-54.
499 For Obergefell's application to nonmarriage, an increasingly common relationship in the
twenty-first century, see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage,
g7 B.U. L. REV. 425, 430, 432-33 (201 7).
500 See NeJaime, supra note 67, at 35 (discussing the dialogic relationship between exceptionality
and the mainstream); see also Cahill, supra note 40, at 51 n.258 (discussing the dialogic relationship
between central and marginal forms of kinship in American law).
501 Elizabeth D. v. San Diego Cty. Health & Human Servs. Agency (In re D.S.), 143 Cal. Rptr.
3 d gi8, 99, 924 (Ct. App. 2012).
502 See NeJaime, supra note 67, at 7 (discussing how "[s]ame-sex couples leveraged ... excep-
tional cases in ways that dramatically broadened their reach - transforming exceptions into rules").
503 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) (referring to the "rare case in which a child's
maternity is in issue").
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decreasingly rare, and her influence on the law of motherhood is increas-
ingly manifest.5 0 4
In addition, it is important to remember that the law of unwed fa-
therhood has shaped doctrine in universal ways even though it emerged
in a minority area. The logic of maternal certainty (and paternal uncer-
tainty) surfaced in a set of cases dealing with nonmarital parenthood,
which at the time was far less prevalent than it is today. In the 1960s
and 1970s, five to seventeen percent of all U.S. births were to unmarried
women.5 05 Today, that number is around forty percent.5 0 6 But, as this
Article has shown, the law deploys that logic to constrain the rights not
just of unmarried fathers, but also of same-sex couples, nonbiological
mothers, transgender individuals, and even biological mothers. The
constitutional doctrine relating to maternal certainty took shape around
a relatively exceptional case that was eventually mainstreamed.5 0
There is no reason to doubt that a similar process will play out with
family law's new maternity.
B. Legal Implications
Trickle-up maternity could impact the law in at least three interre-
lated ways: by expanding (or even eliminating) constitutional maternity;
by exposing as a stereotype the biological basis for maternal certainty;
and by pushing the law in more egalitarian directions that better align
with legal and cultural commitments to sex, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion equality.
. Expanding (or Eliminating) Constitutional Maternity. - Trickle-
up maternity could expand the constitutional mother to accommodate
mothers other than the monolithic and epistemologically obvious one
derived from unwed-father law. Those mothers might include inten-
tional mothers, nonbiological mothers, nongestational functional moth-
ers, and marital mothers. This Article does not define the exact param-
eters of this constitutional category;5 08 nor does it rank these mothers in
504 See supra Part III, pp. 2263-88.
505 SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 69, at 48 app. tbl.A-i.
506 Percentage of Births to Unmarried Mothers by State, supra note 7o.
507 For example, the defendant-employer in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes cited the page
of Nguyen that espouses maternal certainty when discussing whether "treating a person whose sex
is male as a man" constitutes sex stereotyping. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note ii, at 5
(citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001)). In this way, the logic of maternal certainty has
expanded far beyond the unwed-father cases.
50 Scholars recently have begun to outline the contours of constitutional parenthood in an era of
alternative reproduction and constitutional equality for same-sex families. For some examples, see
Higdon, supra note 36, at 15 24-40 (advocating a "twenty-first century" definition of constitutional
parenthood, id. at 1524, that is grounded in a combination of biology, intent, and function, but
rejecting federal constitutional protection for de facto or functional parents "absent biology and
intent," id. at 1538); NeJaime, supra note 47, at 275 (explaining the article's project as "building the
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order of importance,5 o or suggest that constitutional law ought to ex-
tend special protection to only one of them.5 10 Its argument, rather, is
that trickle-up maternity could expand the boundaries of constitutional
motherhood in a way that approximates family law's more capacious
maternity. A more capacious conception of constitutional maternity
could in turn benefit not just nontraditional mothers, including those
who establish maternal relationships through means other than biology
and birth, but also children, who have interests in maintaining bonds
with established caregivers regardless of how those caregivers become
parents.511
Of course, trickle-up maternity could push constitutional law to elim-
inate remaining distinctions between maternity and paternity entirely,
and to embrace instead a sex-neutral concept of constitutional
"parenthood."5 12 As this Article has argued, family law's new maternity
has already moved in this direction by bringing men and women closer
case for a liberty interest that includes nonbiological parent-child bonds'). I have previously advo-
cated an intent-based model for reproductive regulation. See Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived,
supra note 273, at 686 (arguing that the regulation of alternative and sexual reproduction ought to
"turn[] on intent rather than on procreative mechanics and on unreliable (and constitutionally ques-
tionable) criteria like sex and intimacy").
509 Some scholars have rejected the expansion of constitutional maternity beyond gestation and
birth, even in an era of alternative reproduction. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra note 19, at 473-75
(arguing that constitutional motherhood ought to flow from gestation regardless of genetic connec-
tion rather than from genetics alone).
510 Quite the contrary. As Part III demonstrated, the new maternity unfolding in the family law
domain draws from constitutional unwed-father doctrine to establish simultaneous legal rights in
two mothers. In so doing, the new maternity is reforming unwed-father doctrine's insistence that
constitutional parenthood cannot extend to two people of the same sex simultaneously. See Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 490 U.S. io, 11S (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the possibility of dual consti-
tutional fatherhood).
511 Recent scholarship argues that children have interests in maintaining relationships with es-
tablished caregivers regardless of whether those caregivers are parents. See Anne C. Dailey &
Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1487 (2018) (imagining and
proposing a "new law of the child" which, among other things, takes "children's broader interests
seriously" by "giving children greater access to important adults in their lives," regardless of whether
those adults are parents).
512 The idea that constitutional parenthood would be completely sex neutral is not so radical in
light of the fact that the Court has already struck down most gender classifications in the family
law domain as unconstitutional sex stereotypes. See, e.g., Naomi Mezey & Cornelia TL. Pillard,
Against the New Maternalism, u8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 230 (2012) (remarking that today's
"legal parent is ... sex-neutral" because of "[t]he official de-linking of presumptive parenting roles
from a parent's sex . . . in modern equal protection doctrine, statutory law, and common law"). This
Article agrees with Professor Naomi Mezey and Judge Pillard that many aspects of parenting law
are today sex neutral. Nevertheless, it argues that significant bodies of constitutional, statutory,
and common law remain wedded to the idea of inherent sex difference when it comes to pregnancy.
Moreover, those bodies of law insist on using ostensible pregnancy-based ifferences, like maternal
certainty, to justify differential treatment of men and women, fathers and mothers, biological and
nonbiological parents, and same-sex and opposite-sex families.
2294 [Vol. 133:2221
THE NEW MATERNITY
together in the law of parenthood. Family law shows that proof of ma-
ternity, like paternity, is often complicated, "difficult," 5 1 3 and nonobvi-
ous. In addition, family law shows that women, like men, can become
parents without becoming pregnant, and that women, like men, can be
related to their children not through gestation but rather through genet-
ics, function, and intent. Finally, family law shows that sometimes the
person who bears and births a child is not a woman at all. In all of
these ways, family law already provides a sex-neutral vision of consti-
tutional parenthood that might trickle up to unsettle many of the dis-
tinctions between motherhood and fatherhood that constitutional sex
equality law takes for granted.
2. Exposing Biology as a Stereotype. - Trickle-up maternity could
expose constitutional law's doctrine of "real" biological difference as a
stereotype. Part II of this Article argued that maternal certainty is a
biological rationale that often blurs into stereotypes about mothers, fa-
thers, and their relative caretaking capacities.514 This section argues
that maternal certainty is itself a stereotype because it rests on erroneous
factual assumptions about who is a mother (or pregnant person) in the
first place. On this reading, the new maternity shows that biological
rationales, even at their most biological, can be sex stereotypes.
The government engages in unconstitutional sex stereotyping when
it treats individual women and men on the basis of generalities. The
logic of maternal certainty does just that by assuming that all legal
mothers are present at birth - and that all mothers are the people who
give birth - because most mothers might be. Those statements have
never been an accurate reflection of reality, even when procreation was
exclusively sexual,5 15 but they are especially problematic today, now that
biological, social, and legal maternity can be unbundled in ways that
render some mothers more like some fathers. As with some fathers,
some mothers are not present at birth, and like paternal identity, mater-
nal identity is sometimes in question.
Whether factual assumptions are unconstitutional sex stereotypes de-
pends on whether those assumptions are correct today - not on whether
they were right fifty years ago. As the Morales-Santana Court stated,
sex classifications "must substantially serve an important governmental
interest today, for 'in interpreting the [e]qual [p]rotection [guarantee],
[we have] recognized that new insights and societal understandings can
513 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 269 (978) (plurality opinion).
514 See supra Part II, pp. 2253-63.




reveal unjustified inequality . .. that once passed unnoticed and unchal-
lenged."' 5 16 In Morales-Santana, the relevant "new insight" included
the fact that more fathers were involved in the raising and caretaking
of their children in 2017, when Morales-Santana was decided,5 17 than
in 1940, when Congress passed a sex-specific federal immigration law
that reflected the "once habitual, but now untenable,"5 1 assumption
that the "unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a nonmarital
child." 519
The relevant "new insight" unearthed by this Article is the fact that
maternity is today not as certain, obvious, and self-evident as constitu-
tional law assumes. Maternal certainty might have been true (or at least
more true) in the 1960s and 1970s, when maternal certainty first sur-
faced in constitutional law to justify sex discrimination. But maternal
certainty's factual assumptions increasingly border on "untenable" -
and unconstitutional - sex stereotypes in a world where maternity can
be as uncertain as paternity.
3. Pushing the Law in More Egalitarian Directions. - After trick-
ling up to dislodge constitutional law's paradigmatic mother, the new
maternity could trickle back down to destabilize the various bodies of
law that rely on maternal certainty to justify discrimination against a
range of actors, from transgender individuals to nonbiological mothers
to unwed fathers. In so doing, trickle-up maternity could have the effect
of channeling the law writ large to better conform to contemporary legal
and social commitments to sex, gender, and sexual orientation equality.
As for transgender discrimination, the new maternity ought to make
it harder for state and private actors to invoke constitutional law's cer-
tain and obvious mother to justify the legality of gender-identity dis-
crimination. Recall that opponents of transgender equality have argued
that transgender discrimination is not illegal sex discrimination because
transgender discrimination is based on sex, and sex, defined as maternal
certainty, is not a stereotype.5 20 Insofar as the new maternity shows that
maternal certainty is incorrect, it exposes one of the dominant arguments
in favor of transgender discrimination to be an unconstitutional sex ste-
reotype, defined by the Court as a refusal to respect exceptional cases.
Relatedly, the new maternity could also challenge other forms of
transgender and gender-identity discrimination that rely on the notion
516 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 16go (2017) (alterations and omission in original)
(quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)).
517 See id. at 1693 n.13.
518 Id. at 16go-gi.
519 Id. at 16gi.




of real biological difference between the sexes, including birth-certificate
misgendering and discrimination in sports.
As for family law, the new maternity could challenge the argument
that it is legal to discriminate on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, and
nonbiological parenthood in the application of the parental presumption
because of maternal certainty.5 21 It could also make it harder for the
law to automatically assume that mothers will shoulder more parenting
burdens than fathers because the mother is always present at birth. 5 2 2
In addition, the new maternity could unsettle laws that regulate alter-
native reproductive technologies in ways that reflect and reinscribe con-
stitutional law's paradigmatic mother, including laws that require ge-
netic maternity, but not genetic paternity, for surrogacy contracts to be
legal.523 Such laws appear willing to tolerate paternal uncertainty (in
the form of genetic nonrelatedness) but not a similar form of maternal
uncertainty, perhaps because they unthinkingly apply the presumed
norms of sexual reproduction, like maternal certainty (in a genetic
sense), to nonsexual reproduction.
Finally, trickle-up maternity could unsettle sex classifications in im-
migration law - including the biologically grounded classifications that
remain intact even after Morales-Santana .52 4 It could also decouple sex
and pregnancy in ways that resonate in other constitutional settings,
including in abortion law, which, as argued earlier, conflates pregnancy
and motherhood.5 2 5
C. Anticipated Objections
One anticipated objection to the vision of maternity endorsed here is
that constitutional maternity is right most of the time, since legal, social,
and biological maternity exist in one woman in most cases. Another
objection is that reforming constitutional maternity will devalue
women's reproductive labor. Yet a third objection (related in part to the
second) is that reforming constitutional maternity will threaten consti-
tutional protections for pregnancy by decoupling sex and pregnancy.
521 See supra p. 2262 (discussing the role that maternal certainty has played in cabining the ap-
plication of the parental presumption to traditional, heterosexual families).
522 See Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 839 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (making this
argument).
523 See supra pp. 2271-72 (discussing the requirement in most states that intended mothers, but
not intended fathers, have a genetic connection to a child born through surrogacy for the surrogacy
contract to be legal).
524 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing the continuing appeal of maternal
certainty even in Morales-Santana, which rejected the logic of maternal certainty as applied to
federal law's sex-specific duration-of-residency requirement).
525 See supra pp. 2258-59 (discussing abortion law's conflation of motherhood and pregnancy
and why that conflation is problematic).
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The first objection - that constitutional maternity is right most of
the time - underappreciates constitutional law's insistence that equal-
ity guarantees protect the exceptional case, not the state of affairs that
exists most of the time. Part II discussed the numerous cases that stand
for that proposition,5 26 reaffirmed most recently in Morales-Santana,
which recognized that "[o]verbroad generalizations . . . have a constrain-
ing impact, descriptive though they may be of the way many people still
order their lives."527 In this sense, Morales-Santana reversed the logic
of the late nineteenth-century sex discrimination case Bradwell v.
Illinois, 528 which rejected Myra Bradwell's claim that Illinois's refusal
to admit her to the state bar because she was a woman violated the
Constitution.529 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Bradley, applying
the separate-spheres ideology in vogue at the time, intoned that "the
rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of
things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases"5 s - exceptional
cases like Myra Bradwell,5 3 1 who wanted to be a lawyer rather than
simply "fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."5 32
Read through the lens of Bradwell, the web of laws and doctrines that
has taken shape around maternal certainty rests secure since maternal
certainty descriptively reflects "the general constitution of things"5 3 3 and
"the way [that] many people still" 5 34 become parents. But read through
the lens of Morales-Santana, that web is constitutionally vulnerable since
maternity is less monolithic - and less certain - than the logic of ma-
ternal certainty presumes.
The second objection - that reforming constitutional maternity
could devalue women's reproductive labor - assumes that constitu-
tional maternity today values women's reproductive labor. Whether
that is so is unclear. Constitutional maternity is less about valuing re-
productive labor per se and more about valuing the maternal certainty
that pregnancy supposedly guarantees. When the Court says that moth-
ers are inherently different from fathers because women birth children
and men do not, the Court is ultimately privileging the fact that birth
means that we know who the mother is, not necessarily the fact that
526 See supra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
527 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017) (emphasis added).
528 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
529 Id. at 130, 138-39.
530 Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment).
531 This Article is not conceding that Myra Bradwell was an exceptional case in desiring to be-
come a member of the bar, but rather that the Court regarded her as being such a case.
532 Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment).
533 Id. at 142.
534 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017).
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birth means the woman invested valuable reproductive labor.5 3 5 Put
differently, constitutional maternity's paramount concern has always
been about identifying who the mother is, not about rewarding her for
gestation. If that is right, then it is hard to see how reforming constitu-
tional maternity by opening that category up to different kinds of moth-
ers will take something away from women that the Constitution cur-
rently gives them.
The third objection - that constitutional maternity will threaten
constitutional protections for pregnancy by decoupling sex and preg-
nancy5 3 6 - assumes that constitutional law currently views pregnancy
as a formal matter as a form of sex inequality. But in 1974, the Court
in Geduldig v. Aiello53 held that pregnancy classifications were not re-
viewable sex classifications under the Equal Protection Clause unless an
invidious intent to discriminate on the basis of sex could be shown.5 38
Despite Geduldig's tortured logic,5 s and despite the fact that later
Supreme Court decisions - and federal statutory developments - have
chipped away at that logic, 5 40 Geduldig technically remains good law.
535 For instance, the Nguyen Court upheld the provision of immigration law at issue there for
two reasons: first, because birth meant that the mother could be accurately identified; and second,
because birth gave the mother an opportunity to create a meaningful connection with her child -
meaningful enough to confer United States citizenship upon that child. See Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 62-65 (2001). On this view, women are rewarded (to the extent that we view that provision
as benefitting rather than burdening women) not for their gestational abor but rather for a post-
birth relationship that maternal certainty ostensibly makes possible. See Hendricks, supra note 19,
at 469 (observing that the Nguyen majority upheld the law because it "ensured an 'opportunity' for
a meaningful relationship, which the mother satisfied by her necessary 'presence at the birth,' as
opposed to the certainty of her relationship with the child through gestation and birth" (citing Nguyen,
533 U.S. at 64-68)). Even in earlier unwed-father decisions, it was not always clear whether the
Court valued pregnancy because of gestation or because of the maternal identification ostensibly
made possible by birth. See supra note 358 (arguing that Lehr v. Robertson, which justifies sex-
specific parental rules on the ground that a mother's "parental relationship is clear," 463 U.S. 248,
260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)), is
itself unclear as to the precise meaning of "parental relationship").
536 This objection might also be framed as a fear about "neutralizing" or "degendering" preg-
nancy. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIALVII L. REV. 653, 655
(1992) (criticizing "the liberal legal feminist notion that Mother is an institution which must be
reformed - that is, contained and neutralized").
537 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
538 Id. at 496-97, 496 n.20.
539 The Geduldig Court held that pregnancy discrimination did not constitute facial sex discrim-
ination because pregnancy classifications distinguished between pregnant and nonpregnant people,
not between men and women. See id. at 496 n.20. In 1976, the Court extended Geduldig's logic to
Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that pregnancy discrim-
ination was not impermissible sex discrimination under federal law. See id. at 133-40.
540 Congress overruled Geduldig with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)), which provides that discrim-
ination "'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex"' under Title VII includes discrimination "because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." Id. As for Geduldig's
view of pregnancy classifications under the Constitution, some scholars argue that the Court recog-
nized in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), that pregnancy
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In addition, even when the Court has associated pregnancy with
women specifically, it has done so to justify sex discrimination, as Part
I's review of the Court's illegitimacy and unwed-father decisions
demonstrates.5 4 1 Indeed, while resisting seeing pregnancy discrimina-
tion as a kind of sex discrimination, the Court has invoked pregnancy
as a reason to uphold sex classifications that reflect and reproduce sex-
role stereotypes.5 4 2 As Professor Katharine Bartlett argued shortly after
Geduldig was decided, "[tihat women may and do become pregnant is
the most significant single factor used to justify the countless laws and
practices that have disadvantaged women for centuries."543 On this
view, the tethering of sex to pregnancy has not always helped women;
in fact, it might actually have harmed them by making it easier for the
state to justify a range of sex stereotypes - and asymmetrical caretaking
responsibilities544 - on the purported logic of biological difference and
reproductive uniqueness.545
classifications constitute impermissible sex discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment when
they reflect and reproduce sex stereotypes about men and women and their relative caretaking
responsibilities. See Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to
Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1892 (2006) (reading Hibbs as alterna-
tively "limiting Geduldig sub silentio" or clarifying it).
541 See supra pp. 2234-39.
542 In addition to the illegitimacy and unwed-father decisions reviewed in Part I, see also Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (ig8), which cited to pregnancy as an inherent biological dif-
ference between men and women when upholding California's sex-specific statutory rape law as
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 469-73 (plurality opinion). For schol-
arly recognition of this phenomenon - the Court's reading of pregnancy as sex neutral in one
context (pregnancy classifications) and as sex relevant in another (sex classifications) - see Franklin,
supra note 136, at i8o, where the author observes that after Geduldig, "when the government urned
around and defended sex classifications by reference to pregnancy, the Court . . . concluded that
pregnancy was an 'inherent difference' between men and women that could justify their differential
treatment." Franklin notes that "[d]espite the apparent tension between these approaches, they are
consistent in one respect: in both circumstances, the Court steps back and allows the state greater
leeway to regulate because pregnancy is involved." Id.
543 Katharine T Bartlett, Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1532 (1974).
544 See, e.g., Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 839 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (justifying
different rules for determining mothers versus fathers on the "genuinely differentiating characteris-
tic[]" of the mother "usually [being] the child's primary caregiver during the infant's first weeks of
life" and the fact that "the identity of the mother is rarely, if ever, in question" (first quoting Rose v.
Stokely, 673 N.W.2d 413, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); and then citing LAF v. BJF (In re RFF), 617
N.W.2d 745, 756 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000))).
545 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 543, at 1536 (observing that Geduldig found that "because preg-
nancy is 'an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics,' a classification
based on pregnancy is not sex-based" (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974);
Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, supra note 45, at 956 (pushing back on the argument that severing
sex and pregnancy will frustrate constitutional protection for women by observing that "[i]f the law
defines women as a class by their capacity to become pregnant, then this capacity appears to be a
legitimate basis for discrimination against women").
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Furthermore, decoupling sex and pregnancy as a formal matter -
something that the 2017 UPA gestures toward546 and that a few states
have already done by legally recognizing gestational fathers as males5 47
- does not foreclose "more substantive arguments linking pregnancy
discrimination to sex."5 48 As Professor Reva Siegel has argued, in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,549 the Court linked
pregnancy and sex inequality by focusing not on the formal association
between sex and pregnancy, but rather on the way in which pregnancy
regulation perpetuates unconstitutional stereotypes.55 0 On this reading,
it is possible to decouple sex and pregnancy as a formal matter and still
preserve space for arguing that pregnancy regulation is unconstitutional
sex discrimination when it enforces grossly simplistic assumptions about
men and women and their relative positions in domestic and public life.
CONCLUSION
Real differences in parenthood are fading, yet constitutional law con-
tinues to give them effect in ways that burden many: unwed biological
fathers, same-sex couples, nonbiological mothers, biological mothers,
and transgender individuals. All of these constituencies are touched by
constitutional law's long-standing assumption that mothers and fathers
are inherently different in a variety of ways relating to reproduction,
sex, gender, and the family. That assumption limits their ability to be-
come parents. It determines how they ought to parent. At its most
extreme, it frustrates their expression of sex and gender identity.
Considerable attention has been paid in the law - and in culture
more generally - to the "elusive" and uncertain father.55 1 For decades,
546 See supra section III.B, pp. 2 282-84.
547 See supra pp. 2286-88.
548 Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, supra note 45, at 956. One such substantive argument is
"that in practice, discrimination based on pregnancy drives women's inequality." Id. Others are
"that [pregnancy discrimination] is based on the assumption that all workers meet a traditionally
male norm," and that pregnancy discrimination "is a thinly veiled attempt to exclude women from
the workplace." Id.
549 538 U.S. 721 (2003); see id. at 735-37 (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act as applied
to government actors as a valid exercise of Congress's enforcement power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
550 See Siegel, supra note 540, at 1892 (observing that Hibbs established that "legislative classifi-
cation concerning pregnancy is sex-based state action within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause" when it "reflect[s] sex-role typing and [is] not attributable to reproductive physiology
alone"); see also id. at 1893 ('Hibbs treats classifications concerning pregnancy that reflect sex ste-
reotypes as sex-based state action within the meaning of the exception reserved in Geduldig.").
551 See generally MILANICH, supra note i; Carl Zimmer, Fathered by the Mailman? It's Mostly
an Urban Legend, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2Q16), https://nyti.ms/iqc6mxr [https://perma.cc/2BK2-
C6Vg] (observing that "[u]ncertainty over paternity" is a cultural obsession that "goes back a long
way in literature[, as e]ven Shakespeare and Chaucer cracked wise about cuckolds, who were often
depicted wearing horns"). For an overview of the role that the trope of uncertain fatherhood, in the
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Sophocles's myth of uncertain paternity and its tragic consequences has
inspired legal debates over the practices of alternative reproduction and
the kind of family that they facilitate.552 The notion of a similarly "elu-
sive" and uncertain mother seems by comparison impossible to imagine,
wedded as law and culture are to the idea that maternity, unlike pater-
nity, is a matter of incontestable fact.5 5 3 Ours is a law of the uncertain
father, not a law of the uncertain mother.
Constitutional law both reflects and reproduces this idea. Histori-
cally, complicated "[q]uestions of motherhood never arose"5 5 4 in the law
- including in constitutional law - and that tradition continues to res-
onate today in constitutional motherhood. Indeed, to the extent hat the
Court "has offered any guidance on the broader topic of constitutional
parenthood," it has only occurred "within the nonmarital, biological fa-
ther context."5 55 Constitutional law's understanding of maternity looks
more like maternity as described by the Tennessee Supreme Court,
which observed that Tennessee law "employ[s] the term 'mother' in a
way that assumes we already know who the 'mother' is."556 Motherhood,
on this view, bears no explanation.5 57
This Article has made visible a law of the multidimensional mother,
one obscured by constitutional maternity's insistence on singular and
monolithic motherhood. It has also imagined what the implications of
the new maternity would be for constitutional law. The idea that the
new maternity could trickle up to unsettle constitutional maternity is
context of the incest taboo, has played in literature, culture, psychoanalysis, and the law, see Cahill,
supra note 61, at 2 14-26.
552 In the relatively early days of alternative insemination, commentators stoked Oedipal fears
by warning that anonymous sperm donation would lead to accidental incest. See Martin Curie-
Cohen, The Frequency of Consanguineous Matings Due to Multiple Use of Donors in Artificial
Insemination, 32 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 589, 590 (1g8). More recently, the incest taboo has
emerged as a reason to ban human reproductive cloning and to require non-anonymity in gamete
donation. See LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING I7-ig
(1998) (comparing cloning and incest); Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for
Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH I, 3 (2008) (advocating donor non-anonymity
to prevent accidental incest between related individuals). Oedipal fears have also emerged in dis-
cussions about women raising children either alone or together in a same-sex relationship. See
Cahill, supra note 61, at 226-37. In either case, commentators anxious about fatherless families
have raised the specter of incest specifically and of the familial dysfunction associated with viola-
tions of the incest taboo more generally. See id. Given the power of the Oedipus myth (in literature,
psychoanalysis, and law) as the paradigmatic case of paternal uncertainty, it is important to keep
in mind that Sophocles's tale is equally one of paternal and maternal uncertainty.
5s3 See MILANICH, supra note i, at 3, 12, 14.
554 Higdon, supra note 36, at 1493.
555 Id. at 1486.
556 In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3 d 714, 723 (Tenn. 2005). In that case, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that a woman who gave birth to triplets was their legal mother even though she lacked a
genetic relationship to them. See id. at 7 16-17.
5s7 In this sense, constitutional maternity is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's approach to ob-
scenity before Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 1s (1973), clarified its definition. See Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing pornography as something "I know ...
when I see it").
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not necessarily radical - that project has been unfolding in state courts
for years. Its consolidation in constitutional law, however, would have
meaningful consequences, both within and far beyond the law of
parenthood.
